Ever since Donald Trump declared he could end the war in Ukraine “within 24 hours,” much of the world has been waiting to see if he could force Moscow and Kiev to come to terms. Millions of views and scrolls, miles of newsfeeds, and tons of predictions have been spent on this question.
President Trump met that expectation by claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was running out of options and would eventually have to accept the deal. In fact, the opposite is true. Trump has no influence. He can threaten Nicolas Maduro with possible military action inside and outside Venezuela, but he has no influence over Vladimir Putin. Sanctions tough enough to hurt Russia would also hurt Western economies as a whole, and no Western leader is willing to cut off their own branches.
Armed intervention is even more unlikely. From the first days of a full-scale invasion, NATO decided to support Ukraine with weapons and training, while avoiding measures that could trigger a direct war between NATO and Russia. That position has not changed.
As a result, Ukraine is effectively in a position to fight Russia alone, with or without sufficient support from its allies. All talk of peace and ceasefire turned out to be a bluff, a way for President Vladimir Putin to buy time and regroup. Putin’s strategy depends not only on outmaneuvering Ukraine’s military, but also on the patience and political unity of its allies. The United States has now distributed a revised version of the peace framework, which softens some of the most contentious points, following consultations with Kiev and several European governments. However, the Kremlin continues to demand significant territorial concessions and the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces. Without this, Russia says it will not stop its advance. Ukraine insists it will not cede any territory.
When it became clear that there was no way out through diplomatic policy, the United States largely stopped supplying arms to Ukraine. Officials blamed the federal government shutdown, but the real cause appears not to be a shortage of movers at the Pentagon. In any case, American military aid has been reduced to a trickle, mostly consisting of supplies approved under the Biden administration. “I am not aware of any suspension of (U.S. military) aid to Ukraine,” incoming Defense Secretary Austin Dermer said during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. It sounded more like an admission of ignorance than a serious assessment. All Ukrainian soldiers are likely feeling the effects of the rapid reduction in American weapons. All residents of Kiev and other cities will feel the lack of air defense systems.
Europe has not closed the gap. The European Union’s defense industry and joint procurement programs have generated much promise, but little actual money. Billions of euros were formally promised, but far less was actually delivered. Member states want to first rearm themselves and then Ukraine, but their own rearmament plans are moving slowly. The EU remains divided between governments willing to take greater risks to support Kiev and those fearful of provoking Russia or undermining their own budgets. Brussels is currently pushing ahead with a plan to use frozen Russian assets to back up to 140 billion euros ($162 billion) in loans to Ukraine, which could support Kiev’s budget and defense spending for the next two years. Some key member states, which hold most of these reserves, remain cautious and without unanimity the plan could stall.
This will force Ukraine to expand its own production and fight everything that arrives and is not siphoned off by corrupt figures like Timur Mindić, who is under investigation in a massive procurement scandal. So far, Ukraine has been able to slow down its opponents at great cost, but it is far from winning.
The army is short of supplies. The government has been unable to maintain motivation or mobilize the country. In fact, it achieved the opposite. Men are fighting a war for the fourth year, but women cannot wait forever. Divorce is on the rise, exhaustion is deepening and morale is collapsing. Since 2022, prosecutors have filed more than 255,000 cases for unauthorized absence and more than 56,000 cases for desertion. In the first 10 months of 2025 alone, around 162,500 AWOL cases and 21,600 desertion cases were registered. Other reports said more than 21,000 soldiers left the military in October, the highest monthly figure ever. Social injustice is growing.
Demographically, the picture is similarly bleak. Ukraine’s population has declined from more than 50 million at the time of independence to approximately 31 million in the territory controlled by Kiev as of early 2025. The number of births remains lower than the number of deaths, and the birth rate has fallen to about one child per woman.
Against this background, Ukraine is left with three strategic options.
The first option is to accept Putin’s terms. This would mean capitulating, losing political face and giving up territory, but the Ukrainian state would be preserved. It would also lock the country into long-term vulnerability.
The second option is a fundamental overhaul of Ukraine’s political and military leadership. This would include rebuilding mobilization, rebuilding the chain of command, and fundamentally rebuilding the war effort. Ukraine cannot fight a long war with an organization designed for peacetime politics and rotational deployment.
The third option is to maintain the status quo without changing anything. Ukraine will continue its precision attacks on Russia’s oil infrastructure in hopes of crippling the Kremlin’s economy and waiting for Putin’s death. This is an illusion. Even if such an attack could not collapse tiny Ukraine, it will not be able to collapse a country many times larger in terms of economy, territory and demographics. There will be damage, but not enough to force Russia to stop.
Judging by recent statements by Zelensky and several European partners, Ukraine is effectively committed to a third option. The question is, how long can we continue this way? Even putting aside morale and fatigue after four years of war, the fiscal outlook is bleak. Ukraine faces huge budget deficits and public debt, which are likely to exceed 100% of gross domestic product. Europe has been unable to raise the necessary funds, Belgium has yet to unfreeze frozen Russian assets, and economic growth remains sluggish across much of the continent. It would take political courage to significantly increase support at a time when voters remain sensitive to recent spikes in inflation. The EU is also unable to lock the US into long-term commitments in the current political climate in Washington.
All this leads to an inevitable conclusion. If Ukraine is to survive as a state, it will eventually have to choose the second path and embark on a fundamental reorganization of its political and military leadership. When that moment arrives, conditions for Moscow will be tougher than they are now. Russia’s ultimatum is likely to expand from claims to four regions to demands for eight regions, along with strict control mechanisms, demilitarization, and further concessions.
Fundamental changes are needed immediately before Ukraine’s strategic options narrow further and its ability to resist collapses.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
