The Trump administration is currently deciding what the future of Ukraine, and by extension Europe, will be in terms of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security. Washington is aiming to strike a deal to end the all-out war that Russia launched in February 2022 and waged by Russian President Vladimir Putin against Ukraine, even if it means abandoning long-standing international principles that prohibit recognition of territory acquired through military occupation.
But for broader Europe, and the European Union in particular, there is much more at stake than these principles, which Washington has rarely prioritized in its own foreign policy.
Deterring President Putin’s further aggression and ensuring Ukraine’s political and economic stability are at the heart of Ukraine’s security and political concerns. If neither can be achieved, resolving the conflict will endanger the long-term security of the bloc itself.
Of course, all of this must be managed while ensuring that the Trump administration itself does not once again question its commitment to NATO’s security infrastructure and further jeopardize European security. However, Europe is already beginning to realize these concerns, albeit belatedly. By last year, 23 NATO members had spent a target of 2% of GDP on defense, and the alliance agreed to a new goal of raising core defense spending to at least 3.5% of GDP by 2035, and spending up to 1.5% of GDP on critical infrastructure and expanding the defense industrial base.
More quickly, Europe has surpassed the United States in total military aid to Ukraine for the first time since June 2022, with 72 billion euros ($83.6 billion) allocated by the end of April, compared to the U.S. government’s 65 billion euros ($75.5 billion), according to the Ukraine Support Tracker.
But whatever the outcome of the Trump administration’s efforts to force Ukraine into a negotiating position that Putin might accept, increased European support will not be enough to offset the stalled U.S. funding. Military aid is only part of the picture. Kyiv also relies on financial aid from Western countries to ensure the continued functioning of the government. And as Russian attacks and air raids continue, reconstruction costs continue to mount. In February, the World Bank estimated its size at $524 billion (506 billion euros), equivalent to about 280% of Kyiv’s GDP in 2024.
Without dramatic action, Europe risks being left to Trump’s whims regarding its future security, despite bowing to Trump’s demands not only on NATO spending and military aid to Ukraine, but also on trade through a deal that significantly increases average US tariffs on imports from the EU and the UK.
However, there are clear policy choices that Europe can make to further deter Putin while ensuring adequate financial support for Kiev in the coming years and shaping the outcome of the conflict resolution.
The European Union and the United Kingdom could move to confiscate Russian sovereign funds frozen in their jurisdictions from 2022 onwards. Most importantly, it could seize 185 billion euros ($214.8 billion) frozen at Belgium-based clearing house Euroclear. Most of it is currently in cash, so it can be quickly deployed or reinvested. Additionally, Russian government funds frozen at Luxembourg-based Euroclear will also be seized. The deal with rival Clearstream is estimated at around 20 billion euros ($23.2 billion).
Europe is not unaware of this possibility and has in fact been discussing doing so for several months. Euroclear’s assets are already being used to back a $50 billion (€43 billion) loan to Ukraine, completed in January 2025, which is secured by the proceeds from these assets.
Europe was expected to move forward with plans to create new asset-backed loans worth 140 billion euros ($162.6 billion) at the European Council meeting on December 18-19, after deferring a final decision at the previous council meeting on October 23. The delay is largely due to the stubbornness of the Belgian government, which has supported the Kremlin’s claims while demanding compensation from European countries. Such a move would be unprecedented.
But there is ample precedent. German and Japanese government assets were confiscated by the United States during World War II. In the latter case, Japanese assets were also frozen prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, much of which was later retained under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty.
The Kremlin’s threat to lock up Belgium in a decades-long lawsuit is also exaggerated. They rely on pre-Soviet bilateral investment agreements, which Putin and his proxies have already been unable to successfully invoke to unfreeze assets or challenge past sanctions. Additionally, European courts have dozens of unresolved claims against Russia worth tens of billions of dollars, including an arbitration award of about 13 billion euros (about $15 billion) won by energy company Uniper against Gazprom in 2022 for disrupting gas supplies. The largest and most important case remains the 2014 ruling against former Yukos shareholders over the Kremlin’s takeover of the company. The ruling survived all appeals. In October 2025, the Dutch Supreme Court rejected Russia’s final challenge, confirming that the award, currently worth more than $65 billion including interest, is final and enforceable against Russian state assets worldwide. However, enforcement remains dependent on courts identifying suitable Russian assets that they are willing and able to seize.
The Kremlin will no doubt engage in legal proceedings and litigation over these disputes, as it has repeatedly done throughout Putin’s presidency. But we will lose, and we will pay a price if our national interests are at stake. Russia has repeatedly complied with adverse rulings when critical access to Western markets or assets is at stake. The only clear example of the West or Russia returning unpaid funds as a result of litigation arising from Russia’s wars is the settlement paid by Russian state insurance company NSK and airline Aeroflot over President Vladimir Putin’s seizure of aircraft leased from Western companies in 2022.
There is no excuse for Europe’s delay in action to date. Each month of inaction increases Europe’s financial burden and increases the likelihood that Washington will strike deals that ignore Europe’s interests. The issue has now become an important issue. The question is how to ensure Ukraine’s continued funding and ability to maintain its defense. It is also all the more important for Europe to act before the Trump administration tries to reach an agreement with the Kremlin over its head.
The 28-point “peace plan” drawn up by Kremlin insiders and signed last month by Trump’s special envoy and longtime ally Steve Witkoff includes carving out these same frozen funds and even requiring Europe itself to provide an additional $100 billion, as well as diverting frozen Russian assets from rebuilding Ukraine and directly imposing an additional financial burden on Europe. Such an agreement would subject Europe to even larger bills if the Kremlin fails to honor its commitments, as was the case with ceasefire agreements signed in 2014 and 2015 after the Kremlin first invaded Ukraine.
Europe has leverage to advance political, economic and military security in negotiations over Ukraine’s future, and it must not be afraid to use it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
