Military advances by Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces in southern Yemen mark an important turning point in the country’s political and military conflict.
The latest fighting is between the STC and Yemen’s internationally recognized government, known as the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) and led by Rashad al-Alimi. The irony here is that the STC, led by Aidars al-Zubaidi, is also a member of the Yemeni PLC. However, the relationship between the two groups is unstable and sometimes chaotic.
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The Yemeni government has condemned the STC’s recent military advances and land grabs across the south, labeling the group as separatists and calling their actions “unilateral and a blatant violation of the transitional framework.”
On the ground, STC forces have completed control of the remaining southern provinces, furthering the group’s efforts to revive its decades-old desire to establish an independent state in southern Yemen.
Battle of Hadramout
Recent rapid developments are redrawing Yemen’s map of control and could further impact its future as a strong, coherent and unified country.
The fall of Hadramawt last week was seen as a sudden and shocking development, but it came after a long period of tension in the oil-rich province. The Yemeni government has remained more on the sidelines, stationing some military brigades in camps in Hadramaut and Al-Mahra governorates. Local and tribal agents competed for control and influence while allying themselves with regional states.
Utilizing superior military equipment and large numbers of troops, the STC advanced almost invincibly, overtaking Hadramawt and al-Mahra.
Government forces lacked modern weapons, sufficient manpower, and perhaps the will to fight.
The fall of Hadramawt was extremely important and assumed even greater importance to many Yemeni politicians given the special local and regional status of this governorate. This dealt a final blow to the elements of Yemeni unity and the legitimacy of the government, dashing all bets that Hadramawt would not fall into the hands of STC forces.
Both the incoming STC forces and government and local tribal fighters had their own alliances and allegiances to competing regional powers, with connections and allegiances to Hadramawt tribal leaders, politicians, and local actors.
Why is Hadramout important?
Hadramawt is an important and essential governorate in Yemen, covering more than one-third of the country’s area, approximately 200,000 square kilometers (77,000 square miles), and has a population of approximately 2 million people.
It accounts for the largest share of Yemen’s oil resources and contains the most important oil fields and export terminals. Additionally, it is home to Yemeni and Arab Gulf businessmen and a cradle of cultural and historical wealth. In other words, Hadramawt was a Yemeni province with the elements of a full-fledged state, and its residents hoped to establish a Hadrami state that would restore its past glory and be far removed from the political and military conflicts that engulfed other Yemeni provinces.
Hadramout Governorate has always had a unique political and administrative character throughout all eras and political systems, especially during the socialist regime that ruled the south from the early 1970s until 1990, when Yemen’s two parts, north and south, were unified.
This unique character continued under the unified state, as Hadramawt continued to be ruled by its own people and refused to accept officials from outside its geographical boundaries. As a result, the people of Hadramawt consider the STC’s domination to be an unprecedented occupation, which is unacceptable to them, given that most of the STC’s leaders are from the frontier provinces of Raj and Dahle. The stability and continuity of the STC’s authority in the province is therefore questionable, as the group lacks local and national support.
“Divorce with no reward”
These effects will undoubtedly cast a shadow on Yemen’s eight-member People’s Liberation Army, led by Rashad al-Alimi, who was expelled from the presidential palace in Aden’s al-Masik district along with his ministers and bodyguards.
Many considered this a “divorce without reward” and a disastrous end to all previous understandings and agreements aimed at maintaining a political order based on common principles that did no harm to any of the parties.
In light of these developments, the legitimate government currently controls only small tracts of land in Taiz and Marib provinces.
However, Marib is already surrounded by Houthi forces from the north and STC forces from the south. The Houthis are an Iranian-backed group that controls the capital and northern and northwest Yemen. Taiz is besieged by the Houthis from the north and by the forces of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, son of ousted Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, from the east.
It is not unlikely that these areas will fall into the hands of one of these two powerful political parties at any time. If that happens, Yemen’s legitimate government will be nothing more than a piece of paper, even though it has had virtually no influence on the ground since the rise of the STC forces and the expansion of the Houthis.
The unattainable desire of the South to secede
As political sociologist Fairouz al-Wali says, despite its military control on the ground, the STC does not have the authority to declare southern independence. This is because this decision rests not with the STC but with external regional powers with deep interests in southern Yemen.
He pointed out that the path to a southern state would not pass through the gates of Aden’s Maasik Palace, but through the United Nations Security Council, where regional powers could play a pivotal role.
There is also a recognition that it will be difficult for the STC to declare independence, at least in the foreseeable future, due to the lack of essential resources to fund the budget of an emerging state that does not have even the most basic elements of sustainability. Such a nation would inherit an empty treasury from a country exhausted by more than a decade of war.
In addition to economic, security, and military challenges and a lack of public services, the southern state envisioned by the STC would face conflicts with neighboring powers and other countries that do not want Yemen to break up into belligerent mini-states. This would create a volatile security situation and have dire consequences for the entire region.
