Exactly 15 years ago, Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia sparked unprecedented pan-Arab protests demonstrating the overwhelming desire of Arabs for a more democratic form of government.
In extraordinary scenes, millions of protesters across several countries rallied against authoritarian leaders who have held power for decades, challenging a political system defined by repression, corruption and exclusion.
Demonstrators’ grievances centered around centralized power structures that breed corruption and injustice and concentrate wealth in the hands of a relatively small number of people. What followed was not just a regional uprising, but a historic demand for dignity, responsibility, and democratic governance.
As expected, the regime responded with heavy-handed tactics, and scores of demonstrators were killed, beaten, and arrested.
However, the democracy movement had great early successes.
Within months, all four long-time dictators were overthrown: Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh.
In a few countries, including Bahrain, Algeria, and Iraq, regimes have successfully quelled protests, ending them before they could become serious.
Protest movements in other countries have resulted in limited reforms, and in the case of Syria, there has been no immediate change of government, resulting in a prolonged civil war.
Like Syria, Libya and Yemen eventually descended into violent conflict.
Egypt and Tunisia were the only countries with significant long-term successes in the Arab Spring, with both countries quickly overthrowing dictators and beginning transitions to democracy almost immediately.
Although results were mixed, observers generally praised the Arab Spring as a moment of revolutionary democracy for a region long under oppression. But 15 years later, while popular demands for democracy persist, it is clear that authoritarian regimes have learned how to ensure that such uprisings never succeed again.
Examples of Egypt and Tunisia
In both Egypt and Tunisia, the transition to democracy initially appeared to be taking hold. A constituent assembly was established, a new constitution was drafted, new political parties and media organizations were established, and new political leaders were elected.
Importantly, in both countries political parties formed by the Muslim Brotherhood, which has long been well-organized in many parts of the region, rapidly gained influence.
While some observers view the political rise and influence of centrist Islamists as benign or even positive, others argue that it poses problems.
Setting aside debates about the potential strengths and weaknesses of political Islam, both Egypt and Tunisia were initially seen as hopeful models for Arab democratic change precisely because they suggested that authoritarianism was not an Arab inevitability.
Although both countries’ transitions were fraught with serious challenges and sometimes outright crises, both countries demonstrated that modern Arab societies can build democratic systems, even if imperfect and fragile.
Perhaps more importantly, the examples of Egypt and Tunisia showed that the Arab population is committed to democracy, with election turnout in both countries comparable to that of some established Western democracies.
But looks and turnout were at least partially deceiving, especially in the case of Egypt. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and its representatives won referendums and elections, including the presidency, but never truly took power.
Egypt’s “deep state” (military, police, intelligence, judiciary, and media) never completely retreated from the political scene.
The former regime succeeded in blocking the two elected parliaments and then collaborated with anti-Islamist Egyptian liberals in the summer of 2013 to overthrow Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Mursi.
Egypt’s 2013 coup was a complete reversal of democracy, a return to the pre-2011 status quo, and perhaps even more tyrannical.
Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, Morsi’s defense minister, rapidly consolidated his power. He oversaw mass murders, mass arrests, banning of political parties, media shutdowns, sham elections, and ultimately an overhaul of Egypt’s legal and political framework.
Experts have convincingly argued that the authoritarian regime Mr. El-Sissi has created is even more despotic than Mr. Mubarak’s.
Tunisia’s flirtation with democracy lasted longer than Egypt’s, but it ultimately suffered similar setbacks.
In 2014, Tunisia adopted a new constitution and elected its first democratic president, Beji Caid Essebsi.
However, the election of new president Kais Saied in 2019 marked the beginning of the end for Tunisia’s democratic experiment.
In July 2021, nearly two years after taking office, Saied asserted emergency powers, sacking the prime minister and proroguing parliament, overthrowing Tunisia’s nascent democracy.
Since then, Said has further consolidated his power.
lessons learned
It is clear that the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia have learned at least one thing from the pro-democracy protests of 2010-2011. That is, their dictatorship was not authoritarian enough.
In both countries, political and legal frameworks are being carefully redesigned to prevent civil disobedience of the kind witnessed 15 years ago.
The slightest protest or opposition will not be tolerated.
In Egypt, for example, a 2013 protest law bans public demonstrations. The 2015 Terrorism Act considers any act of “threat” that “undermines national unity,” “disturbs public order,” or “obstructs public institutions from carrying out their duties” to be an act of terrorism.
Egypt’s military government since 2013 has also shown that it will not leave any elections to chance.
The government orchestrated a sham election, passed an electoral law guaranteeing parliamentary loyalty to the president, and amended the constitution to extend El-Sissi’s rule until 2030.
As rifts emerged and opposition figures were allowed to run for president, El-Sissi used his power grab to arrest or permanently banish them.
Experts have noted how closely Tunisia’s Saied is following in El-Sissi’s footsteps.
Mr. Said has not established Mr. Sisi’s level of repression in Tunisia, but like his counterpart in Egypt, he has rewritten the constitution, expanding presidential powers and removing checks and balances.
Data collected by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index shows that Tunisia has regressed to pre-Arab Spring levels in many political and economic indicators.
cracks in the system
Fifteen years after the Arab Spring, the underlying issues that sparked the protests – corruption, injustice, and economic hardship – still exist, and are perhaps more pressing now than they were then.
Arab countries have by far the lowest scores on the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with many ranking near the bottom of global rankings, and countries remain mired in injustice.
For example, of the 21 Arab countries recently evaluated by Freedom House, not one was rated as “free.” And of the nine Arab countries assessed in 2025 as part of the Global Justice Project Rule of Law Index, most are near the bottom of the global rankings.
Importantly, despite the Gulf states, the Arab region as a whole continues to experience economic hardship.
According to the World Bank, per capita gross domestic product (GDP) remains extremely low in most countries outside the Gulf, and the United Nations says food insecurity and hunger remain serious problems in many parts of the region.
The economic problems in Egypt and Tunisia are indicative of many other parts of the region.
In Egypt, the military’s economic empire and inequality have widened since the 2011 uprising, while inflation and poverty have increased.
Meanwhile, Tunisia’s economy is also in recession.
A recent report from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said Said’s economic approach led to “lower real wages and higher unemployment,” as well as a significant increase in domestic debt and a “collapse in (economic) growth.”
Democracy: The elephant in the room
Perhaps most worrying for Arab regimes is that the population continues to overwhelmingly desire democratic government.
According to the Arab Public Opinion Index, more than 70 percent of Arab respondents support democracy, while only 19 percent disapprove.
The survey results also suggest that Arab citizens have a negative assessment of their country’s level of democracy. We tend to associate democracy with freedom, equality, and justice. I have a positive view of the Arab Spring.
A recent Arab Barometer poll suggests similar results.
Arab Spring is not over
In December 2024, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was overthrown and forced into exile, nearly 14 years after the uprising against him began.
This disaster, perhaps more than anything else, showed that analysts may have been premature in declaring the Arab Spring over.
The recent Gen Z protests in Morocco provide further evidence that many Arabs, especially young people, are capable, willing and ready to fight for change.
Therefore, it may only be a matter of time before it reaches a boiling point and protests start again.
Governments know the risks are real. El-Sissi’s regime in Egypt once again provides a useful example.
In recent years, President El-Sissi has been forced to repeatedly warn Egyptians against protests.
In a public appearance several years ago, he said a repeat of the 2011 uprising “will never happen again” in Egypt.
The paranoia is real—Egypt’s deep state seems unwilling to take chances by opening up the political arena.
The regime has recently unleashed a widespread election fraud program and reportedly aims to extend Sisi’s government indefinitely.
Not content with eliminating domestic opposition, the Egyptian government has also sought to thwart opposition abroad.
The regime is trying to shut down opposition media outlets based outside Egypt and demanding the extradition of popular opposition figures.
Earlier this year, young Egyptian Anas Habib organized a peaceful protest at the Egyptian embassy in The Hague.
In response, Egypt’s foreign minister called on local embassy officials to detain and arrest the protesters. In an apparent act of retaliation, Egyptian authorities arrested Mr. Habib’s elderly uncle in Egypt.
Beyond Egypt, Arab countries have recently begun to increase domestic security cooperation, with governments actively seeking individuals wanted in other countries for extradition.
These extreme actions highlight the paranoia, and the Arab regimes seem to understand that this is a break in the Arab Spring, not the finale.
History suggests that if the movement continues, it will not be announced in advance.
Most of the time, people have the last word. You never know when they will choose to say it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
