Somalia’s political transition over the past 25 years has not been successful by chance. These were maintained through international engagement, pressure, and mediation aimed at preserving the fragile political settlement. But today, Somalia stands at a dangerous crossroads. The federal government’s pursuit of unilateral power cloaked in the language of democratic reform threatens to create a crisis of legitimacy and undermine decades of political gains and international investment.
Universal suffrage is an ideal shared by all Somalis. However, deep political differences between groups, persistent security challenges, looming government mandate deadlines, and financial constraints make timely universal suffrage nearly impossible.
Pursuing universal suffrage without political consent, institutional provision, or minimum security will not deepen democracy or sovereignty. It increases the risk of fragmentation and parallelization of powers while concentrating power in the hands of incumbents.
Instead of addressing these constraints through consensus, governments deploy the rhetoric of universal suffrage to seize power. They unilaterally changed the constitution, which is the basis of a political solution. It also enacted self-serving laws governing the electoral process, political parties, and the Electoral Boundaries Commission. In addition, the government has appointed 18 members, all of whom have the support of the ruling Justice and Solidarity Party (JSP).
Somaliland, on the other hand, announced its withdrawal in 1991 and has been seeking recognition for the past 35 years. Most of Somalia’s national opposition rejected the government’s approach, along with leaders from Puntland and Jubbaland states, and established the Somalia Future Council. These groups have announced plans to hold a political convention in Somalia and signaled their intention to pursue a parallel political process if the government does not listen.
Somalia’s federal government does not fully control the country. Al-Shabaab controls specific regions and districts and maintains the ability to operate far beyond its direct control. The recent attack by hardliners on a prison near Villa Somalia was a stark reminder of the fragile security environment in which the electoral process must take place.
Given the extent of polarization and the limited time left for the current mandate, the international community will need to intervene to support Somalia’s sixth political transition in 2026. The most viable way to ensure a safe transition is to promote an improved indirect election model. Somalia’s political class has long experience with indirect elections and has relied on this model five times in the past 25 years. However, even with political agreement, an improved indirect election model for the 2026 system must meet criteria of timeliness, feasibility, competitiveness, and inclusiveness.
The current government’s term expires on May 15, 2026, and discussions have already begun among government supporters about unilaterally extending its term. This should stop. If a political agreement is reached in time, some technical extension may be necessary, but this should only take place while the 2026 selection and election process is actively underway. One way to avoid this recurring crisis would be to set firm and binding deadlines for elections. Puntland City, for example, maintains a schedule of elections held every five years in January.
An improved indirect election model must be viable. That is, it should be easy to understand and implement. Political groups may agree on a quorum of delegates to elect each seat. Recognized traditional elders from each constituency will then elect delegates. Delegates from smaller districts work together to elect candidates for those seats. Although this system is far from ideal, it is still viable under current conditions.
Unlike previous attempts, an improved indirect election model must be truly competitive and inclusive. In past elections, politicians manipulated parliamentary selection by restricting competition through a practice known as “Marxis” (best man). Preferred Candidates introduces the best man, someone who pretends to compete but never intends to win. The next election requires a process that allows candidates to compete meaningfully rather than symbolically. Clear thresholds of “no manipulation” and “no best man” should be enforced.
Inclusivity remains a major concern. Women, who should make up around 30 percent of seats in parliament, are frequently compromised. Political agreements must include clear commitments to inclusivity, and institutions overseeing elections must be empowered to enforce women’s quotas. Government leaders have also arbitrarily controlled the seats allocated to Somaliland representatives. Given the unique political circumstances, an individualized, negotiated and reliable process is required.
Finally, widespread corruption has long tainted Somalia’s selection and election processes and undermined their integrity. In 2022, the presidents of the federal member states controlled and manipulated this process. One effective measure to curb corruption under the improved indirect election model in 2026 would be to consolidate electoral districts and increase the number of voters per seat. In practice, this means that delegates from multiple districts vote together, reducing opportunities for vote-buying.
The international community has been pressuring Somali political officials to reach an agreement, insisting that there should be no term extension or unilateral elections by the government, and that there should be no parallel political plans by the opposition. This approach can be effective when combined with the influence that the international community still holds. Somalia’s political class once again needs to be forced into serious, structured negotiations rather than unilateral action.
As in the past, the international community must clearly define political red lines that must not be crossed. The government should refrain from any term extensions or unilateral election projects. At the same time, opposition parties must abandon plans for a parallel political agenda, such as federal member states holding elections outside the political agreement.
Somalis have repeatedly expressed their desire for democracy. What stands in the way is not the will of the people, but the polarization of elites and the instrumentalization of reforms for political survival. At this critical moment, the international community cannot afford to retreat into passivity. Proactive and principled engagement is essential to prevent a collapse of Somalia’s legitimacy, preserve the gains of the past 25 years, and protect the significant investments made in Somalia’s peacebuilding and state-building.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
