With Venezuela and the United States teetering on the brink of war, China has been vocal in condemning America’s actions. In Beijing’s view, the U.S. government’s escalation, including the seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker, the raid on a drug smuggling ship, and the blockade of Venezuela’s coast, are classic examples of U.S. unilateralism that violates the sovereignty of other countries and violates the United Nations Charter.
In a telephone conversation with his Venezuelan counterpart on December 17, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed opposition to the United States’ “unilateral bullying” and expressed support for Venezuela’s right to “protect its sovereignty and national dignity.”
However, the Chinese government has been unable to offer Caracas more than rhetoric. China is clearly wary of falling into a geopolitical trap, and its inaction shows the limits of its influence in Latin America.
Relationship with Latin America
For more than two decades, China has pursued expanding economic ties with Latin American countries. As a result, today it is South America’s largest trading partner. It is also Mexico’s second-largest trading partner, one of the United States’ closest allies in the region.
China’s involvement in Latin American countries is facilitated by the high degree of complementarity between the two economies. Agricultural products, especially soybeans from Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, have improved China’s food security, especially during the trade war with the United States. Meanwhile, minerals such as lithium carbonate from Chile, Argentina and Bolivia have become essential to China’s burgeoning electric vehicle (EV) industry.
In recent years, China’s EV exports to Latin America have skyrocketed, increasing by 55% in 2023 alone. The region has not only alleviated China’s overcapacity problem, but also provided a market for Chinese communications technologies such as Huawei’s 5G, which the West has long rejected. Currently, Huawei’s 5G equipment is present in most countries in Latin America.
The United States has traditionally viewed Latin America as its own backyard and has been understandably suspicious and hostile to China’s growing influence in the region. In February, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, previously an outspoken China hawk who has labeled the Chinese Communist Party an “evil genocidal regime”, launched a diplomatic offensive across the region. He declared himself on a mission to “counter the[Chinese Communist Party’s]influence in the Western Hemisphere” and sought to persuade Latin American countries to reduce their ties with China.
Despite failing to offer a convincing alternative model of economic cooperation and opting instead for extortion tactics through tariffs, Washington still has the upper hand in this battle for influence. For example, although most countries in the region have recognized Taiwan as an integral part of China and have been economically tempted to adhere to the “one China” policy, the region remains the last bastion of diplomatic support for Taiwan, with seven countries in Latin America and the Caribbean maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan over China.
This week, the United States scored a major victory in Honduras’ presidential election, with conservative Trump supporter Nasri Asfulura winning the election. During his campaign, he promised to sever diplomatic ties with China and restore formal relations with Taiwan.
Over the past year under the Trump administration, several Latin American countries have bowed to U.S. pressure to limit economic ties with China.
In February, Panama officially withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And in March, the Hong Kong-based operator of the Panama Canal announced it would sell a majority of its stake to a consortium of American companies. The move follows President Trump’s assertion that the vital waterway is controlled by China. Mexico announced in December that it would impose tariffs of up to 50% on Chinese goods starting January 1.
In Venezuela, US pressure has less to do with close ties with China and more to do with US domestic politics. Mr. Rubio is seeking to carry out his long-standing political agenda to please his opposition Venezuelan and Cuban-American constituencies.
Nevertheless, any regime change in Caracas is certain to harm China’s interests. As the largest customer of Venezuelan crude oil, China has a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability in Venezuela. Although China itself is not dependent on Venezuelan oil, and Venezuela is not even among the top 10 oil suppliers, the seizure of a Venezuelan oil tanker by the United States undermines China’s energy strategy, which aims to avoid over-reliance on a single energy supplier.
Monroe Doctrine 2.0 or a trap?
China views Venezuela’s escalation not only from an economic perspective but also from a geopolitical perspective. The larger context of US global power projections is important.
In its recently released National Security Strategy (NSS), the Trump administration declared that the days of the United States acting as the world’s policeman are over, and instead advocated a return to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, a 19th-century diplomatic strategy that sought to prevent outside interference in the Americas that could harm U.S. interests.
Notably, although the NSS does not designate China as the greatest threat to the United States, it does say that the US government maintains a military capable of militarily thwarting China’s ambitions for Taiwan.
The document sends mixed signals to China, along with rising tensions between the United States and Venezuela. The United States, on the other hand, appears to be prioritizing competition with China and instead focusing on reaffirming its hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
However, it has not taken any significant steps to signal its disengagement from Asia. For example, military bases in South Korea and Japan remain fully operational.
Beijing is concerned that Washington is trying to lull China into a false sense of security with its rhetoric and apparent geopolitical changes. Therefore, remain cautious.
Following the NSS announcement, China released a policy document on Latin America and the Caribbean. Perhaps in response to recent events, the paper reflects an attempt by the Chinese government to bring the fight to the doorstep of the United States.
However, the policies and strategies outlined in this document share the same shortcomings that China’s foreign policy has always had. In other words, they provide symbolic rather than substantive support. China’s attempts to rally the Global South under the banner of opposing U.S. hegemony and promoting unity based on grievances have fallen significantly short of their goals when confronted with U.S. military power.
In this context, and given Venezuela’s limited economic value and geopolitical distance for China, Beijing will not devote any resources to defending the Latin American country.
If the United States invades, China will likely use it to advance its vision of a multipolar world and position itself as a defender of international law and the United Nations Charter. Although China may see the United States mired in a protracted war as a positive development, it is almost certain that China will not support Venezuela.
But if the United States overthrows the Venezuelan government, the limits of China’s power in the region will become clear. Such a scenario would undoubtedly prompt many Latin American countries to reconsider whether it is a good idea to work with China when an aggressive United States is so close.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
