In recent days, leaked audio recordings and documents have revealed the broad outlines of a plot to start an uprising in Syria’s Alawite-held coastal areas. Many senior officials from the exiled former regime of Bashar al-Assad are behind this plan. The leaks revealed the recruitment of fighters within the Alawite community, the movement and storage of weapons, and the transfer of payments to families.
The revelations come months after an uprising in the coastal region in March killed more than 1,000 people, including civilians, government forces and Alawite fighters.
Similar violence erupted again in Suweida, a Druze stronghold in southern Syria, in July, where hundreds of Druze civilians were killed in failed attempts by government forces to restore order after clashes between Sunni tribes and Druze militias.
There have also been sporadic clashes between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and government forces, despite a March 10 agreement to integrate the former into the national army.
There are now growing concerns that minority-majority areas will be carved out, undermining the establishment of a strong Syrian state and even violating the country’s territorial integrity. However, such developments are not inevitable.
Alawite challenge
Leaked audio recordings and documents indicate that the remnants of al-Assad’s regime have not accepted their fate and are planning some form of comeback, but they are far from successful. Most Alawites appear to be deeply shaken by what they see as abandonment and betrayal by the al-Assad family, and are willing to adapt to this reality, resigned to living under the new authority.
Although a few hardcore figures may still harbor fantasies of returning to power, perhaps by creating a coastal enclave, such ambitions remain politically disconnected from the broader Alawite community.
It is economic poverty and physical insecurity that shape Alawite attitudes today, not a desire for secession or restoration of the old regime.
The response to last month’s call for protests by Ghazal Ghazal, head of the so-called Islamic Alawite Council of Syria and the Diaspora, reflected accumulated grievances rather than a realistic political plan.
The dismantling of state institutions, especially the military and security services, has pushed hundreds of thousands of families into poverty. Even pension recipients have been left unpaid for more than a year.
If violence returns among Alawites, it will be driven by poverty and desperation rather than ideology or political ambition. This situation needs to be addressed before it escalates into a full-blown hunger rebellion.
The lack of transitional justice further exacerbates tensions. The law encourages victims of the previous regime to seek revenge outside the legal framework, while collective condemnation directed at Alawites frequently leads to revenge killings in Alawite-majority areas. Many Alawites are now calling on the government to publish a clear list of former regime officials responsible for serious crimes, in order to clarify individual responsibility and reduce the burden of collective guilt on communities.
Druze and Kurdish resistance
The situation is more complex in southwestern Suweida, where the local Druze community steadfastly refuses to allow government forces to enter its territory. Hikmat al-Hijri, a prominent Druze spiritual leader with known ties to Israel, is suspicious of the new government, and his position has hardened in the wake of March’s massacres on the Syrian coast. During the summer, he was elevated to the position of sole political authority for the Druze community.
Suwayda became a de facto autonomous region in July after government forces backed by Sunni tribal fighters failed to take control. Al-Hijri openly appealed to Israel, and Israeli intervention forced Damascus to withdraw.
Since then, he has overseen the creation of the so-called National Guard, led by former regime officers and funded and armed by Israel, while openly asserting independence.
Damascus in the northeast also faces formidable challenges. The SDF has refused to fully implement the March 10 agreement, abandoning the political and military gains it has made over the past decade.
The collapse of the latest round of talks to implement the deal in Damascus on Sunday has sparked tense fighting in and around Kurdish-majority areas of Aleppo, threatening to plunge the country into another civil war, this time along ethnic fault lines.
The SDF, which is backed by the United States and enjoys good relations with Israel, commands about 60,000 fighters and runs an autonomous civilian government that controls about a third of the country, including a significant amount of Syria’s natural resources. In effect, the Self-Defense Forces aspire to a status similar to Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government.
maintain unity
Dire predictions that Syria would slide back into civil war did not come true. However, the current situation still leaves major challenges.
Lacking decisive US support and fearing Israeli intervention and organized unrest both along the coast and in Suweida, Damascus has little credible influence to fully unify the country in the short term.
With the minority incapable of resisting the new government and Damascus lacking the power to subjugate it, Syria risks falling into a prolonged stalemate that could eventually solidify into a de facto partition.
Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland as a breakaway state has fueled fears that it will employ similar tactics in Syria, seeking to weaken the state by fostering sectarian conflict.
However, there are also other outside powers with vested interests in a stable and unified Syria. The United States, fearing a resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS) and a resurgence of Iranian influence, is pressuring both the Self-Defense Forces and the Damascus government to implement the March 10 agreement. President Turkiye is also pressuring the SDF to soften its position and agree to integration terms. The Turkish government has threatened to use military force to halt attempts by Kurdish forces to leave Syria.
A number of European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, are also stepping up efforts to stabilize Syria, with the aim of facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. Following a series of attacks by the US in December, the recent joint UK-French attacks on ISIL targets in Syria further demonstrate Paris and London’s interest in ensuring stability and security.
However, the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa cannot rely solely on external support to maintain Syria’s unity and territorial integrity. Initiating an inclusive political process, establishing a unity government, and convening a national dialogue conference to draft a new constitution with broad participation of Syria’s political, ethnic, and sectarian constituents could help garner more support in Syria’s troubled regions.
Initiating a path of cross-border justice along with national reconciliation will also help heal the wounds of the past 14 years. Some kind of conciliatory attitude toward minorities on the coast, in Suwayda, and in the northeast would also help. But all these measures will have little effect unless they are accompanied by appropriate economic policies specifically designed to address deep poverty and staggering unemployment.
Taken together, these policies will certainly help Damascus halt Israel’s evil plans against Syria and maintain unity.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
