Two weeks ago, incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced his withdrawal from the presidential race. The move effectively paved the way for former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to return to power amid political negotiations after November’s elections.
This development is not just an act of political recycling. It reflects the failure of Iraqi state-building after the 2003 US invasion. Iraq under al-Maliki may well revert to the disastrous policies that led to the rise of ISIL (ISIS) in 2014.
sectarian politics
In considering what al-Maliki’s return would mean for Iraq, it is important to consider his track record. When he was first nominated for the prime minister’s post in 2006, the administration of US President George W. Bush supported him. Despite early red flags, Washington did so in the name of stability and trust. By November 2006, just six months after al-Maliki took power, US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley was already expressing concerns about his ability to curb violence against Sunni populations.
The Bush administration’s decision to continue supporting the prime minister reflects its own record of misguided policy, driven by ignorance of the region and its history. By supporting al-Maliki, Washington paved the way for the chaos and instability it was trying to avoid.
During his first two terms, al-Maliki established a governing template that intentionally dismantled the vision of inclusive politics that followed the 2003 settlement. He pursued a policy of deliberate exclusion of the Sunni population at the political and social level under the guise of de-Baathization. Initially aimed at eliminating Saddam Hussein’s supporters, the process was weaponized by al-Maliki as a sectarian tool. In 2010, for example, the prime minister used the de-Baathization law to ban nine political parties and more than 450 candidates, mostly Sunnis, from parliamentary elections.
Security services under his leadership have also carried out arrests of moderate Sunni politicians on trumped-up charges of “terrorism” and cracked down on peaceful demonstrations.
The 2013 massacre in the town of Al Hawija in Kirkuk province is a case in point. In January of that year, large numbers of Sunnis gathered for several weeks of peaceful protests against the discriminatory policies of al-Maliki’s government. Three months later, security forces attacked a protest sit-in, killing at least 44 protesters.
Under al-Maliki, Baghdad also witnessed the deliberate expulsion of Sunnis from their homes and the consolidation of Shia-dominated areas. This was a form of population engineering with the full support and complicity of the state.
As a result of these policies, sectarian politics escalated, ethnic and religious identities became the main divisive factors in society, national unity was undermined, and the country descended into civil war.
Incessant attacks against Sunni communities have caused widespread discontent and have been easily exploited by extremist groups, first al-Qaeda and then ISIL (ISIS).
corruption and mismanagement
The industrial-scale drain on national wealth during the al-Maliki era was nothing short of astonishing. The Iraqi Parliament’s Transparency Committee estimated in 2018 that $320 billion had been lost to corruption since the US invasion to that point. Al-Maliki was in power for eight of those 15 years.
This money was used to live a luxurious life for those close to al-Maliki, buy expensive real estate, and deposit into shell companies and secret bank accounts. All of this is not a problem of government dysfunction, but a problem of grand theft.
The Iraqi Federal Integrity Commission has extensively documented such misconduct, but to date no one has been held accountable. Under al-Maliki, judicial independence was destroyed and any process of accountability became impossible.
Misgovernment also extended to the security forces and military. For years, the military has been paying “ghost soldiers.” By 2014, the bill for this corruption scheme had ballooned to $380 million a year. It turned out that the prime minister himself ran his own prison and commanded a special forces force of 3,000 soldiers loyal to him.
Years of corruption and dysfunction within Iraq’s military, amid nearly $100 billion in U.S. funding, led to the disastrous 2014 military disbandment in the face of advancing ISIL (ISIS) forces.
Return of Al Maliki
Al-Maliki has not spent the past 11 years in political isolation. Instead, he was at the center of the political machine, planning and putting in place all the necessary elements for an eventual return under the watchful eye of successive US administrations.
A third term in office would likely deepen sectarian divisions and entrench corruption. Iraq’s governance will continue to be undermined by his tendency to create shadow power structures that empower supporters at the expense of the regime.
Al-Maliki’s return will also be important regionally. After the fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime and the severe weakening of Hezbollah, Iraq became Iran’s most important regional security and financial asset.
Iran’s position in the region has not been more vulnerable in recent decades, and Mr. Maliki’s return would effectively prevent Iraq from pursuing a more independent path from Tehran in its domestic and foreign affairs.
His third term is also likely to hinder normalization with Damascus. Mr al-Maliki has vocally opposed engagement with Syria’s new leadership. Last year, he spoke out against interim President Ahmed al-Shallah’s attendance at the Arab League summit in Baghdad, saying he was “wanted by an Iraqi court on terrorism charges.”
In parallel, the new al-Maliki government will also pose a challenge to US national interests. The appointment of Mark Savaya as special envoy to Iraq, the first in 20 years, by President Donald Trump’s administration signaled its intention to pursue policies aimed at curbing Iranian influence.
The US government wants to dismantle the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and fully integrate it into the Iraqi military. Mr al-Maliki is unlikely to undertake such a move, as he is the “godfather” of these parallel armed groups. Dismantling them would mean destroying his own creation and severing ties with Iran.
But what is at stake is not just what policies al-Maliki will pursue. There is also the fact that Iraq cannot escape a political cycle that is nothing short of catastrophic. This shows that Iraq’s political elites have learned nothing from the 2014 crisis.
Sectarian mobilization and kleptocracy remain viable political options. Iraqi youth have repeatedly taken to the streets to protest this deeply flawed and dysfunctional status quo. Without major changes in incentive structures, accountability structures, and the sectarian distribution of power, Iraq is doomed to repeat the same grave mistakes of the past.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
