In June 2025, the United States had just attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, but President Donald Trump was quick to dismiss the attack rather than imply that it was the start of a war between the United States and Iran.
“Now is the time for peace,” was President Trump’s message at the time.
Recommended stories
list of 3 itemsend of list
Fast forward to the present day, and Trump has threatened an even larger attack, backing up his threat with a massive movement of U.S. military assets, including aircraft carriers, into Iranian waters.
President Trump said the threats were a means to persuade Iranians to agree to the deal, which reportedly includes demands to effectively halt Iran’s nuclear program, limit its ballistic missile program and end aid to allies across the Middle East.
This is Trump’s foreign policy. That is, a focus on threats and a willingness to carry out limited military operations, at least initially, designed to avoid American entrenchments. At the same time, President Trump said he is leaving the door open to regime change, although he is not necessarily a supporter of it.
President Trump is actively cultivating an image of what, more pejoratively, might be called a “madman theory” of foreign policy. The idea, said to have originally been originated by former US President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s, is meant to make you wonder how far your enemy is willing to go, no matter how absurd it may seem.
The assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani by the United States in 2020 was one of the main examples of President Trump acting in this way during his first term. The unexpected killing of a senior state official from another country directly risked war and was contrary to the opinion of many foreign policy experts. Still, Trump saw it as an act of deterrence and strength, and felt vindicated once it became clear that Iran would not respond in kind.
President Trump has further strengthened this style of foreign policy in his second term, with particular emphasis on the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. It now serves to lend further weight to his current threat to Iran.
This tactic responds to two distinct instincts within President Trump and those around him. It is a desire to be seen as different from the neoconservatives who drew the United States into the 2003 war and subsequent disastrous occupation of Iraq, as well as a desire to undermine any regional powers seen as a threat to the United States and its main Middle East ally, Israel.
Essentially, Trump wants to use the threat of force and occasional attacks to gain short-term “victories” that weaken America’s adversaries while avoiding protracted engagements.
Can Trump succeed?
How long it’s effective depends on the size of your goals. Trump’s threats could work in his favor if limited concessions are accepted by both the United States and its adversaries.
A case in point is the US president’s current threat that he will “no longer help” Iraq if pro-Iranian politician Nouri al-Maliki becomes prime minister.
President Trump may be imposing his will on Iraq, but it is not a threat of war but one backed by potential economic consequences, so there is less of a sense that Iraq’s sovereignty is being attacked. It would also leave the door open to other politicians the United States deems suitable to be prime minister, including the current incumbent, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Although al-Sudani is within the same broad Shiite political alliance as al-Maliki, it is considered less close than Iran and does not carry the baggage of the latter. If that actually happens, keeping al-Sudani rather than al-Maliki in power would be a relatively easy trade-off in exchange for exposure to the economic wrath of the United States, allowing Trump to secure another “victory.”
In Syria, U.S. policy appears to be more focused on a gradual withdrawal, as President Trump feels he has a partner in the group in President Ahmed al-Shalah who can work with him. US Syria policy is fixated on two goals: ensuring that ISIL (ISIS) does not strengthen and ensuring that there is no threat to Israel from Syria.
At the same time, President Trump has no qualms about abandoning the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which is currently an ally of the United States and is considered to meet the requirements.
In return, Gulf states led by Saudi Arabia say they can vouch for the Syrian government and al-Sharaa, a way for President Trump to largely wash his hands of at least one issue in a region he has long argued is prone to endless war.
increasing complications
In Lebanon and Gaza, President Trump is using the threat of military force to achieve two goals: an end to all-out war and an agreement to disarm anti-American and anti-Israel forces.
Although President Trump’s policy goals in Lebanon and Gaza are less extremist than in Iran, achieving them will be more complicated than the relatively moderate concessions demanded from Iraq.
Although the United States supports Israel in both the Lebanon and Gaza conflicts, it intervenes after provoking a devastating Israeli war and positions itself as a peacemaker.
But peace is conditional on the complete disarmament of Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. During the phased negotiations in both cases, the United States has offered a check on Israel to prevent a return to full-scale war, but it has allowed Israel to carry out periodic small-scale attacks, reminding Israel and the United States of what actions it may take if its demands are not met.
But complete disarmament is a bitter pill for both Hezbollah and Hamas.
In Syria, Hezbollah and its supporters will see this as an acceptance of defeat in the fight against the US and Israel. It is a devastating blow to an organization that sees itself as a resistance movement against these two superpowers.
President Trump’s Peace Commission, established to oversee the Gaza administration, is in some ways better for Hamas, but similarly, the complete disarmament required of the group, even as Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land continues with no end in sight, deprives it of one of the central elements of its self-identity.
Both Hezbollah and Hamas are therefore likely to view agreeing to demands for complete disarmament as an existential issue, opening the door to a breakdown in future negotiations.
long term effects
Iran’s past experience with President Trump and Iran’s perception of its own existential threat could test the limits of Trump’s approach to foreign policy.
Although President Trump claims he wants a deal, the Iranian government has shown that it simply does not believe him, based on his previous attacks on duplicity during negotiations and what he believes is a willingness to kidnap foreign leaders as a show of American power.
Iran appears to see little course correction, and based on its experience over the past year, it now believes that concessions will only invite further pressure.
The Islamic Republic, or at least elements within it, recognize that its survival is at stake. So now the US and Trump are on the other side with potentially nothing to lose. Will a “madman” foreign policy approach work in these circumstances?
After all, President Trump’s approach to projecting U.S. military power could force concessions from the other side, but only if the other side feels targeted for exclusion.
