After all, Bangladesh’s 13th parliamentary elections were not a revolution. It was a calculation.
When the votes were counted, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won a decisive victory, returning to power after years of political wilderness under Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule.
Most headlines featured this as a dramatic comeback, and rightly so. But behind the scenes, this was a carefully navigated trend rather than a wave of voter choice. This was a contest built on frustration and First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) arithmetic.
To understand why the BNP took off, we first need to dispel the lazy narrative that this was a wasted Jamaat moment. When the results came out, the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JI) secured 68 seats and the Jamaat-led bloc secured 77 seats in parliament. This is no small feat for a party whose highest number of seats in parliament in 1991 was just 18. Many analysts had suggested that Jamaat’s support was increasing heading into the polls, and the data supported that claim. However, under the FPTP system, an inflated vote share does not automatically result in 151 seats out of 300 constituencies.
The election was not driven by any significant revolution, although it was sparked by the large-scale uprising that toppled Prime Minister Hasina’s dictatorial regime in August 2024. But there were no deep ideological rifts or permanent reshuffling of voter loyalties. At least, it wasn’t on a scale that would tear apart the very fabric of this country’s electoral mindset.
And, of course, it was not a national wave election in which a single mood spread towards a particular party, across class, gender, and region. What was deployed was a hybrid. In other words, it was a mostly normal election, with significant deviations, but the outcome was predictable.
Most party supporters remained at home. Floating votes were important. And in some parts of the country, dissatisfaction with the BNP’s local leadership led to temporary defections, many to the Jamaat and the NCP.
The anger was real. After August 5, the performance of BNP’s grassroots organizations was abysmal. Minor leaders in each district were accused of corruption and extortion. Resentment smoldered in rural market towns and urban suburbs.
Voters were not just disappointed. They were, in the words of those heard in the teahouses and union parish courtyards, “really, really pissed off.” This outrage explains Jamaat’s rapid growth. A section of BNP supporters and a significant proportion of swing voters drifted towards the promise of an ‘honest alternative’.
But drifting is not destiny.
Although the BNP’s base was historically broader and organizationally deeper than Jamaat’s, it never collapsed. Even after the defection, the numbers remained large. The BNP’s nomination strategy turned out to be unexpectedly shrewd.
While the Jamaat fielded relatively unknown but ideologically reliable figures, the BNP relied on the old guard: candidates with solid name recognition and deep informal networks.
This was especially important in rural Bangladesh. Educated urban voters may be excited by the rhetoric of ethical governance. For them, the idea of an incorruptible, ideologically disciplined candidate resonates as a moral reset.
However, local voters are pragmatic actors. They operate within a complex network of patronage. MP is not an abstraction. He (and usually he) is the mediator of safety nets, employment, stability, and conflict resolution. Honesty alone does not guarantee access. It’s familiar.
Thus a central dilemma for voters emerged. Fed up with BNP’s excesses, many people considered switching. Jamaat has won some constituencies where it has fielded prominent leaders. Elsewhere, however, voters encountered candidates they did not know, whose “integrity” they could not confirm, and whose parties offered nothing more than moral branding.
Faced with uncertainty, they chose the “devil” they knew.
Jamaat further exacerbated its structural limitations through strategic mistakes. The government’s awkward stance on women’s issues, oscillating between reassurance and dog whistles, has failed to win over large swathes of female voters who have sought an expanded public role for decades.
Bangladesh’s social transformation is not superficial, with women at the center of the workforce, education system, and microcredit economy. Political parties that cannot articulate a credible vision for gender equality will not win national waves.
Even more pernicious was Jamaat’s revisionist flirtation with the memory of 1971. The War of Liberation is the moral founding document of this country. Attempts to soften or reinterpret the Jamaat’s historical role alienated voters far beyond secular and liberal elites.
By 1971, even conservative families were redlining. The general trend of public opinion was probably straightforward. People don’t forget.
Still, Jamaat’s performance remained historic. Jamaat-e-Islami and its allied coalition secured 77 seats, a testament not only to its disciplined cadre but also to the BNP’s own misdeeds. Extortion scandals and local arrogance pushed voters into the arms of the Jamaat.
In the highly competitive FPTP environment, even just a few percentage points can flip dozens of seats. The Jamaat exploited its anger precisely in Rajshahi, Khulna and Rangpur divisions, where its organizational strength was strongest.
However, accuracy and breadth are not the same. The Jamaat surge remained regionally concentrated. Support varied widely by class, gender, education, and age. It’s the opposite of a wave election. Without a unified national momentum, it will not be easy to win the FPTP.
And there was a ghost inside the machine, and that was the Awami League (AL). Many commentaries underestimated the Remain vote. Research shows that 5 to 7 percent of die-hards will never defect, but an even larger group (perhaps 20 to 25 percent) are either undecided or unwilling to reveal their preferences. That particular bloc was very important in this election.
Pre-election field surveys and opinion polls showed that many non-hardcore AL voters were leaning toward the BNP, perhaps not out of ideological alignment but out of instrumental rationality. They believed the BNP would form a government and wanted access to services through victorious parliamentarians.
In areas where BNP’s veteran security guards were harassing AL supporters, some abstained or courted Jamaat. Nationally, however, the gravitational pull was in favor of the BNP. Voters wanted to be on the winning side. Recognition became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Four possible scenarios leading up to Election Day have clarified the stakes. Unless AL turnout is large, the BNP is likely to secure a plurality in a close race. With moderate support from the AL, it would win a comfortable majority. With the American League’s overwhelming support, it was possible that they would win a two-thirds majority. Only a full-fledged Jamaat wave, a cross-class, cross-gender embrace of the nation, could have reversed the equation.
That wave never materialized.
In other words, the BNP’s victory is a product of structural advantages, strategic candidate selection, and rational calculations by the country’s traditional voters. It was helped by Jamaat’s self-inflicted wounds on women’s rights and historical memory. Paradoxically, this was made possible by the BNP’s own malfeasance on the ground, and while Jamaat’s vote share increased, it was not enough to overcome the FPTP’s mathematics.
Another footnote in this election is worth noting. It was the rise of the National Citizens Party (NCP), which won five seats. This is no small accomplishment for a new party born out of rebellion in the South Asian country’s highly polarized political environment.
This shows the BNP and Jamaat’s thirst for a new non-binary alternative, however modest. Under a system of proportional representation, such parties may flourish. Under FPTP, five seats is both a breakthrough and a limit.
Bangladesh’s 13th parliamentary elections were, after all, a story of marginality. The limits of anger, the limits of moral branding, the limits of revisionism, and the enduring power of organizational depth in winner-take-all systems.
The BNP won not because it inspired the people, but because it understood them.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
