President Donald Trump is trying to keep his options open regarding Iran, but he may see them narrowing.
With the third round of talks in Geneva ending in an apparent agreement to hold another “technical” meeting in Vienna next week, the White House must decide whether new diplomacy will yield results or whether it will have to accept a highly unpredictable and potentially brutal step toward war.
Militarily, the U.S. signal is clear. This is perhaps the largest increase in air and naval power in the region since the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Refueling planes and some A-10 ground attack planes are parked within sight of tourists landing at civilian airports in Israel and Crete. It is not subtle, but aimed at convincing the Iranian government that President Trump is serious and that his limited patience with the outcome of the negotiations is backed up by considerable force. But that doesn’t mean the president of the United States is suddenly given omnipotence.
The United States chose diplomacy first. This is important because previous bombings of Iran’s nuclear facilities have self-evidently failed, even though President Trump last year claimed that the nuclear program was “dead.” Despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s declarations to the contrary and US intelligence assessments last year, President Trump apparently believes that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Wednesday that he does not believe Iran is currently enriching uranium, but “we see them constantly trying to restructure elements of their program.” If the White House had believed that U.S. forces could bomb the remnants, it likely would have chosen, or asked Israel, to quickly pursue that option without telegraphing the plan. Rather, the administration probably believes that a diplomatic solution that ensures Iran does not have a nuclear weapon and is open to civilian inspections, as it has done in the past, will better achieve its goals.
Iran has proven adept at delaying and complicating negotiations. The arrival of President Trump’s “armada” could change the equation and facilitate a deal sooner. However, the US position is also complicated. It’s still very unclear what Washington’s red line is. Does the United States just want a ban on nuclear weapons or a ban on uranium enrichment? President Trump’s State of the Union address did not explicitly call for a halt to enrichment, and Trump administration officials have given snippets to the media that they may accept “token” Iranian enrichment, perhaps for purely medical purposes.
Should the deal include limits on the range of Iranian missiles that President Trump falsely claimed could soon attack the United States? Will Iran also have to agree to rein in its proxy forces in the region, which has been severely affected by recent Israeli and US military actions and the fall of Syria’s Assad regime in late 2024?
It may be to President Trump’s advantage to keep Iran guessing how much concessions it will have to make in order to send the Armada home. A quick agreement is possible. A 2015 Obama-era agreement provides the inspection framework and infrastructure. Negotiating teams don’t need to reinvent the wheel here. This could be a bonus for U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, who has previously been criticized for not knowing the details of negotiations regarding Ukraine. Another bonus for Witkoff is the presence of two aircraft carriers hovering on the wing, which certainly brings a rare sense of urgency to the Obama-led talks.
But it is Trump’s stick, not this diplomatic carrot, that is causing the real trouble in the White House. The forces deployed to the area are large enough to send a signal of true intent and threat, but probably not large enough to sustain a week-long military offensive. This means that a change of government is impossible.
There is also no ground element in US assets, so Khamenei’s ouster would have to magically occur through a swift and consistent popular uprising after targeted airstrikes have decimated much of the dictator’s security architecture. That’s a pipe dream.
Pentagon officials have also warned in leaks to the media that they lack ammunition and resources needed for large-scale operations. This, combined with reports that US aircraft carriers are in need of maintenance, would put them at great risk if President Trump ordered a sustained and prolonged strike. It would expose the United States to an Iraq-like quagmire, and do so amid clear warnings that America’s military is under-resourced and about to do harm. That’s almost politically suicidal, even if the president feels omnipotent.
President Trump’s more viable military option resembles something shorter and more targeted: a sudden burst of deterrence. But it also carries strategic risks. Using only a portion of deployed forces could signal the limits of President Trump’s conflict orientation and reduce the effectiveness of U.S. deterrence in the region.
Iran’s hardline regime could easily survive a night or two of targeted attacks, counter the token and limited salvos seen in the past, and conclude that regime outrage, and even an armada, is eminently survivable.
Time is not on Trump’s side either. The Department of Defense cannot afford to keep such a huge percentage of its assets tied up for months on end. F-35s idling on the tarmac may be cheaper than hard-fought missiles, but they still jeopardize America’s preparedness for future conflicts that the United States may not choose.
President Trump’s extraordinary display of assets could deter Iranian retaliation after short-term U.S. attacks, but it would also increase U.S. targets for attacks against Iran. There is no risk that Iran’s military, weakened after a disastrous 12-day war with Israel, will overwhelm the United States in the region. Rather, it is a single missile or drone that slips past air defenses and causes enough U.S. military casualties to force a cycle of retaliation. The United States could then be drawn into a war it knows is of its own choosing against an adversary who is convinced that their fight is existential.
After all, without a quick deal, President Trump’s military options narrow by the week. He has prepared neither the American electorate nor the region’s hardware for a widespread and devastating onslaught. Another short, sharp strike will not permanently erase Iran’s nuclear program. However, the limits of President Trump’s desire for war may be exposed. That would be a relief for a region in crisis, but it would be a self-inflicted strategic failure.
