For years, Western interventionists have argued that the long-term costs of Iran’s political order, including repression, economic decline, and social stagnation, outweigh the risks of violent regime change from outside. Last month, the “moral barrier” to intervention was significantly lowered due to the bloody crackdown on the January protests and massive positive coverage of Iranian rebels in Western media.
The U.S. and Israeli intervention began soon after, with U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calling on Iranians to “stand up.” The assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei and other Iranian officials was celebrated as a major accomplishment.
However, it is by no means certain that the removal of a central figure will lead to a “short and decisive rupture” followed by a smooth transition. In fact, a post-Khamenei Iran may not be at all what proponents of intervention hope for.
regime change failed
In the broader Middle East, there are three recent examples of why external intervention is unlikely to result in smooth transitions and stability. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya demonstrate that foreign military operations are often followed by chaos rather than rapid stabilization. A quick look at these countries’ scores on the World Bank’s Global Governance Index illustrates this.
Afghanistan experienced a regime change in 2001 following the US invasion. That sparked two decades of fighting and attacks on civilians. In 2021, the overthrown regime was restored in this country, but stability remains elusive.
After the US invasion in 2003, various rebellions and civil wars broke out in Iraq. Despite democratization efforts, the country has still not been able to return to pre-2003 stability.
After Libya’s collapse in 2011 following a NATO-led intervention, the country fell from a positive stability score on the Global Governance Index to one of the lowest in the world, with no recovery in sight. The country remains divided between two centers of governance: Tripoli and Benghazi.
None of these countries has regained their pre-intervention levels of stability. Their paths have been characterized by long-term fragility and instability, rather than the “short-term adjustments” promised by intervention proponents.
A change of government that may not happen
Iran’s regime differs in many ways from the regimes that collapsed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. The assassination of leader Ayatollah Khamenei could have serious consequences, short of causing the country to collapse.
Within the symbolic world of Shiite Islam, to which the majority of Iranians belong, Khamenei’s death could be interpreted as the fulfillment of a martyrdom scenario. Death at the hands of those considered enemies of Islam can be framed as a passage point of salvation rather than defeat. It is not a painful collapse, as is the case with other Middle Eastern rulers who have been ousted or killed. Rather, it is an idealized end: the sanctification of political life through sacrificial death.
This martyrdom framework has the potential to rally large sections of the population around the national defense narrative, including those who have hitherto been critical of the leadership. By portraying a ousted leader as a martyr to a “foreign invasion,” the state can stir up nationalist solidarity and deep-seated resentment against outside interference, and it can unite security forces and traditionalist sectors of society in ways that regime change supporters have not anticipated.
Due to the outcome of recent protests, this may be more difficult today compared to the previous confrontation with Israel in June 2025. However, the possibility remains high.
It is also important to note that the experiences of Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan show that the complete absence of bureaucratic, security, and financial institutions during external interventions can lead to prolonged instability.
The big question for Iran now is whether it can maintain its administrative integrity and territorial integrity. Achieving this depends primarily on the survival of the “deep state,” a resilient civilian bureaucracy and technocratic class that controls the country’s finances and essential services.
If the central bank, ministries, and local governments continue to function despite the leadership vacuum, the country may be able to avoid the complete “fragmentation” seen in Libya. Furthermore, territorial integrity depends on the continued unity of the regular army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).
One of the big challenges will be finding a “national unifier” in the current climate. The bloody crackdown on protests in January has deeply torn the relationship between the public and political elites, making it difficult for any figure on the regime to claim widespread legitimacy. A “technical-military council” led by people with business backgrounds, such as Parliament Speaker Mohammad Berger Ghalibaf, former President Hassan Rouhani, and Iranian Supreme Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani, may try to intervene to bring about “security first” stabilization, but they lack the spiritual authority of the late supreme leader.
In the absence of someone who can bridge the gap between angry streets and a survival-oriented security establishment, new leaders are likely to struggle to assert their authority.
Instability after Khamenei
If institutional continuity fails or the military and Revolutionary Guards begin to compete, the risk of fragmentation and permanent conflict will increase. In this scenario, the violent rupture called for by some today could mark the beginning of a cycle of structurally ingrained insecurity, the costs of which will be borne by Iranian society as a whole.
There are two factors that shape these results.
The first is the hollowing out of the middle class. Decades of Western sanctions have decimated the very social groups that traditionally functioned as stabilizers during political transitions. Without a strong middle class, the political vacuum left by the ongoing war against Iran is likely to be filled by armed groups and radicalized remnants of the current security apparatus.
These elements of the Ancien Régime, especially the hardline cadres within the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, who perceive the new order as an existential threat to their lives and assets, are unlikely to disappear or “peacefully merge” as the Trump administration hopes. Rather, they are likely to transition from state actors to decentralized rebel forces, using their deep knowledge of the country’s infrastructure to thwart attempts at a stable transition.
The second is social division. Iran has higher levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity than the average Middle Eastern country. In the absence of a central authority and with security leaders currently being targeted, the risk of a fragmentation of the state and the rise of various militias should not be underestimated.
In the worst-case scenario, internal turmoil is likely to follow through existing fault lines of grievances. In border areas, long-simmering insurgency among Baluchis, Kurds, and Arabs could escalate into a full-blown separatist conflict as central control wanes.
In metropolitan centers, the breakdown of unified security chains can lead to localized chaos, where rogue militias acting without orders compete for control of nearby resources. At the same time, violent “elite wars” are inevitable, as the remaining military and political heavyweights struggle to fill the leadership vacuum, potentially turning the state’s own institutions into battlefields of succession.
In recent weeks, the adage “better a bitter end than an endless bitter end” has been invoked by some to justify foreign military intervention in Iran. This perception appears to be based on the belief that a quick solution can be achieved through military means.
But the outcomes of war are not linear, as data from Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan confirm. They catalyze unpredictable and long-term deterioration. Although Khamenei’s death marks the symbolic end of an era, history suggests that the “expectations” of such violent ruptures are often the path to chronic instability and institutional erosion rather than institutional renewal.
For the Iranian people, the regime’s “bitter end” may not be the final act of suffering, but the beginning of a structurally entrenched era of “endless bitterness” that is likely to plague the region for decades to come.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
