How ‘poor man’s cruise missile’ is shaping Iran’s retaliation

In the aftermath of the Israeli and U.S. attack on Iran, U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf are hearing a sound that Ukrainian soldiers have long feared: the one that portends the Shahed-136 “kamikaze” drone.

Shahed, which originated in Iran, is already a staple of modern warfare, with Russia, Tehran’s strategic partner, using the technology in its years-long invasion of Ukraine.

Drones, the most advanced of which is the long-range Shahid-136, are now central to Iran’s retaliatory strategy against the United States and its regional allies, with thousands launched to date.

At first glance, Shahed is unremarkable compared to cutting-edge weapons technology, with analysts sometimes calling it a “poor man’s cruise missile.”

However, while US allies have managed to intercept most of the incoming drones with the help of US-provided defense systems such as Patriot missiles, many Shaheds still manage to hit their targets.

The UAE Ministry of Defense said on Tuesday that 65 of the 941 Iranian drones detected since the start of the Iran war have fallen on its territory, damaging ports, airports, hotels and data centers.

Analysts say the key to effectiveness is in the numbers. Drones are relatively cheap and easy to mass produce, especially when compared to the sophisticated systems used to defend against them.

These factors make drones ideal for swarming and overburdening aerial defenses, with each intercepted drone costing more valuable defense assets.

“The Shahed-136, among other unmanned aircraft systems, has given countries like Russia and Iran an inexpensive way to impose disproportionate costs on their aircraft,” said Patryja Basilchik, an analyst with the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

“They force adversaries to waste expensive interceptors on low-cost drones, project power, and create a certain psychological burden on civilians.”

A U.S. government report describes the Shahed-136 as a one-way attack drone manufactured by an Iranian company with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Behnam Ben Taleburu, senior director of Iran programs at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told CNBC that compared to ballistic missiles, drones fly lower and slower, have relatively modest payloads and are mostly limited to fixed targets.

Public estimates say Shahid drones could cost between $20,000 and $50,000 each. In contrast, ballistic and cruise missiles can cost millions of dollars each.

In that sense, Shahed and its equivalents “essentially function as a ‘poor man’s cruise missile’ that provides a ‘cheap’ way to attack and harass an enemy,” Tabul said.

That cost advantage is important for Iran, which faces both international sanctions and limited access to advanced weapons.

Meanwhile, air defense systems used by Gulf states and Israel could cost between $3 million and $12 million per interceptor, according to Pentagon budget documents.

This cost discrepancy poses serious problems for Iran’s adversaries. Air defense systems have a finite number of defensive missiles, and each intercepted target costs valuable assets.

Therefore, in a war of attrition, the Iranian government could use drones to destroy its air defenses and expose it to more harmful attacks, analysts say.

“The logic is to conserve ballistic missiles for a long time and use up drones as soon as possible,” CSIS’s Basilchik said.

He added that Iran’s ability to maintain mass drone use depends on the size of Iran’s stockpile, how well Iran can protect or restore its supply chain, and whether the United States and Israel can meaningfully disrupt the flow of parts and production sites.

The United States has long sought to disrupt Iran’s production of the Shahed 136, recently imposing new sanctions targeting suspected parts suppliers across Turkey and the UAE.

However, Russia’s production of the Shahid drone shows that such systems can be manufactured at scale even during wartime or targeted sanctions.

U.S. officials claim Iran has launched more than 2,000 drones in the conflict as of Wednesday. But the country is believed to have large stockpiles and could produce hundreds more each week, military experts told The National newspaper.

“Gulf states need to be more careful about when they launch interceptors or risk running out of interceptors,” said José Pelayo, a Middle East security analyst at the Atlantic Council think tank.

“Although depletion is not imminent, it remains an urgent problem,” he said. However, he added, attacks on multiple fronts by Iranian allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis could put the stockpile at risk of being depleted within days.

Shahed-136 was first unveiled around 2021 and gained global attention after Russia began deploying Iranian-supplied weapons during its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Since then, the Kremlin has received thousands of drones and begun manufacturing them based on the Iranian design, highlighting its repeatable and scalable design.

Some analysts have suggested that Iran is leveraging Russia’s extensive battlefield experience with drones, including modifications such as anti-jamming antennas, electronic warfare-resistant navigation, and new warheads.

These warheads typically carry between 30 kg and 50 kg of explosives and are particularly powerful when used in large swarms, with modern versions capable of ranges of up to 1,200 miles.

Michael Connell, a Middle East expert at the Center for Naval Analysis, said the Shahed 136 proved so effective that the United States reverse-engineered it and deployed its own version into the battlefield against Iranian targets.

Last weekend’s attack on Iran marked the first time U.S. Central Command has used a low-cost, one-way attack drone modeled on the Shahid in combat.

Drones have become an essential part of the modern battlefield, and the ways we deal with them are evolving.

Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said Ukraine has had some success in shooting down drones with fighter jet artillery, which is a more sustainable deterrent than missile interceptors.

Ukraine has also recently pioneered the development of cheaper, mass-produced interceptors, which Kiev claims can deter Shahed.

Gulf countries are also expected to adopt more sustainable approaches. The Pentagon and at least one Gulf state are reportedly in talks to buy cheaper Ukrainian interceptor missiles.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s Ministry of Defense said that alongside ground-based air defense, it is also using air force aircraft to intercept Iranian attacks, including Shahid drones.

Electronic warfare, which targets directed energy systems such as Shahed’s GPS and short-range missiles and Israel’s Iron Beam, also costs significantly less to operate than traditional interceptors.

Still, analysts say Gulf states currently lack high-velocity, high-volume counter-drone capabilities. Mr. Pelayo of the Atlantic Council said such a system would likely take years to develop and implement.