Supporters of the U.S. and Israeli military campaign against Iran argue that weakening Tehran by reducing its missile capabilities, disabling its navy, and reducing its ability to project power through regional allies will make the Middle East safer. However, this strategy is based on the premise that a weaker Iran will make the region more stable. In reality, destabilizing one of the largest and most strategically important countries in the Middle East could unleash far more dangerous forces than the current situation.
According to a briefing provided to Congressional staff in Washington, D.C., there was no information to suggest that Iran was planning an attack on the United States. However, military escalation continues, believing that weakening Iran is ultimately in the United States’ interests. If that assumption proves wrong, the consequences could be severe not only for the region but also for U.S. strategic interests.
The first danger is internal fragmentation. Iran’s population is ethnically diverse. Although Persians make up the majority, the country also has large communities of Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, and Balochs. Some of these groups already have a history of political tension and rebellion, including Kurdish militant activity in the northwest and a long-running Baloch insurgency in the southeast.
A strong central state has largely contained these fault lines. However, these tensions could escalate further if Iran’s governing institutions are significantly weakened. The result could be similar to the divisions seen in other Middle Eastern countries after external military pressure or regime collapse.
There are sobering examples in recent history. In Iraq, the dismantling of state institutions after the 2003 US invasion created the conditions for years of sectarian violence and the eventual rise of ISIL (ISIS). The collapse of the Libyan state in 2011 divided the country between competing governments and armed militias, and the crisis continues more than a decade later. The Syrian civil war has caused one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes of this century, with vast swathes of territory becoming a battleground for militias and extremist groups. At the height of the conflict, ISIS was able to capture and control territory across eastern Syria and declared a so-called caliphate controlling millions of people.
The collapse of Iran would create even more dangerous scenarios. It has a much larger population than Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and its territory borders multiple conflict-prone areas. The emergence of armed groups, ethnic militias, and rebel groups within Iran could quickly turn Iran into another theater of long-term instability.
Such instability is not localized. Iran is located in the heart of the Gulf, one of the world’s most strategically important energy corridors. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz along Iran’s southern coastline. Armed groups, rival militias, or an undisciplined navy operating off Iran’s coasts could disrupt shipping routes, attack tankers, or attempt to cut off access to the strait, potentially turning a regional crisis into a global energy shock. This would have an impact far beyond the Middle East. Rising energy prices will ripple through the global economy, affecting everything from transportation costs to inflation. Although U.S. policymakers often view energy insecurity as a regional problem, the reality is that energy insecurity is quickly becoming a global problem.
The strategic implications will be even wider. Iran currently serves as a central node in a network of regional alliances and proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. These actors operate within a framework influenced to varying degrees by the Iranian government. If the Iranian state were to weaken dramatically, its structure could fracture. Some groups operate independently, others compete for influence, and still others may become further radicalized without central coordination. As a result, the security environment across the Middle East will become more unpredictable, diplomatic engagement more difficult, and military conflict more difficult to contain.
Another risk lies in leadership uncertainty. Some policymakers assume that weakening Iran’s current leadership will lead to a more moderate political order. However, regime change rarely follows a predictable scenario.
Iran’s political system is home to multiple competing factions, including conservative clerical networks, reformist politicians, and powerful factions within the security apparatus such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Leadership change in Iran is not about a single successor, but about the balance of power between the clergy, elected officials, and security apparatus. That balance can quickly shift if existing leadership is weakened or removed during wartime. The Revolutionary Guards, which already control vast military and economic resources, could strengthen their authority and push Iran toward a more overtly militarized political order. In such an environment, more radical forces, especially those who believe that compromise with the United States is impossible, may gain influence.
There is also little evidence that continued military attacks will create pro-American sentiment among Iranians. History shows that external pressures often strengthen rather than weaken nationalist sentiment. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, did not generate pro-American attitudes, but rather fueled resentment and rebellion. Similarly, repeated Israeli military actions in Lebanon tend to strengthen rather than weaken support for Hezbollah.
Beyond the Middle East itself, instability in Iran could also trigger large-scale migration flows. Iran already hosts millions of refugees from neighboring countries, especially Afghanistan. If civil war breaks out within Iran, the displacement of even a small portion of Iran’s more than 90 million people could create a much larger migration flow than that seen during the recent Middle East crisis.
Many of these migrants are likely to head to Turkiye and eventually Europe, putting further pressure on a government already facing a migration crisis. Although this may seem far removed from mainland America, the political implications for America’s allies in Europe will inevitably impact transatlantic relations and Western cohesion.
Taken together, these risks reveal broader strategic issues. While weakening Iran may seem appealing to the United States from a narrow military perspective, destabilizing a regional power rarely produces orderly results.
The United States has faced similar dynamics before. The collapse of Iraq’s state power after 2003 did not eliminate threats in the region. It created something new. Libya’s division since 2011 has created a permanent security vacuum. The Syrian civil war has turned into a multifaceted conflict that has transformed the politics of the entire region.
For Washington, the question should be whether the long-term effects of destabilizing Iran will ultimately make the region and the world more dangerous. If recent history is any guide, destabilizing Iran could ultimately create the very threat the U.S. government hopes to eliminate.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
