Gulf states have spent years trying to broker peace between Iran and the West. Qatar mediated nuclear negotiations, Oman provided behind-the-scenes diplomacy, and Saudi Arabia maintained direct dialogue with Iran from 2024 to 2025. In any case, Iran attacked the Gulf states. The idea that Gulf states have a moral responsibility to protect Iran from the consequences of its actions on the basis of good neighborly relations is now grotesque in context. Iran did not return good neighborly relations. Iran returns ballistic missiles.
Iran’s position is based on three propositions. First, Iran acted in lawful self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The host country relinquished its territorial sovereignty by allowing U.S. military bases to be located within its territory. It argues that the definition of aggression in Resolution 3314 justifies attacks on these bases as legitimate military purposes. Each of these propositions is legally flawed, factually distorted, and tactically wrong. Taken together, this amounts to a legal argument that, if accepted, would permanently destabilize the Gulf, undermine fundamental principles of international law, and, in a bizarre twist, strengthen the very security threats to which Iran is responding.
Self-defense claim does not meet necessary legal standards
Article 51 of the UN Charter authorizes the use of force only in self-defense against an “armed attack,” and the term does not refer to a state invoking the use of force. The International Court of Justice has given a limited interpretation of the requirement for an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the UN Charter in cases such as Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (1986) and Oil Platforms (Iran v. United States) (2003). The court distinguished between the most serious uses of force, which amount to armed attacks invoking the right of self-defense, and less serious uses of force, which do not. Therefore, not all uses of force, such as minor incidents or limited military operations, constitute an armed attack. From this perspective, the mere presence of foreign military bases in the Gulf, maintained for decades under defense agreements with host governments, would not in itself amount to an armed attack against Iran.
Necessity and proportionality are also part of customary international law, which requires self-defense to be necessary and proportionate. Iran has also not held demonstrations. Targeting the territory of other sovereign Arab states in response to U.S. policy decisions is neither necessary since diplomatic and UN tools remain available, nor proportional as it would have military consequences for states that are not party to the conflict with Iran.
Importantly, Article 51 also includes a mandatory procedural element that states exercising self-defense must immediately notify the Security Council. Iran has consistently circumvented this requirement with each escalatory act. Although this may seem like a trivial element, it is actually a means by which the international community can verify and check claims of self-defense. States that circumvent this requirement have not adopted Article 51. This amounts to a misuse of the wording of Article 51.
Iran’s interpretation of resolution 3314 is a fundamental distortion
Article 3(f) of the Annex to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) (1974) states that acts of aggression include “acts in which a State authorizes another State to use its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to commit acts of aggression against a third State.” Iran could rely on this provision to hold Gulf states that host U.S. military bases accountable for any acts of aggression committed against Iran from their territory. Nevertheless, the mere presence of a military base is not sufficient to consider it a legitimate military purpose. This will depend on their actual contribution to military operations against Iran under the rules of international humanitarian law.
Such an interpretation of Iran would therefore be wrong on three different legal grounds.
First, Resolution 3314 is definitional in nature. This resolution was adopted to assist the Security Council in determining when an invasion has taken place, and is not intended to give states the power to unilaterally punish states deemed to have committed aggression through the use of force. The resolution itself asserts in Article 2 the Security Council’s authority to decide what constitutes an invasion. Self-application of Article 3(f) of the Resolution is therefore completely avoided.
Second, Article 3(f) speaks of the initiation of an active attack, rather than the passive acceptance of military bases. The legal distinction is a fundamental one. A state is exercising a certain degree of sovereignty by concluding a defense treaty with another state and stationing the latter’s military on its territory. States that actively initiate, coordinate, or enable military attacks against third parties are dealing with an entirely different problem. Iran has not credibly demonstrated this latter case. The presence of U.S. forces and bases in the Gulf has been a fact for decades, and does not constitute armed aggression against Iran under any legal standard.
Third, even if Article 3(f) were to apply, the appropriate course would be to bring the issue to the Security Council rather than launch a unilateral military attack. General Assembly resolutions do not invalidate the Charter. Iran cannot rely on non-binding resolutions that define conditions that override Chapter VII’s use of force requirements or Article 51’s clear standards.
Sovereignty cannot be determined by the strategic preferences of neighboring countries
Invoking the principle of good neighborliness, Iran is calling on Gulf Arab states to deny US base rights. Good neighborliness is a two-way principle, and interference in the internal affairs of other countries is not permitted. Of course, interfering with the decisions of another country simply because it is considered inconvenient for the intervening country is also not acceptable. All United Nations member states have the inherent right to conclude defense treaties with anyone they choose, regardless of the opinions of their neighbors.
The asymmetry of Iran’s position is striking and self-disqualifying. Iran itself has active military ties with Russia and China. Iran supports the activities of non-state military actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, providing weapons, finance, and training. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force operates openly in various states, and this has been widely documented in UN Panel of Experts reports and other international monitoring reports. According to the standards that Iran applies to Gulf states, a state that hosts within its territory the activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, the transfer of Iranian arms, or the coordination of Iranian proxies is engaging in aggression against third parties. Iran would not accept this principle if it were applied to its country. A legal principle that is unacceptable to the parties to which it applies is no legal principle at all. It’s a political tool.
A doctrine that defeats Iran’s own strategic interests
From the perspective of international relations theory, Iran’s position follows the logic of offensive realism, which seeks to eliminate the external balancing structure of its regional neighbors by claiming that they are inherently hostile. However, this approach is empirically self-defeating.
Under balance of threat theory, states respond to offensive capabilities, geographic proximity, and aggressive intent. Iran’s doctrine raises all threat variables for all states in the region to the highest level by asserting the right to attack any host state it perceives as a threat. A clear result, evident from the data, is that the integration of states and external powers in the region is not weakening, but is becoming more consolidated. A permanent base for the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, UAE negotiations over F-35s, Saudi Arabia’s THAAD deployment, and Qatar’s expansion of Al Udeid base are responses to Iranian escalation, not the cause.
From a constructivist perspective, the legitimacy of a legal argument is based in part on the normative credibility of the state presenting the argument. Iran’s record of compliance with IAEA regulations, including enriching uranium to over 60% purity in 2023-2024, obstructing inspections, removing surveillance cameras, and general violation of the non-proliferation regime, has seriously undermined the country’s credibility. A state that is itself a violator of the legal system cannot claim the role of the rule of law, seeking protection under the norms of the legal system.
Iran’s legal basis has always been theoretically flawed. What happened after February 28, 2026, made Iran’s actions morally and politically wrong. Iran did not just target U.S. military assets. The reality of the situation is now documented and cannot be denied. Early in the conflict, ballistic missiles and drones were launched against Gulf states. This is the first time that a single actor has attacked all six GCC countries simultaneously. Iran systematically escalated its attacks in stages. Day 1: Iranian missiles are fired at military bases. Day 2: Iranian missiles are fired at civilian infrastructure and airports. Day 3: Iranian missiles are fired at the energy sector. Days 3 and 4: The US Embassy in Riyadh is attacked by Iran. International airports in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait were attacked by Iranian missiles, resulting in the suspension of flights across the region. Video from Bahrain recorded Iranian Shahed drones attacking an apartment building. This is not self-defense. This is collective punishment for sovereign states that have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid conflict.
Given the actions Iran itself has taken, the rationale provided by Iran misses the point. The doctrine held that only targets involved in preparing or launching attacks against Iran were legitimate targets. Civilian airports are not military bases. The Palm Jumeirah hotel is not a military headquarters. Manama apartment complexes are not weapons storage facilities. None of these targets were legitimate, according to Iran’s own stated legal rationale, and yet they were attacked. This was not a legal principle at all. It was a pretext for coercion, and the conduct of the war revealed this to be the case.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
