The resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah has come as little surprise to those who have been following closely. The question was not whether the conflict would recur, but when. The arrangements following the Nov. 27, 2024 ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel were widely understood to be temporary and structurally weak, leaving the underlying dynamics of the conflict largely untouched.
The ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and France was formally aimed at ending active hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. In reality, however, this agreement did not truly end the conflict. Israeli forces maintained a presence within Lebanese territory, and military attacks against Lebanon continued on an almost daily basis. The agreement itself contained significant ambiguities. It recognized the Israeli military’s ability to carry out operations whenever it perceived a potential threat to security.
This provision created a fundamental imbalance. The U.S.-chaired monitoring mechanism, which also includes France and includes the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Israeli military, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), was tasked with monitoring the deal, but lacked the authority to independently verify whether the threats raised by Israel were genuine or whether the targeted locations were indeed Hezbollah strongholds. More importantly, the mechanism did not establish a clear process for verifying or adjudicating violations of the agreement. As a result, accountability remained vague from the beginning.
In line with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL was the only international organization to systematically document violations. UNIFIL records more than 10,000 violations of Lebanese airspace and more than 1,400 military operations by Israel within Lebanese territory between November 27, 2024 and the end of February 2026. These incidents left around 400 people dead and over 1,100 injured in Lebanon.
After the US-Israel war against Iran resumed hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, the monitoring mechanism itself collapsed. The final, and likely final, meeting at the end of February, with no Israeli representatives present, ended the framework intended to oversee the cease-fire agreement.
Meanwhile, in addition to establishing two buffer zones, Israeli forces still maintain control of five strongholds in Lebanese territory near the villages of Rabune, Marwahin, Aitaroun, Hula and Sarad. According to the terms of the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, Israeli forces were expected to withdraw from these locations to allow for the deployment of the LAF, but this transition never materialized.
During this period, UNIFIL worked with the LAF to facilitate the redeployment of the Lebanese army to southern Lebanon, returning several positions to Lebanese state control. However, continued Israeli attacks and military presence have prevented the LAF from fully regaining authority in the south and restoring legitimate government institutions throughout the region.
The new conflict that erupted on March 2, 2026 appears to be even more asymmetrical, unpredictable, and violent than the previous conflict. One of the main reasons is the absence of active diplomatic mediation that could de-escalate. Unlike earlier phases of the conflict, when international diplomacy, however limited, sought to prevent a full-scale war, this new phase unfolded in a relative diplomatic vacuum.
Since the widespread conflict began in 2023, Israel’s political and military leaders have repeatedly expressed their intention to create a security buffer north of the Blue Line with little civilian presence. Attack patterns observed since late 2024 suggest continued efforts to create just such a reality on the ground. The scale of the destruction in southern Lebanon supports this interpretation, with many villages near the Blue Line severely damaged and several communities nearly destroyed. Notably, much of this destruction occurred after the Nov. 27 ceasefire, by which time much of the civilian population had already been evacuated and Hezbollah attacks against Israel had ceased.
Attempts to restore local governance and services in affected villages are quickly facing setbacks. Whenever local governments attempted to rebuild administrative centers using temporary structures such as prefabricated buildings and containers, these structures were frequently attacked. These attacks prevented the recovery of civilian life and the rebuilding of local institutions.
Recent reports indicate the presence of Israeli forces in other villages in southern Lebanon, including Ramya, Yaroun, Hura, Kafr Qera, Qiam, Kfar Shuba, Aytaloun, and Markaba. If confirmed, this would mean a further expansion of Israel’s operational presence within Lebanese territory, with no timetable for withdrawal in sight.
These developments place significant burdens on international law, particularly on the principles of sovereignty and protection of civilians. However, the international community’s reaction has been surprisingly muted. Diplomatic efforts to mediate the conflict have so far failed to materialize.
The situation was further exacerbated by the controversial decision adopted by the Security Council on August 31, 2025. This decision was primarily driven by the U.S. government during the mission’s annual mandate renewal debate.
The new resolution granted peacekeepers one last update, calling for them to cease operations by the end of 2026 and for a final closure by 2027. If this decision remains in effect, southern Lebanon could soon be without an international military presence capable of monitoring the situation, assisting civilians, and assisting in the redeployment of the LAF.
The impact of such an absence is profound, greatly increasing the risk of miscalculation and uncontrollable escalation.
The alleged use of white phosphorus along the Blue Line and the repeated spraying of chemical pesticides to prevent farmers from replanting their crops suggest a deliberate effort to keep the area free of population and civilian infrastructure. These actions will further depopulate border areas, while further weakening southern Lebanon’s already severely damaged agricultural economy, which could have long-term socio-economic consequences.
Compared to the 2023-2024 conflict, current hostilities have also expanded geographically. Air raids and attacks are now occurring in a wider range of parts of Lebanon, including areas previously considered relatively safe. This expansion could increase public anxiety and destabilize Lebanon’s already fragile political balance.
The domestic situation in Lebanon remains extremely sensitive. Continued military pressure risks shifting political alliances, weakening state institutions and further weakening Lebanese security forces.
For many Lebanese, the growing pattern of attacks brings back memories of past periods of civil war and internal unrest. Such a dynamic could serve Israel’s strategic interests by further weakening Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s renewed attacks on Israel, reportedly in the wake of the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, may also reflect the dynamics of what the group perceives as an existential conflict shaped in part by ideological imperatives. Hezbollah has long described itself as a pillar of the “axis of resistance,” and its continued commitment to Israel strengthens this identity.
At the same time, Hezbollah faces internal political challenges. The organization has sought to reaffirm its relevance in Lebanon’s evolving political landscape. In this context, new military activities could serve as a means of demonstrating that armed resistance remains necessary.
In recent months, the LAF has attempted to retake areas of southern Lebanon with considerable determination, despite limited resources. However, these efforts never matched the level of international support promised. The international community, weakened and divided, often constrained by geopolitical alignments and the primacy of US and Israeli strategic priorities, proved unable to provide sustained support.
Recent developments have led Israel to prepare for a possible ground invasion of Lebanon. Such an operation would follow a long historical pattern of Israeli military interventions in the country, including in 1978, 1982, 2006, and most recently in 2024.
If a ground attack were to materialize, it could have serious implications for Lebanon and regional stability. The current trajectory suggests a dangerous convergence of military escalation, institutional weakness, and diplomatic paralysis. Without renewed international engagement and reliable mediation, the Israeli-Lebanese border risks falling into another protracted and catastrophic phase of conflict.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
