Sudan’s civil war will soon enter its fourth year, with no end in sight. The conflict has also drawn in other regional actors who support and sustain the war by supporting Sudan’s belligerent factions. This risks triggering wider repercussions in the region, with serious repercussions both inside and outside Sudan. Sudanese civilians are paying the price.
On the military front, momentum is shifting between the Sudanese army and the militia Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Currently, the front is mainly extending along the central and western parts of Kordofan, with no decisive breakthrough in sight. As the war approaches its fourth year, the conflict is steadily regionalizing to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, making it extremely difficult to reach a settlement. Deeply funded external backers are turning Sudan into an indirect theater of conflict. Their funding, weapons, and logistics shape battlefield calculations, maintain combat capability, and sometimes shift military momentum, prolonging conflicts and reducing incentives for compromise.
On one side stands Sudan’s military, which brings together a coalition of supporters including Egypt, Eritrea, Turkiye, Qatar, Iran, and initially neutral mediator Saudi Arabia. These countries, along with the United Nations and the Arab League, recognize Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the military commander, as Sudan’s head of state. Most frame their support as support for the government in the fight against domestic rebellion.
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates is a major backer of the RSF, providing financial, military and logistical support. This support enabled the RSF to sustain large-scale operations, including the long-running battle of El Fasher. After the city fell after a nearly 18-month siege, images and testimonies of atrocities including executions, torture, kidnappings and sexual violence circulated. The scare triggered a wave of critical press coverage of Abu Dhabi’s role, but this has not affected Emirati support.
Sudan’s geopolitical position helps explain why external powers continue to be deeply invested. The country is located at the crossroads of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and North Africa. For some regional powers, the war concerns not only Sudan itself, but also their own security interests and the projection of influence in a rapidly changing and contested regional order.
Sudan’s African neighbors have also been drawn into the conflict, sometimes for direct national interest and sometimes because of incentives offered as transit points for arms and supplies. These dynamics could exacerbate existing fault lines across the Horn of Africa and consolidate multiple regional conflicts with Sudan at their epicenter.
Tension engulfs diplomatic efforts
On September 12, 2025, after months of US-led negotiations, the Quad – the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt – proposed a roadmap to end the war. There were early diplomatic developments within the Quad format, including agreement on major principles and indirect consultations. In theory, coordination between these external supporters could create meaningful pressure on both the SAF and RSF to negotiate an end to the war.
Instead, tensions between Quad members Saudi Arabia and the UAE have escalated, overshadowing roadmap negotiations.
In December, these tensions exploded in public. Yemen’s UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council launched a surprise attack on Saudi-backed forces near the Saudi border, angering Riyadh and sparking a rare public rupture between the two Gulf powers. Saudi Arabia publicly condemned the UAE and demanded its complete withdrawal. The UAE subsequently announced its withdrawal. However, the cracks have not yet been filled. Saudi-aligned media now regularly accuse the UAE of “destabilizing the region,” including Sudan.
The UAE-Saudi feud risks exacerbating the intractable nature of the war. For example, there could be more overt support for the military from Egypt, Turkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. And few expect the UAE to reduce its support to the RSF.
The US must push harder
The United States remains at the center of the push to end the war, despite continuing questions about whether the Trump administration intends to follow through on efforts to end the war. These questions may be heightened amid the war that the United States and Israel have launched against Iran, which has also retaliated by attacking Gulf states.
All these developments raise questions about whether the Quad negotiations over Sudan will make any progress in the short term. As Gulf states respond to unprecedented security threats, attention is unlikely to turn to Sudan. But the same crisis can also create opportunities. Facing common security challenges, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may find reason to put aside some differences, such as those over Sudan. If this happens, the effect could be constructive and help revive stalled diplomatic efforts to end the war. The United States and European powers, as well as other regional actors such as Turkiye, Egypt, and other Gulf states, should help broker a de-escalation between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, which should be used as an important step toward a ceasefire in Sudan. For such a ceasefire to occur between the two warring parties, Sudan would now need to initiate an internal political process, likely facilitated by the African Union and the United Nations.
There is also an urgent need to cool down temperatures in the Horn of Africa, which is at risk of a broader regional war due in part to tensions over the Sudanese conflict. It is time for African and other leaders to step up and try to de-escalate the situation.
Even though the war with Iran is escalating and attracting worldwide attention, it is important to remember that Sudan’s conflict is also poised to escalate unless further steps are taken to stop it.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
