Over the past few months, the geopolitical chessboard has tilted dramatically, with the steps being laid for the much-anticipated but asymmetrical summit between President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, which has now been officially set for May 13-15 following statements from both the White House and China’s Foreign Ministry. While Washington has repeatedly expressed the importance it attaches to the talks, Beijing approached them in a characteristically cautious manner, viewing the summit not as a breakthrough but as part of a broader need for “communication” and “strategic guidance” between the great powers.
This subtle diplomatic maneuver speaks volumes about the changing global balance of power. For the first time in decades, the United States finds itself in a position of acute vulnerability and increased dependence on Chinese cooperation to extricate itself from a disaster of its own making.
The cause of this American predicament is the recent failure of military adventurism in the Middle East. Having launched an illegal and unprovoked war against Iran alongside Israel, the US military has found itself mired in a costly and long stalemate. In retaliation, the Iranian government has effectively closed off the Strait of Hormuz, with more than a dozen US warships now enforcing a naval blockade and rerouting dozens of ships, shocking global energy markets and raising fears of a global economic meltdown. Washington now finds itself racing for the exit.
In a surprising reversal from their usual hawkish rhetoric, U.S. government officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, have increasingly doubled down on the public’s desperate pleas for Chinese intervention. They are calling on China to use its considerable influence to persuade Iran to reopen the vital waterway.
What makes this dynamic particularly striking is the contradiction at the heart of U.S. policy. While Mr. Trump and Mr. Rubio have appealed for Chinese aid in the Hormuz crisis, the broader U.S. posture remains confrontational as disputes over technology regulations and other issues continue. This contradiction reveals that the regime is increasingly driven by despair.
The U.S. government narrative conveniently frames China as the party most desperate for a solution, citing Beijing’s heavy dependence on Middle Eastern energy imports. However, this assessment largely misunderstands China’s strategic preparedness. Far from being paralyzed by the turmoil, Beijing has already shown remarkable resilience. Through careful stockpiling, a diversified supply chain, and strong domestic production, China coped extremely well with the shutdown and avoided the immediate economic shock that the U.S. government had anticipated.
As a result, the Chinese government views the standoff in Hormuz as a crucial stress test that it has already overcome. Aware of the risks, China is in no hurry to bail out belligerent Washington. Recent diplomatic activity has made this increasingly clear. China has maintained close communication with Iran throughout the crisis, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosting Iran’s foreign minister for consultations on the situation. Rather than simply pressuring Iran to reopen Hormuz, Beijing is demanding a comprehensive “grand deal.” Why settle for small concessions when you can force the United States to cease hostilities against Iran, lift crippling sanctions, and embrace a new multipolar security architecture in the Middle East?
Iran offered a response to a U.S. proposal to end the war that focused on a cessation of hostilities and efforts to secure the strait, but President Trump quickly rejected it as “completely unacceptable,” underscoring the continuing impasse that the U.S. hopes China can break.
Although China did not start this fire, it is now an essential force that can extinguish it strictly on its own terms. Beyond the immediate crisis, Beijing’s ultimate strategic focus remains unwavering: the Taiwan issue. This broad assertiveness will undoubtedly continue into the Trump-Xi summit. While President Trump is desperate for tangible deliverables and photo-ops to distract from the domestic turmoil, Mr. Xi can afford to play the long game.
Unlike previous administrations, which got away with vague diplomatic pleasantries, Beijing is expected to significantly increase pressure. China is likely to demand that the United States move beyond its current lukewarm pledge to simply “not support” separatist forces and explicitly oppose Taiwanese independence.
Recognizing Trump’s eagerness to win, the US president may try to use Taiwan as a bargaining chip. He could make concessions on this issue and even help broker peace in other disputes in exchange for China’s cooperation in reopening the Strait of Hormuz and purchasing large quantities of American agricultural and energy products.
However, the Chinese government is too disciplined to fall into such short-term traps. Taiwan is a non-negotiable core interest, and temporary trade-offs are strategically unwise.
Trump may lavish praise on his personal relationship with Xi Jinping and project an image of friendly dealings, but Beijing has no illusions about the man on the other side of the table. China’s leadership understands that Trump cannot be trusted. An agreement reached today could be scrapped tomorrow based on his whims or domestic political calculations. Beijing has welcomed the prospect of a “big deal” and maintained a friendly façade, but has refused to rely structurally on President Trump’s promises.
By stabilizing its bilateral relationship with the United States over the coming months, China aims to ensure a predictable external environment conducive to its long-term rise, especially with several high-level meetings scheduled between the two countries’ leaders throughout the year.
But for Beijing, the stakes go far beyond Taiwan. A key priority for China is also to secure firm guarantees regarding Japan’s rearmament trajectory. As Tokyo rapidly expands its military and becomes increasingly willing to intervene in Taiwan’s contingencies, China will demand that the United States strictly rein in its allies’ ambitions.
On a broader geopolitical scale, Beijing has positioned itself as a responsible stabilizing power and has repeatedly called on the international community to defuse the Hormuz crisis and prevent widespread economic turmoil. In doing so, China draws a sharp contrast to the United States, which openly launches illegal wars and engages in what critics call state terrorism, including extrajudicial kidnappings and killings of foreign leaders and their families.
After all, the coming days are critical not only for the future of U.S.-China relations, but also for the resolution of the U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the broader structure of the international order. The era of American unilateralism is dying in the Gulf. China will enter the Trump-Xi summit in an advantageous position, armed with strategic patience and increasingly powerful leverage in the crisis.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
