After nearly half a century of direct conflict, the United States finally went to war with Iran. After 15 weeks, the battle was over. This regime not only survived a confrontation with the world’s most powerful military, but emerged believing itself stronger than before.
Despite US President Donald Trump declaring the US had already won just days after the war began, Iran maintained its ability to fight back until an interim cease-fire agreement was reached with the US. Its most powerful weapon turned out to be effectively blocking the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world’s oil passes, causing the largest oil supply shock in history.
Iran is betting its survival on strategic victory over the United States and Israel. However, surviving a war may prove easier than winning peace. Assuming the ceasefire holds, the more important battle is whether the Islamic Republic’s leaders can translate their defiance into sanctions relief, economic recovery, and enough public support to secure the regime’s future.
Predicting its victory, the Iranian regime empowered a hardline leadership, launched missiles and drones into neighboring countries, rejected a temporary ceasefire, and doubled down on its nuclear program.
It also appointed Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of assassinated Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to succeed his father in a deliberate show of continuity that counters the Islamic Republic’s long-standing taboo against hereditary rule. The United States still maintains a functioning government and a cohesive military capable of launching ballistic missiles that threaten Washington’s regional allies and the global economy.
A memorandum of understanding agreed between the United States and Iran over the weekend provides for an “immediate and permanent” cessation of hostilities, paves the way for the lifting of all sanctions against Iran, and lifts the freeze on its assets, without forcing Iran to abandon its missile program or support for regional proxies. In return, Tehran reiterated its longstanding pledge not to build nuclear weapons, pledged to dilute uranium to near-weapons-grade uranium, and agreed to lift the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This is a concession that does not go far beyond what was offered before the war.
“There is a strong sense of confidence for the Islamic Republic and its supporters that they are being left alone to take the biggest blow that the United States and Israel can inflict, and that they are getting concessions,” said Sheena Toosi, senior non-resident fellow at the Center for International Policy.
But experts say any sense of victory could quickly dissipate if the regime fails to translate its wartime successes into domestic gains, which may require reining in hardliners’ appetite for continuing the conflict.
Iran’s generals and warmongering politicians have long prided themselves on their ability to fight back. This confrontation emboldened them. They see the result as evidence that it was military strategy, not diplomacy or compromise, that forced the deal.
Hardliners have risen to power and command of the battlefield, and their supporters now fill Iran’s streets daily with rallies celebrating the new legitimacy forged by surviving U.S. and Israeli attacks. Moderate President Massoud Pezeshkian remains constrained by executive rule, and his reformist comrades have been sidelined, some reportedly under house arrest.
But experts say the Islamic Republic’s fundamental problems remain unresolved. Unless it can translate its purported victories into tangible economic benefits for ordinary citizens, the regime may have to continue to reckon with a turbulent future at home and potential foreign enemies.
“They (regimes) are more confident and probably have more support because they survived the war and they have a good loyal base,” said Sanam Baqir, head of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House think tank in London. “But there are still people who want the Islamic Republic to end.”
Despite widespread hardship, daily life in Iran has largely continued despite the greatest existential threat in the Islamic Republic’s 47-year history. Military and economic recovery strategies prepared the country for a protracted conflict, in which asymmetric tactics proved effective and a new generation of commanders emerged.
But ordinary Iranians have also borne the brunt of the U.S. attack, with more than 3,000 people killed in more than three months of war. Prices for basic goods have soared, many people have lost their jobs, and millions are now at risk of falling into poverty amid widespread economic struggles.
“The Iranian people need to know the benefits of war,” CIP analyst Toosi said. “The Islamic Republic says its grand strategy will work and a new regional order will emerge, but if the people cannot understand this at the dinner table, the problems of the regime will not be resolved.”
Just weeks before the war, the Islamic Republic faced one of its biggest threats at home, with tens of thousands of people taking to the streets to protest dire economic conditions exacerbated by U.S. sanctions. The government’s brutal crackdown has left thousands dead, but the movement has exposed the weakness of the regime and its leadership.
Protesters and political opponents alike are witnessing enemy infiltration, facing President Trump’s claims to arm ethnic rebels, and must reckon with an increasingly paranoid administration. The Islamic Republic will enjoy new boldness in confronting dissent.
Crucially, the Iranian government must contend with well-entrenched hardliners within the regime, including powerful figures who vehemently oppose the terms of the current agreement with the United States and have previously tried to sabotage diplomacy to promote war.
In the belief that they are the victors of this war, these hardliners argue that the deal amounts to a surrender to the United States and an abandonment of Iran’s core priorities. Like President Trump, but for different reasons, they opposed the 2015 Iran nuclear deal reached under the Obama administration.
To appease both protesters and hardliners, Iranian negotiators are expected to insist to their U.S. counterparts that any final deal must include significant sanctions relief and the unfreezing of Iranian assets.
The administration understands that purely symbolic victories will not be enough to win over regime opponents who have temporarily put aside their grievances in favor of wartime unity, and hardliners who have reluctantly halted calls for war with the promise of major concessions from Washington.
And without significant sanctions relief that would alleviate the suffering of ordinary Iranians and put the country on a clear path to economic recovery, difficult questions about the regime’s longstanding policy of defiance toward the United States could rise again.
Paradoxically, such a bailout and unfreezing of assets would almost certainly be interim for key concessions on Iran’s nuclear program, concessions that hardliners are likely to reject.
And the main untested variable will be what comes with Mojtaba Khamenei’s leadership. He has not yet appeared in public, and it remains unclear what form his leadership will take as supreme leader.
“Will governments become more exclusive or more inclusive in the aftermath of the war, and what are the social and political freedoms?” asked analyst Tossi. “All of this will become clearer in the coming months.”
