When Nvidia’s longtime chief security officer and head of product security resigned in August, there was little reason for outsiders to notice. Just two and a half months later, CEO Jensen Huang himself quit the company, citing growing questions about his extramarital affairs. It began with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data center company that U.S. investigators suspect of leaking Nvidia chips to China, and then expanded to reports of two separate incidents with Nvidia employees.
At the time, David Reber, who had worked for four years as CSO and seven years across NVIDIA, said he was retiring for health reasons. “This wasn’t the change of direction I had planned, but I know what comes first: my family and my health,” he wrote on LinkedIn in late August, revealing that he was diagnosed with early-onset Parkinson’s disease more than two years ago.
Reber’s successor, Saša Zdjelar, spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager, followed by a year at Salesforce and several years at cybersecurity firm ReversingLabs. Zugelar did not respond to questions Thursday about the transition or what the security team knows.
Although there is no public information linking Reber or Zdjelar’s role changes to the Megaspeed issue, it seems reasonable to wonder what Nvidia’s security team knew about Huang’s relationship with government surveillance of Megaspeed, and whether anyone raised concerns. Mr. Lever did not respond to questions Thursday. Nvidia also did not respond to related questions.
Not all of these relationships are the security team’s job. Relationships with subordinates are typically handled by human resources, legal, and the board of directors. However, an affair with a corporate executive under federal investigation is different. (Megaspeed has denied any wrongdoing.) Security experts say the incident could create vulnerabilities that foreign intelligence agencies may seek to exploit.
Finding such exposure is not easy. Nicholas Eftimiades, a retired senior intelligence officer who has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, said the way intelligence agencies collect information, much of it through everyday conversations rather than hacking, makes it especially difficult for security teams to identify risks.
Some people within Nvidia clearly knew part of the picture. Nvidia’s top lawyer was involved in the government’s Megaspeed investigation more than a year ago, The New York Times reported earlier this week. (NVIDIA said it was in regular contact with officials.) Reports about Huang’s relationships with employees suggest that his co-workers were also aware of them, even though the conduct is not explicitly prohibited by Nvidia’s code of conduct. The Times cited five Nvidia employees who said he had relationships with his direct vice president, and Reuters later reported a second relationship, citing two people familiar with the matter. What is unclear is whether any of them achieved security.
Even if it did reach Nvidia’s security team, Eftimiades, who wrote “Chinese Espionage and Tactics” in 2020, said security teams often have limited resources. First, unlike other cost centers, they are not profitable and are therefore often underfunded. He said it’s surprisingly common for CEOs to respond to security team warnings with “nothing more than compliance.”
Experts say many companies define security very narrowly. “Too many companies still approach security primarily in terms of protecting facilities, preventing cyberattacks, and responding to physical threats,” Don Aviv, CEO of corporate research firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz wrote in an op-ed for The Hill. They argued that “security teams need to pay greater attention to insider threats, including the development of executives and employees by foreign intelligence agencies, suspicious business relationships, conflicts of interest, and attempts to obtain sensitive information through trusted personal contacts.”
Still, some of it is beyond what any team can do. Speaking generally, and not about Huang, Eftimiades offered the theory that CEOs complain they can’t do something because “I’m fighting a board that doesn’t want to do this.” This will tell intelligence agencies who the obstruction is. The service then asks, “Who is the fault here?” Then find a way to access that person’s email and phone.
Rival intelligence agencies often want policy insights, such as who is driving changes to export rules and who are the biggest obstacles, rather than technology. “The Intel world tends to be like a cancer,” he says. “Once inside the body, it spreads out and looks like it’s trying to reach out.”
This strategy is not new, “especially for China,” Eftimiades added. Any executive who does business with this country “will tell you they’ve been approached.” He said there are “a lot of diplomat stories” about American diplomats going into hotel rooms and finding women in their beds. What’s new compared to Soviet-era espionage, he says, is the relationships these services now cultivate over years rather than weeks.
Eftimiades said technology can augment human intelligence, pointing to IMSI’s catcher as an example. These devices mimic cell towers, so nearby phones connect to them. He said the basic version costs about $1,000 and fits in a suitcase, but government-grade models cost much more.
Eftimiades said no one knows yet whether these were used against Huang. Huang’s phone has likely been hardened to detect, if not completely prevent, a breach. But in any case, what NVIDIA’s security team knew and was able to act on it should become clearer as the board’s independent review and federal investigation progress.
Meanwhile, Eftimiades said he hopes the entire episode serves as a “wake-up call” to American industry, which is largely “ignorant” about Chinese tactics. “We lost trillions of dollars of intellectual property,” he estimates. “Everything we think we’re doing isn’t working.”
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