In recent months, a new fundamental idea of “Article 5-like” guarantees has taken hold in European and US discussions regarding Ukraine. In March, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni first proposed a mechanism inspired by Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which provides for collective action in the event of an attack on a member state. US President Donald Trump’s team then pushed for US “Article 5-type” guarantees outside of NATO in August. In September, French President Emmanuel Macron capped the shift by gathering 26 European partners in Paris and pledging to form a post-war “security force.”
These suggestions may sound reassuring, but they are not. In a world where we face nightly drone attacks, blurred maritime boundaries, and constant pressure on critical infrastructure, replicating NATO’s words without the NATO machinery will endanger Ukraine and make Europe unsafe.
Russian activities within NATO territory have gone from rare to routine. On September 10, 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace during a widespread attack on Ukraine. NATO jets shot down the threatening aircraft, and Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Charter, which allows for consultations in the event of a threat.
Denmark temporarily closed several airports in the weeks that followed after repeated drone sightings. A few days later, French sailors boarded a tanker suspected of being part of a Russian-linked “shadow fleet” that took part in the drone sabotage.
Germany also reported coordinated drone flights over refineries, shipyards, university hospitals and the Kiel Canal. Meanwhile, months of damage to undersea cables and energy links across the Baltic Sea are a growing concern.
Each episode is serious. However, none of them clearly exceeded the legal standard for invoking the right of collective self-defense under Article 5.
That is the core problem with “NATO-style” guarantees. Article 5 is powerful because it provides that an attack on one country is an attack on all, but it still requires a political process that begins with consultation and allows each ally to freely decide how to respond. It was written for visible aggression. Lines of troops lined up on the border. A ship firing across the battle lines. Fighter planes attack the territory.
Today’s reality is different. Launching drones from outside Ukrainian territory, overnight incursions into allied infrastructure, and cutting cables by ships are meant to fall just below the formal threshold. A copy of Article 5 outside of NATO’s joint command would be even slower and weaker than the original without an allied presence or pre-agreed rules for Ukraine.
When considering Kiev’s security mechanisms, allies need to recognize that Kiev is no longer a consumer of security. It is a security contributor. After the Polish incident, allies began seeking Ukraine’s counter-drone know-how. Ukrainian experts have been sent to Denmark to share tactics such as sensor fusion, jamming and the use of low-cost interceptors.
NATO leaders are now openly saying that Europe must learn how to defeat cheap drones without launching missiles that cost hundreds of thousands of euros. This is a notable change. Ukraine is not just protected. Helping build it.
Ukraine’s allies also need to remember what happened in 1994. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Kiev gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for political “security” from several countries, including Russia and the United States. These warranties were not legally binding.
In 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and fomented war in Donbas, while denying the presence of Russian troops and using soldiers without insignia to obscure the situation. Even if Ukraine had joined NATO at the time, its ambiguity would have raised questions about whether Article 5 would apply. In 2022, Russia openly invaded.
Clearly, arguments over unenforceable promises and thresholds will not stop determined aggressors. That’s why we need guarantees that automatically trigger action, rather than statements that can be debated on the fly.
What works is a package that is more stringent than Article 5 on issues that matter to subthreshold adversaries, such as time, automaticity, presence, intelligence, and productivity.
First, you need an automatic trigger. Legally authorized “if-then” mechanisms must be triggered within hours if clear indicators are met. State-originated drones or missiles enter Ukrainian airspace from outside. Massive drone incursions into border areas. Destructive cyber attacks or sabotage against defined critical infrastructure. The initial package will include both military measures and strong sanctions. Consultations coordinate responses, not decide whether to respond.
Second, we need a joint air and sea shield that treats Ukraine’s skies and neighboring seas as one operational situation. Allies will need to maintain continuous air radar and maritime patrol coverage. Fuse the sensor from low altitude to high altitude. Participants’ rules for shooting down drones along the agreed path. It combines electronic warfare, directed energy and radio frequency tools, low-cost interceptor missiles and classic surface-to-air missiles. The challenge is economic. Europe must make Russian drone strikes expensive, not for itself but for Moscow.
Third, there must be a visible presence and ready logistics. Before a ceasefire can be reached, the allies will need to build forward logistics in Poland and Romania, including ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance bases, and build air bridges to Ukraine. After an agreed ceasefire, multinational forces, air defense personnel, maritime patrol teams, and engineers can be sent in turn to Ukrainian ports and airfields. The objective would not be to establish a permanent base, but to ensure that any new attack would immediately draw in multiple capitals.
Fourth, we need an intelligence compact. Allies need to move from ad hoc sharing to an institutional arrangement with Ukraine that integrates satellites, signals, open source, and battlefield sensors into a common near-real-time product. The focus is on quick attribution. The right to protect yourself depends on what you can prove, and deterrence depends on knowing that your adversary can prove it quickly.
Fifth, you need to sign a production contract. The multi-year funding should anchor co-production of drones, air defense components and artillery shells in Ukraine, alongside European and American factories producing high-end systems that are still lacking in Ukraine and Europe. Allies should commit to purchasing Ukrainian systems on a large scale and tying guarantees to contracted production volumes rather than communiqués. Empty magazines make empty promises.
These measures do not imitate the text of Article 5. These measures will counter another threat using the tools available to counter it. Europe’s recent experience in Polish skies, German shipyards, Danish airports, and the Baltic Sea shows how an enemy can apply steady pressure without triggering the classic definition of an “armed attack.”
If Ukraine only receives “NATO-style” language, similar gaps will carry over outside the alliance. Instead, if Ukraine and its partners secure automated responses, shared aerial imagery, visible presence, real-time information, and an industrial base to keep up, they will build something stronger: guarantees that work in the world as it is, not in the world as it was.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
