Pakistan seems to have caught the geopolitical wind just right. Last month, Pakistan signed a defense pact with Saudi Arabia. Under this bold agreement, an attack on one side would be considered an attack on both, dramatically increasing security in an already fraught region. At the same time, Islamabad is secretly shipping samples of rare earth minerals to the United States and seeking deeper export deals. Meanwhile, the US government appears to have a renewed interest in treating Pakistan as more than just a peripheral irritant.
These moves suggest momentum. Commentators in Islamabad and Riyadh are calling this a revival of Pakistani foreign policy and a belated recognition of the country’s strategic imperatives. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s attendance at the Gaza peace summit only reinforced the impression that the country is returning to the center stage of the Islamic world.
However, this is not an overnight miracle. It is a product of changing needs, pressures, and adjustments in volatile regions. Behind the optics lies a harsher reality.
The first impetus for Pakistan’s foreign policy push was the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Washington’s sudden departure still leaves a void that they are struggling to fill. With the strong presence of hostile Iran and the Taliban, the United States needs a counterweight in the region. Pakistan, because of its geography, intelligence networks, and long-standing ties to Afghanistan, has suddenly become an important issue again.
US President Donald Trump’s demand that the Taliban hand over Bagram Air Base, five years after signing an agreement paving the way for a US withdrawal, underscores the US’s search for influence. If this strategy fails, Pakistan will clearly become a backward country. It would be the only country with both the logistical capabilities and political connections to help Washington maintain a presence in the region.
The second factor is uncertainty in US-India relations. Over the past decade, Washington has drawn New Delhi deeper into its Indo-Pacific strategy and strengthened its global profile in ways that Pakistan views as threatening. However, US-India friction is increasing. Disputes over visas and customs are intensifying. India’s embrace of Moscow raised eyebrows in Washington.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Beijing in August sent a clear signal that India is ready to avoid risks with China. Economically, his “Make in India” program, modeled after East Asia’s low-cost export strategy, could undermine U.S. manufacturing. For President Trump, who wants to maintain balance in Asia, Pakistan once again appears useful as a counterweight to India’s flirtation with Beijing.
The third and most destabilizing factor is mineral diplomacy. Islamabad’s outreach to Washington has focused on the promise of access to rare earth minerals, many of which are located in restive areas of Balochistan province. In theory, this looks like a win-win. Pakistan gains investment and the United States secures vital resources. But the reality is much darker. Balochistan remains Pakistan’s poorest province despite decades of extraction. Infrastructure projects are underutilized, airports remain empty and unemployment remains high.
The Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act, 2025, passed by the provincial assembly in March, has only increased frustration. Under the law, Islamabad is formally empowered to recommend mining policy and licensing decisions in Balochistan, a move that has sparked opposition across the political spectrum. Critics say this undermines local autonomy and centralizes control of Islamabad. Even right-wing religious parties such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F), which rarely aligns with nationalist groups, have voiced opposition, arguing that the law is yet another attempt to strip local communities of their legitimate interest in state resources.
This rebound highlights a dangerous trend. Exploitation of resources without local participation fuels resentment and rebellion. By opening its mineral resources to foreign investors without social safeguards, Islamabad risks further alienating a province already scarred by conflict and militarization. What looks like relief in Islamabad can look like dispossession in Quetta.
Taken together, these factors suggest that the shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy is less a renaissance than a calculated pivot under pressure. The vacuum in Afghanistan, the recalibration of US-India relations, and the lure of mineral diplomacy all explain Islamabad’s new prominence. But nothing erases the underlying vulnerability. As priorities shift, the US government may once again treat Pakistan as expendable. India’s importance in US strategy has not disappeared. And if resource transactions continue to be extractive and exclusive, discontent in Balochistan will only deepen.
The applause in Riyadh, the high profile at the Gaza summit, and the polite handshakes in Washington should not be mistaken for strategic renewal. Pakistan is acting cautiously, improvising under pressure and trying to turn vulnerabilities into opportunities. But the real test lies at home. Unless Islamabad is able to confront governance failures, regional inequalities, and political distrust, foreign policy gains will remain weak.
Ultimately, no defense or minerals agreement can replace a stable social contract within Pakistan. That is the true renaissance that Pakistan is still waiting for.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
