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Recent fighting between the Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led group that controls much of northeastern Syria, has ended with the government significantly expanding its control, particularly in Arab-majority areas. Washington, long a major backer of the SDF, brokered a ceasefire but sided with Damascus, declaring it was time for the SDF to be reintegrated into the new Syrian state. This surprising axis has been in the planning for a long time, especially since the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.
U.S. support for the Self-Defense Forces was always problematic and ultimately destined to end. While working on Syria at the State Department, I joined several officials to warn the Obama administration that supporting the SDF was a strategic mistake that would prolong the conflict and exacerbate sectarian tensions.
It would have been wiser—albeit more difficult—to address the root causes that enabled the rise of ISIL (ISIS): President al-Assad’s repression of his people and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s sectarian policies. Instead, Washington risked dividing Syria and damaging relations with Turkiye.
The SDF was dominated by hard-line Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) elements, which are actively fighting Turkiye, a key NATO ally. The group was also deeply at odds with other Syrian opposition groups and most Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq. We argued that even if al-Assad or the rebels were ultimately victorious, the SDF would eventually be forced to reintegrate into the state structure led by the victors.
Nevertheless, the decision was made to involve the Self-Defense Forces in the fight against ISIL, while largely ignoring al-Assad’s crimes against its own people. Fast forward to today, and the outcome appears to be unfolding in Washington’s favor, despite its role in causing the problem in the first place.
First, the worst-case scenario of retaliation by the victorious rebels against Kurdish civilians has not materialized. On the contrary, the Syrian government has made significant efforts to reassure the Kurdish community that it will be protected, while establishing humanitarian corridors for those affected by the fighting.
On January 16, President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree granting citizenship to Kurds and recognizing Kurdish as a national language alongside Arabic. The timing was perfect and undermined the SDF’s main claim to legitimacy as the sole protector of Kurdish rights and freedoms. Furthermore, the Syrian army and security forces largely avoided repeating previous mistakes seen along the coast and in Suweida, where violence against minority communities occurred.
Second, the Syrian military demonstrated remarkable operational proficiency in defeating U.S.-trained and equipped forces, long seen as the only cohesive partner capable of countering the threat posed by ISIL and other extremists.
A victory in al-Sharah would have a powerful demonstration effect and strengthen Washington’s perception that it has a willing and capable military partner in Damascus. This opens up new strategic options for the United States as it reevaluates the scope and duration of its military presence in northeastern Syria.
Third, the government gained control of important oil and gas fields in the northeast. This would significantly accelerate Syria’s economic recovery while reducing dependence on US financial assistance. US President Donald Trump’s administration wants to ensure Syria’s economic viability as part of its bet against al-Shara and its government.
Accounting for more than 80% of Syria’s oil and gas production, these fields are likely to attract foreign investment. While the participation of US energy companies could potentially benefit the US economy, the Syrian government is also seeking to diversify its investments through agreements with several countries.
Of course, these developments remain fluid, and much may change in the coming weeks and months. Damascus would be wise to pursue a negotiated settlement with the SDF as it retreats into Kurdish-majority areas after rapid development.
Continuing the fighting would have serious humanitarian and reputational costs. On January 18, al-Sharaa announced a US-brokered ceasefire that included the integration of SDF institutions into the central government structure. However, the next day’s talks failed to resolve the difficult issue of how to incorporate the Self-Defense Forces.
Both sides should focus on implementing the January 18 agreement, rather than heading toward an all-out confrontation. Al-Sharah clearly has the upper hand, but he will be able to further demonstrate his qualities as a statesman by demonstrating both domestically and internationally that he is determined to find a peaceful solution.
Given recent battlefield losses and sustained U.S. pressure for integration, options are becoming increasingly limited for the SDF leadership. It may be difficult, but the moment has arrived. The current cessation of fighting provides an opportunity to secure special administrative agreements in Kurdish-majority cities and regions, such as allowing SDF fighters to continue their operations on the ground after they are integrated into the national security apparatus.
These seismic shifts reflect al-Shara’s astute reading of U.S. strategic interests and his ability to act accordingly. The US government has long supported a unified and stable Syria that does not pose a threat to neighboring countries. The United States has tolerated the Assad regime’s brutality for decades because it has broadly maintained these conditions.
It is now clear that Syria is incapable of threatening regional stability, and President Trump’s primary concern was whether the country’s new leadership could maintain order and unite the country. Al-Shara’s latest maneuvers suggest he may have taken a decisive step toward answering that question.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
