For nearly 27 years, the Venezuelan military, officially known as the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (FANB), has been a strong ally of Presidents Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro as they systematically turned toward authoritarianism as they sought an alternative to Western liberal democracies.
FANB helped the Venezuelan government dismantle the institutions of the previous political system and persecute its most ardent opponents. In return, the Chávez and Maduro governments each gave the military increasing power within Venezuelan politics, offering it other leadership roles such as ministerial positions, gubernatorial positions, embassies, mayoral positions, and control of state-owned enterprises.
Now, with the abduction of President Maduro by US special forces last Saturday, the image of the military as the protector of the Venezuelan state has taken a hit. The deposed president was kidnapped from Fuerte Tiuna, Venezuela’s largest military complex, in an operation that exposed flaws in FANB’s military technology and defense protocols.
The military faces a serious dilemma. It can make changes and become a guarantor of the deal led by the US administration of President Donald Trump and interim President Delcy Rodriguez of Caracas, or risk further attack by the US and the erosion of its power and position.
rise before fall
Over the years, FANB’s influence has increased significantly to include law enforcement agencies, often replacing the role of state and local police departments.
This phenomenon accelerated after the presidential election on July 28, 2024, when the then-Maduro government faced an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy amid strong accusations of widespread vote-counting fraud.
A police state has been established in Venezuela, taking mass surveillance of the opposition to a new level.
The government, then and now, became dependent on the survival of FANB. This was done in part by incorporating the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), paramilitary groups (also known as “colectivos”), and political, judicial, and military elements of the military police. The Venezuelan government describes this overall security framework as a “coalition of civilians, military, and police.”
The post-Maduro era
This power means the military will continue to play a key role in any political transition in Venezuela. Many analysts believe that any government established in Venezuela will need military support to rule, whether through democratic means or by force.
The Delcy Rodriguez administration is no exception to this rule. Despite counting on President Trump’s acquiescence to take the reins of a post-Maduro political transition, the president in charge of Venezuela needs the support of the Venezuelan military to avoid exacerbating political and social tensions within the country. Rodriguez’s acceptance among military leaders is a key reason why the US president trusted her, rather than opposition leader Maria Colina Machado, to lead political change in the country.
However, Maduro’s abduction also exposed FANB’s weaknesses. Although President Trump has said there are no such plans for now, the insurmountable power asymmetry with respect to U.S. military power leaves Venezuela vulnerable to the possibility of a new attack from the United States.
This threat is the biggest motivation for FANB itself to compromise, and the reason why the military leadership may actively participate in the political transition led by Rodriguez.
What’s next for the military?
The Venezuelan military will want to maintain its position within Venezuelan politics for as long as possible.
To achieve this objective, the FANB leadership will likely need to follow a series of measures, some of which were unthinkable in Venezuelan politics until recently.
First, military leaders must distance themselves from any accusations linking them to drug-trafficking activities, an official line used by the United States in its military operations against Venezuela.
Second, the military leadership must accept a new oil deal between Venezuela and the United States, which will very likely give American companies significant control over Venezuela’s oil reserves and production.
Third, at some point in Venezuela’s political transition, FANB may need to reduce its repressive activities against Venezuelan civilians. In practice, this means that the role of the police in the current police state, the so-called “municipal-military-police union,” will be reduced.
Finally, Venezuela’s military leadership must strengthen its relationship with Interim President Rodríguez. Because she represents the only, and perhaps last, direct line of communication with the Trump administration. Domestically, the military is likely to argue that this is necessary to strengthen the country’s stability amid the turmoil caused by President Maduro’s departure.
Essentially, adopting these changes would mean that the military would assume the agreement reached between Rodriguez and Trump and serve as a stabilizing agent in the post-Maduro country. It’s a format the United States is also familiar with, and Washington has relied on military-led installations in multiple countries for decades, from Egypt to Pakistan to Thailand and many others.
The Venezuelan military has few options today. Failure to adapt and coordinate with Mr. Trump and Mr. Rodriguez could invite a new armed attack by the United States. If this were to happen, the credibility of the military and current political leadership would be undermined, and the country’s political and social instability would be further exacerbated.
