2026 will be a key year as Kenya prepares for its next general election in 20 months. At a time when electoral systems are less reliable than ever, regional and global restraints on political violence are hollowing out, and serious problems beckon unless urgent action is taken.
Election violence in Kenya is rarely a product of chronic tribalism. It is almost exclusively a state-driven phenomenon and requires adjustment of specific circumstances. Two things are most important. One is whether the elections themselves can be trusted. Second, whether the incumbent is running for re-election.
Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1991, Kenya has held seven presidential elections. Only four of those incidents witnessed significant violence. In all four elections, necessarily unpopular incumbents ran. In 2002, 2013, and 2022, when incumbents did not appear on the ballot, violence was relatively quiet, even when the credibility of the elections themselves were challenged.
The lesson is clear. The best prevention is to increase the credibility of elections and impose institutional constraints on state actors.
Kenya has made some progress in this regard since the firestorm that followed the disputed 2007 election. The 2010 Constitution introduced checks against the unfair exercise of state power, most importantly an independent judiciary, which has proven to be a reliable forum for resolving electoral disputes. Electoral reforms to increase transparency, most visible in the 2022 elections, also took some of the sting out of polls.
But today, that progress is at risk. And President William Ruto is running for re-election.
After long delays, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was reconstituted in July last year, but not without controversy following the president’s initial decision to ignore a court order blocking the appointment of commissioners following a legal challenge to their qualifications.
This undermined the committee’s credibility from the start. A disastrous and violent by-election in November for dozens of vacant Senate and National Assembly seats further undermined public confidence in the commission as an independent umpire. This requires immediate action.
However, the credibility of elections is not limited to the IEBC. Kenyan media plays a particularly important role. For years, major media outlets have treated the release of vote tallies as an official event best left to election officials for fear of antagonizing those in power. That cowardice has repeatedly undermined public confidence in election results.
The 2022 election was a missed opportunity. Even as polling station results were published, Kenyan media appeared unable or unwilling to compile the numbers independently and explain in real time what the numbers meant. In 2027, the media cannot continue to ignore its responsibilities. There is time to collaborate, rebuild capacity, and invest in data journalism. They should be prepared to independently verify the results and hold elections, even if it is uncomfortable for the powers that be.
Media weaknesses are also increasingly being exploited through online disinformation. And the tools are becoming much more powerful. Kenya is no stranger to electoral manipulation in the digital age. It was one of Cambridge Analytica’s testing grounds, and its microtargeting operations during the 2013 election helped normalize data-driven psychological campaigns long before the scandal went global.
Today, artificial intelligence dramatically increases that risk. AI-driven disinformation can flood platforms with synthetic content, fabricate audio and video, disguise trusted voices, and target communities by serving customized narratives at high speed and scale.
In an environment where trust in institutions is already weak, disinformation is more than just misleading. It may become unstable. It could delegitimize the results before a vote has even taken place, create panic and mobilization based on false claims, and justify repression in the name of maintaining public order. Strong, competent, reliable, and effective media are essential to mitigating these impacts.
Regional and international institutions and pressures were also important in curbing the violent desires of Kenya’s elites, but they are now in decline. In today’s global environment, such restraint is much less likely. Across East Africa, governments are perpetuating repression as elections approach. In neighboring Tanzania and Uganda, authorities have acted with impunity to suppress dissent and election protests.
And this regional shift is occurring in tandem with a broader breakdown in global responsibility. Western support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza has accelerated the erosion of international norms, weakened institutions such as the International Criminal Court, and created a permissive environment for malign actors.
Given this situation, Kenya must focus on strengthening its domestic defense. Time is running out to advocate for reforms to protect independent state institutions from political interference. The Kriegler Commission, set up after the 2007/8 election, recommended that changes to electoral rules be completed at least two years before polling date, but that deadline has now passed.
Still, 2026 presents an opportunity to rebuild coalitions that can mobilize citizen action as a bulwark against state repression. In the 1990s, these included civil society organizations, the church, and the media.
The Gen Z protests show that Kenyan youth can also be a powerful political force, and we are likely to see them on the streets again this year. The question is whether their elders will join them against the state’s conspiracy.
Violence next year is inevitable. But stopping this requires urgent action to protect increased electoral transparency and mobilize public action as a shield against abuses of state power.
The clock is ticking.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
