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The ongoing US-Israeli attack on Iran, sparked by the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader last Saturday, has reignited military and political action between Lebanon and Israel, with Hezbollah once again taking center stage in the face of the most existential crisis in its history. All aspects of Hezbollah’s political position, military capabilities, and war plans against Israel in Lebanon are currently under intense scrutiny from regional and domestic actors.
The Lebanon-Israel front has been relatively quiet since the final ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel was agreed in November 2024. By “quiet” I mean that while Hezbollah and the Lebanese government regularly debated whether and how to carry out the government’s disarmament plan, Israel violated the ceasefire daily, bombing numerous targets, killing dozens of people, and seizing even more Lebanese territory.
Everything changed overnight after Hezbollah launched a low-intensity but highly symbolic rocket and drone attack against northern Israel earlier this week, in which Israel retaliated with bombing, killing at least 35 Lebanese and forcing tens of thousands to flee some 55 villages in the south. Israel has also called up more than 100,000 reservists to take part in a planned military operation in Lebanon to silence Hezbollah’s weapons. In an unusual move, the Lebanese government on Monday firmly announced an “immediate ban on all Hezbollah security and military activities” that are now considered “illegal” and demanded that the party hand over its weapons.
This flare-up of the Lebanese-Israeli front during the US-Israeli attack on Iran immediately raised questions that were difficult to answer reliably. How militarily capable is Hezbollah, which was heavily attacked in 2024? Is Iran willing to re-enter the war against Israel in a sustained manner, or was this attack a one-time show of solidarity with Iran after its supreme leader was assassinated last Saturday? Did Hezbollah make the decision to attack Israel on its own, or was the decision made by the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Tehran? Will Israel regularly bomb dozens of targets in Lebanon and assassinate Hezbollah and other resistance leaders, or will it send ground forces to once again occupy southern Lebanon? And will the Lebanese government proceed with its plan to forcibly disarm Hezbollah, risking deep political and ethnic tensions in an already economically bankrupt and deeply divided country?
The consequences of this heightened tension and conflict will affect the political and military situation throughout the Middle East. Because its principal actors accurately reflect the most important power relations that have shaped, and often destroyed, the entire Middle East over the past century. These include governments and national identities, non-state armed groups and sub-state identities, Israel, Western colonial powers, and regional powers in the Middle East.
Conspicuously absent from this list of actors are ordinary citizens across the Middle East, who typically have little or no say in choosing governments or shaping national policy. How these forces interact in Lebanon in the coming weeks and months will help shape broader outcomes in the region in relation to other dynamics, including the war with Iran and future relations with the United States and other Western powers, China and Russia. The coming month will reveal just how effective Hezbollah forces are, both in resisting Israeli forces inside Lebanon and in attacking Israel from the air.
The big question now is why Hezbollah has decided to re-engage militarily with Israel at this moment, given the weakened state and the political pressures it faces within Lebanon.
Part of the explanation seems to be that waiting carries its own risks. These include further Israeli attacks, increased political pressure within Lebanon, and the possibility that a weakened Iran will be unable to maintain support. The answer, which is becoming clearer over time, is that both Iran and Hezbollah believe they are facing an existential moment of survival or destruction, given the attack on Iran and Hezbollah’s precarious vulnerability to domestic, Israeli, and American pressure.
Hezbollah has lost some popular support in Lebanon due to a weakening military position and a backlash from many Lebanese who are tired of having to deal with successive wars, destruction, displacement and poverty. Importantly, it also appears to be losing support from long-time ally Nabi Berri, the Shiite parliament speaker and Amal leader who has long served as a key political link between Hezbollah and the Lebanese state. Amal’s cabinet voted for the government’s decision to outlaw Hezbollah militarism.
With its attacks on Iran and its leaders, Hezbollah recognized its precarious position within the three-power relationship. The possibility that Iran would be damaged to the point that it would be unable to maintain support for Hezbollah. and US and Israeli pressure to continue attacking Lebanon while pushing the Beirut government towards some form of agreement with Israel, if not an outright peace treaty then at least a non-belligerency agreement.
If Hezbollah waits too long to resume its resistance to Israel militarily, it could find itself in a hole from which it will not be able to climb out unscathed. This reality caused the party to renege on a promise it had made months earlier to Mr. Berri not to resume war with Israel, leaving him feeling slighted and weakening traditional alliances.
Hezbollah also recognizes that the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance (which includes itself, Iran, Hamas, Yemen’s Ansar Allah, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces) is weakened by military attacks against all of its constituent groups. Hezbollah and Iran are its key core, and both countries now feel that they must fight tooth and nail to force the United States and Israel into a ceasefire or are doomed.
A key unresolved question now is whether Iran and Hezbollah’s military capabilities are sufficient to withstand vicious and persistent attacks on Iran and Hezbollah and force a ceasefire. There is no doubt about their will to fight. However, while the current fighting across the region for Hezbollah and Iran will end in defeat, victory, or post-ceasefire damage due to a stalemate, the Middle East will witness structural changes in regional and global alliances that reflect a new political and ideological balance across the region.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
