US President Donald Trump has signaled he could withdraw from the Iran war unilaterally without defeating the Islamic Republic, opening the Strait of Hormuz, or reaching a deal with Iran to end attacks on the US and its allies.
The president has boasted that “the hard part is over,” and is optimistic that these steps will ease the economic pain that Iran’s attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf have caused to consumers in the United States and around the world.
But Iran insists it will decide when the war ends and shows no signs of giving up until the US agrees to its demands. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said on Tuesday that the Iranian government rejected a “deadline” and was ready to continue fighting “for at least six months.”
Here’s why the hard part of the war may not be over yet.
President Trump declared on Tuesday that “one goal” of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons was “achieved.” The United States has bombed multiple nuclear facilities in Iran, but more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which could be used to make bombs, is missing.
Despite President Trump’s assertion that the “disparate people” now governing Iran are “much more reasonable,” experts have reason to believe that Iran is more likely to seek the bomb than it was before the war. Former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who issued a fatwa banning its development, was killed by the US and Israel. Hard-liners within the country are now calling for the weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program, arguing that Iran’s status as a nuclear power is not an effective deterrent against attack.
Failing to overthrow the Islamic Republic, the United States would be left with a more hardline regime whose civilian leadership is weakened by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Guard could make Iran even more reclusive and significantly increase its crackdown on freedom and dissent.
An early withdrawal from the Iran war would effectively be an admission that the United States was unable to open the Strait of Hormuz through diplomatic or military pressure. President Trump said gasoline prices would “crash” if the U.S. left the bloc, and argued that since the U.S. imports relatively little energy from the Middle East, the burden of securing waterways should fall on importers.
But markets don’t work that way. The price Americans pay at the pump is set in global markets, regardless of where their fuel comes from, and U.S. prices will still rise if supply shocks are not addressed.
Leaving without a deal to reopen the strait would effectively give Iran a victory in imposing its sovereignty over the waterway, giving it immense influence over the global economy and far more power than it previously wielded. Iran’s scrutinization of ships passing through the strait and the imposition of tolls of up to a reported $2 million per vessel threatens to become the new normal, creating a new source of revenue as Iran pursues a war it has little intention of ending.
Paradoxically, if more countries choose to ask Tehran for permission to pass through the strait, Iran’s control would be strengthened and more oil could flow, providing some relief from rising prices. However, this would set a precedent with little basis in international law and raise serious questions about the effectiveness of the rules-based maritime order. And even if oil supplies return, experts say it could take weeks or even months for the drop in oil prices to seep through the pump.
During the war, Iran broke two taboos with its Gulf Arab neighbors. For the first time, Iran launched a direct attack on its territory, punishing the actions of its American ally, effectively closing Hormuz to oil shipments and depriving it of its economic lifeline.
Gulf states see both countries as having an existential crisis, and an early withdrawal from the no-deal war could expose them to repeated attacks for years to come. It would also give Iran significant influence, allowing it to dictate the terms of its oil exports, while maintaining the threat of further missile attacks on Iranian cities if it refuses to comply with the increasingly belligerent Islamic Republic.
Questions may also arise about the implicit deal linking investment and strategic alignment in the Gulf to continued U.S. protection. “We’ll protect you,” President Trump declared during a visit to Qatar as part of the first scheduled tour of his second term, as Gulf states promised trillions of dollars in U.S. investment. A hasty withdrawal that would leave Gulf states left to fend for themselves would likely be seen as a betrayal of that commitment.
Israel may continue to attack Iran and Lebanon
If the United States withdraws too quickly from the war, where Israel retreats could determine the war’s trajectory. In both Lebanon and Gaza, Israel continued to attack its opponents after agreeing to ceasefires, citing violations by the other side. It signaled early on in the recent Iranian conflict that it was seeking to fundamentally weaken, if not overthrow, the Iranian regime, and could leave the United States with unfinished business if it leaves the Islamic Republic intact.
But Washington has previously shown that it can rein in Israel if it chooses to do so. During the last Israel-Iran war in June 2025, when President Trump moved to end the conflict, he said he forced Israel to recall fighter jets that were already headed to attack Iran.
And even if Israel were to stop attacking Iran, there is no guarantee that Iran would retaliate. Iran, which has been targeted by Israel twice in a year, is likely to seek guarantees it will not be attacked again, but this is unlikely without a formally negotiated end to the war.
Iran has also repeatedly pushed for a comprehensive agreement to end the fighting in Lebanon. It is unlikely that the US withdrawal will resolve this issue. Israel has stepped up operations in the region following attacks by Iran-backed Hezbollah, with plans to flatten and occupy the southern part of the country until it determines the Hezbollah threat has been eliminated.
