The first round of talks between Iran and the US in Muscat resulted in no progress. The coming weeks will determine whether they have laid the groundwork or just bought time to escalate.
When Iranian and American negotiators concluded hours of talks in Muscat on February 6, neither side publicly signaled a change from their original positions. Iran insisted that the discussion focused only on the nuclear file. The United States arrived seeking a comprehensive framework that would also cover broader issues that the U.S. government has publicly raised, such as ballistic missiles, regional armed groups, and even human rights issues. Neither of them won. Both agreed to meet again.
On the surface, this appears to be nothing. It wasn’t.
The Muscat Round was the first high-level diplomatic engagement between the two countries since the joint US-Israel attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. Iran later said the attack killed more than 1,000 people and included attacks on three nuclear facilities. Significantly, both sides agreed to return to the same palace near Muscat’s airport where the previous round was held in 2025.
However, continuity is not progress. There remains a huge gap between what happened in Muscat and what the agreement entails.
Diplomacy takes place under military escort
The most striking feature of the Muscat Round was not what was said, but who was sitting in the room. The American delegation was led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Among them was Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, who wore full uniform for the first time.
It was no coincidence that he was at the negotiating table. That was a signal. As negotiations unfolded, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group was operating in the Arabian Sea, and days earlier, the US military had shot down an Iranian drone that had approached the aircraft carrier.
An Iranian diplomatic source told Reuters that Cooper’s presence had “put in jeopardy” the talks. Another report cited by Al-Arabi TV warned that “negotiations taking place under duress” could impose strategic costs instead of advancing negotiations. For Iran, the message was unmistakable: this was diplomacy conducted in the shadow of force, and there was no substitute for force.
Washington sees this as leverage. Trump, speaking aboard Air Force One after the meeting, called the meeting “very good” and said Iran “very much” wants a deal, adding: “They know the consequences of not getting a deal. They don’t get a deal. The consequences are very steep.”
This is ultimatum diplomacy. That can create urgency. This is unlikely to engender trust, and trust is what is most needed in this process.
structural issues
The United States withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, despite international verification that Iran was meeting its obligations. This decision shattered Iran’s confidence in the durability of US commitments. Iran’s subsequent violations of the agreement and steadily increasing enrichment levels since 2019 have weakened its credibility.
This mutual distrust is not an obstacle to negotiations that can be resolved through creative diplomacy alone. This is a crucial condition for forming any agreement. The United States has the ability to impose enormous economic and military costs on Iran. But power does not automatically produce compliance. To keep its promise, Iran must believe that concessions, not new demands, will bring relief. That belief has been seriously undermined.
Consider the series of events surrounding the Muscat Round itself. Hours after the talks ended, the US State Department announced new sanctions targeting 14 shadow fleet vessels involved in transporting Iranian oil, as well as penalties against 15 entities and two individuals. The Treasury Department characterized the action as part of the administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. Whether it was planned in advance or timed to take effect, the message was clear. Washington says it intends to negotiate and tighten at the same time.
For the Iranian government, which has consistently called for sanctions relief to be the starting point for progress, this latest turn of events confirms exactly the pattern it is concerned about. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made this dynamic clear, telling Iranian state television that “the resulting mistrust is a serious challenge facing the negotiations.”
What really happened in Muscat
Beneath the competing narratives, the contours of a substantive debate are beginning to emerge. Iran reportedly rejected the U.S.’s request for “zero enrichment,” an extremist position it never intended to accept in the first talks. The two countries instead discussed diluting Iran’s existing uranium stockpile, a more technical and potentially more productive means.
Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reported that diplomats from Egypt, Turkiye, and Qatar separately presented a proposed framework to Iran that would halt enrichment for three years, transfer highly enriched uranium out of the country, and promise not to start using ballistic missiles. Russia reportedly indicated it was willing to receive uranium. The Iranian government has suggested that both the suspension of enrichment and the transfer of uranium were bungled.
Perhaps the most important development was the least obvious. According to Axios, Witkoff and Kushner spoke directly with Araghchi during the meeting, breaking from the completely indirect format that Iran had demanded during most of last year’s negotiating rounds. Iran has previously maintained that it only communicates with the United States through intermediaries in Oman. Crossing that barrier, even if only partially, suggests that both parties are aware of the limitations of indirect negotiation when negotiations become technical.
Oman’s framing was perhaps the most honest assessment of the day. Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi said the meeting was aimed at establishing “appropriate conditions for resuming diplomatic and technical negotiations.”
What will be decided in the next few weeks?
President Trump said a second round of talks would be held soon. Both sides indicated to Axios that further talks are planned in the coming days. The compressed timeline is noteworthy. Last year’s rounds had each session separated by several weeks. This pace suggests that Washington believes the diplomatic window is narrowing and that Tehran is at least willing to test its claims.
A few tests will tell you whether urgency creates substance or just speed.
First, there is the issue of scope. The fundamental dispute over the content of the talks remains unresolved. Iran won the first procedural battle. The venue was moved from Turkiye to Oman, regional observers were excluded, and Araghchi claims only nuclear issues were discussed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said before the meeting that the agenda must include “all of these issues.” If the second round begins with the same battle for scope, it will show that even the basics are not yet settled.
Second, Iran’s enrichment stance. Before the June 2025 war, Iran had enriched uranium to 60 percent purity, technically close to weapons-grade. The Iranian government said enrichment had been halted after the strike. But Iran has also made new inspection arrangements conditional on International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of atomic bombed sites, raising concerns among non-proliferation experts. Conversely, reports of resuming or accelerating enrichment are likely to end the diplomatic line.
Third, the military environment. The US naval buildup in the Arabian Sea is not just for show. The downing of a drone near the Abraham Lincoln and Iran’s attempt to intercept a U.S.-flagged ship in the Strait of Hormuz just days before the talks show how quickly signals can turn into miscalculations. Whether the carrier group is strengthened, maintained, or gradually reduced in the coming weeks will reveal more about Washington’s diplomatic assessment than any press statement.
Fourth, the rhythm of sanctions. The same-day announcement of shadow fleet sanctions established a pattern. If Washington continues to impose new economic sanctions between talks, Tehran will treat it as evidence that diplomacy is a performance, not a process.
The fifth is backchannel activity. The most important diplomacy in the coming weeks may not take place in public. Oman, Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye are working together behind the scenes to maintain dialogue. If these intermediate contacts remain active, there is still room for de-escalation. If they remain silent, the margin for error narrows.
Managed deadlock is not a strategy
The most likely short-term outcome remains neither a breakthrough nor a war, but a managed stalemate in which both sides maintain maximum public standing while avoiding measures that would make future negotiations impossible. In reality, this is not a resolution of confidence, but a pause sustained by caution.
For the wider region, this distinction is of urgent importance. Gulf states have no interest in being the stage for escalation. Public statements across the region have consistently emphasized de-escalation, restraint, and conflict avoidance. However, local stakeholders can facilitate, host, and encourage. They cannot impose conditions on either Washington or Tehran.
The Muscat negotiations did not fail. They weren’t successful either. They established that a channel existed, that both sides were willing to use it, and that direct contact between senior officials was possible.
But channels are not plans. The absence of war does not mean the existence of treaties. The period from Muscat to what happens next is a period in which miscalculations are still close to the surface, sustained only by the assumption that both sides are reading each other’s signals correctly.
No agreement will be reached in the next round of negotiations. But it may indicate whether the two countries are building a floor beneath the conflict, or simply postponing the moment when that floor will crumble.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
