After launching “a powerful and deadly attack against the remnants of ISIS (ISIL) terrorists” in northwestern Nigeria on December 25, US President Donald Trump promised “many more strikes” and reaffirmed the United States’ position that “we will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to flourish.” The airstrike occurred less than a week after the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) launched a joint military force of 5,000 detachments, presented as a symbol of collective self-reliance and security autonomy, in a joint effort to combat terrorist groups in member states. It also followed the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)’s ambitious plan announced in August 2025 to activate a 260,000-strong joint counter-terrorism force backed by a proposed annual budget of $2.5 billion for logistics and frontline support.
While these developments may be presented by proponents as decisive steps against terrorism, there is little evidence that escalating militarization alone can defeat armed groups in the Sahel. Rather, it suggests that the militarization of the region is accelerating. This will not only inflame new geopolitical tensions in West Africa but, more importantly, push the Sahel region into armed conflict between states, posing far more serious risks to peace and stability in the region.
Friendship turned sour
Until 2021, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel were managed by a loosely coordinated, non-hierarchical security architecture built around diplomatic and military cooperation between regional and extra-regional actors. This architecture brought together ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, external powers such as the United States and France, as well as regional powers such as Algeria and Nigeria, with ECOWAS playing a central coordinating role.
A classic example is the 2013 African-led international aid mission to Mali, organized by ECOWAS in collaboration with the African Union, the United Nations, and France, to confront Tuareg rebels and their allied armed groups in northern Mali. More prominent was the EU-funded G5 Sahel counterterrorism force, which brought together forces from Africa and Europe and operated from 2017 to 2023. While these agreements were often characterized by tension, competition, and uneven outcomes, they functioned within a common security framework that limited direct confrontation between states.
This balance was disrupted after the Niger coup in 2023. By threatening to use force to restore constitutional order, ECOWAS crossed a political threshold and changed its role from a mediator to an adversary in the eyes of the Nigerian military regime. This threat was widely interpreted as an act of aggression and proved to have played a catalytic role. In response, Niger’s military rulers, along with those of Mali and Burkina Faso, moved to establish the Alliance of Sahel States in a deliberate effort to regain security autonomy, dismantle the existing multilateral security architecture, and sever ties with long-standing partners such as ECOWAS, the EU, the United States, and France.
Notably, the AES has institutionalized mutual defense agreements that codify this break with the previous multilateral security order by explicitly framing ECOWAS and its Western partners as a threat to member states’ sovereignty and national security. This stance not only deepens rifts between former allies, but also signals a dangerous shift towards securitization of the neighbourhood, raising fears of interstate conflict in West Africa, a phenomenon largely unseen since the 1990s.
new geopolitical tensions
In severing its security ties with the West, the AES has pivoted to Russia as its primary security partner to counter decades of US and European influence in West Africa, signaling a deepening but evolving security partnership with Russia. These strategic choices reflect an emerging self-help posture with a new preference for non-traditional allies, but they also intensify geopolitical tensions across the region.
Nigeria’s military role in the coup attempt in neighboring Benin was hailed as a major victory for ECOWAS. However, when a Nigerian Air Force C-130 aircraft made an emergency landing in Burkina Faso two days later, the AES interpreted this as a violation of airspace and sovereignty and authorized the Nigerian Air Force to disable the aircraft involved in further violations. Tensions were heightened by reports that France provided surveillance and intelligence support to Nigeria during the Benin intervention, raising concerns about France’s possible re-entry into the AES security environment. The stakes are even higher for the AES as Nigeria says it intends to expand security cooperation with the United States in the wake of the Christmas strikes. Although targeted at militants operating in northwestern Nigeria, the attack appears calculated to strengthen the United States’ strategic legitimacy as a counterterrorism actor in the region and could open the door for further operations in northeastern Nigeria, where ISWAP and Boko Haram remain active.
Given Nigeria’s influence within ECOWAS, this new security partnership with the United States is likely to shape the operational capabilities of the proposed 260,000-strong ECOWAS force. This does not bode well for the AES, which seeks to insulate member states from Western security influence in the name of sovereignty. Because ECOWAS forces are deployed in member states that are epicenters of terrorist violence, much of the fighting will take place adjacent to AES territory. AES forces are also operating in these areas, making military conflict between the two countries increasingly likely, especially given the region’s porous borders and fluid combat environment. Given that the Christmas Day airstrike reportedly hit an unintended target, the risk of future US-backed ECOWAS airstrikes spilling over into AES territory cannot be ignored. For deterrence, AES may seek to leverage Russian military support, reminiscent of Cold War-era security brinkmanship.
Impact on regional stability
Without reconciliation between AES and ECOWAS, two major risks loom for peace and stability in the region. First, rising geopolitical tensions could draw AES and ECOWAS member states into direct interstate military conflict, potentially pushing West Africa into a regional war. Such conflicts serve neither side’s counterterrorism objectives. Not only would it devastate the region, but it would also create room for armed groups to expand their operations amid a fragmented and chaotic security response. Second, the conflict risks turning West Africa into a new arena of global power struggles, with the Russian-backed AES on the one hand and the US- and French-backed ECOWAS on the other. As a new Cold War erupts, the use of veto power by these global actors in the UN Security Council could further complicate conflict resolution and seriously destabilize the region.
AES and ECOWAS are currently faced with tough choices. The two options are either to revive Cold War-style bloc politics while the West African region heads toward chaos, or to negotiate a security sub-coalition that prioritizes human security as well as national sovereignty. Regardless of how the AES views ECOWAS, the onus is on the latter to address the unintended consequences of rising tensions. Although there is little indication that AES intends to cooperate directly with Western-backed ECOWAS on counterterrorism, ECOWAS may pursue diplomatic engagement to negotiate an operational concept that guarantees respect for AES’s sovereignty. As Africa’s most experienced regional security organization, ECOWAS has the diplomatic capacity to do so. To make progress, Francophone ECOWAS countries should lead these efforts, while Nigeria wields its influence more carefully. Whether ECOWAS is able to take back ownership of its security agenda and define the terms of its external engagement will shape not only the future of West Africa, but the future of the continent as a whole.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
