As Pakistan positions itself as a regional security provider, its growing militancy and economic constraints continue to test the sustainability of its ambitions.
From February 2 to 4, rebel commander in eastern Libya Khalifa Haftar visited Rawalpindi and met with Army Chief Asim Munir at Pakistan’s military headquarters. The visit may have seemed routine, but it highlights Pakistan’s growing defense diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
Pakistan has reportedly signed a $4 billion defense deal with President Haftar’s self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) that includes 16 JF-17 fighter jets and 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft, and was reportedly concluded over about two and a half years. The acquisition of this 4.5-generation fighter gives the LNA a “game-changing” air power advantage that could upset its military balance unless its Tripoli-based rival secures an equivalent capability in time.
Pakistan is also reportedly finalizing a $1.5 billion package to supply the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) with 10 Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 drones and air defense systems to strengthen its capabilities in the ongoing war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
From a purely national interest perspective, increasing Pakistan’s defense capabilities in MENA is not automatically problematic. A larger base could generate foreign exchange, expand diplomatic access and raise Pakistan’s profile in a region where security partnerships are diversifying. It could also strengthen long-standing military-to-military ties in the Gulf and elsewhere.
But the same flurry of activity raises quieter questions. Is Pakistan’s expansion into MENA primarily transactional, focused on arms exports, or part of a coherent strategy to provide security? In other words, Pakistan can export military services and equipment. A more difficult question is whether the country can maintain its position as a “security provider” as internal militancy and border instability continue to draw production capacity into the country.
The Middle East is a useful recent example because it reveals a pattern of contingent and consensus-driven activism. Although Pakistan can provide military cooperation and weapons and gain diplomatic visibility, its approach is shaped by events and short-term openings rather than by a durable economic base or internal security stability.
The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis helps explain why Pakistan’s defense industry suddenly became more marketable in some parts of MENA. Pakistan’s successful anti-aircraft operations against India, which reportedly included the downing of India’s most advanced fighter jet, the Rafale, proved to be a windfall for the country, resulting in a surge in high-value defense partners and customers.
The crisis strengthened the story of Pakistan’s air power, highlighting its superior training standards and operational integration in confronting larger adversaries. Its attributes are increasingly attracting the attention of regional partners.
In September 2025, Saudi Arabia formalized the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan, stating that an attack on one side will be treated as an attack on both. The agreement is an important diplomatic landmark and strengthens Pakistan’s position as a security partner as Gulf states diversify their defense ties.
But beyond air power, training, and defense-industrial cooperation, Islamabad lacks the economic weight to anchor these relationships on a large scale.
In 2024-2025, Pakistan’s net foreign direct investment from each country was approximately $2.5 billion, and its total trade with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries was approximately $20 billion. In contrast, India’s GCC-derived investments alone amounted to $4.7 billion in 2024, and GCC trade amounted to about $179 billion.
Moreover, while Pakistan remains a pure capital seeker and relies on Gulf “rollover” loans and central bank deposits to stabilize its economy, India has moved into becoming a strategic investor in Gulf infrastructure, energy, and technology. This “dependency gap” means that Pakistan, although an important guarantor of security, is rarely an economic partner on the same level.
This imbalance matters because Gulf capitals increasingly treat defense cooperation as one element in a larger portfolio of partnerships, including energy, trade, investment, technology, and supply chains. For example, India and the United Arab Emirates recently discussed deeper defense cooperation through a letter of intent establishing a strategic defense partnership, alongside a $3 billion LNG supply deal and ambitious trade targets.
In such an environment, Pakistan’s security values may open doors, but without comparable economic depth that fosters diverse interdependence, it will be difficult to translate access into lasting influence.
Another constraint on the “net security provider” narrative is the state of Pakistan’s own security environment.
Pakistan recently faced the deadliest flare-up of security situation in Balochistan province in recent years. This is a wave of simultaneous attacks across the province targeting administrative centers and security facilities in and around Quetta. The resulting week-long counterattack reportedly left 216 armed fighters dead, at a heavy cost of 22 security personnel and 36 civilian lives.
Whatever the political explanation, the numbers highlight how much bandwidth states still spend on stabilizing key states.
Later, another signal came from the Islamabad metropolitan area. On February 6, a suicide bomber attacked a Shiite mosque on the outskirts of the capital during Friday prayers, killing more than 30 people and injuring around 170. A faction affiliated with ISIL (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attack. It was the second major attack in the capital in three months.
The western border with Afghanistan is yet another reminder that Pakistan’s security bandwidth is not limitless. Islamabad is currently locked in a standoff with the Taliban regime, which refuses to curb cross-border militancy. The violent conflict, which killed 1,034 people in 2025 alone, has forced countries to divert critical military resources to the periphery, depleting the very capabilities needed to project power overseas.
Indeed, the dire situation painted by South Asia analyst Michael Kugelman – Pakistan “caught between” hardcore adversaries – presents a strategic nightmare. He argues that the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is currently more volatile than the conflict between India and Pakistan and could foster global terrorism.
None of this is an argument for withdrawal. Pakistan’s defense diplomacy in MENA could be particularly beneficial for the country economically and diplomatically. But it suggests strategic tension. In other words, extending security partnerships abroad is easier to maintain when domestic stability is more durable and foreign influence is based on a broader economic base than just military power. If Pakistan wants to be seen as an exporter of security, not just a seller of equipment, it will need clearer principles, stronger domestic stability, and a broader economic base to ensure that events do not continue to dictate its foreign policy priorities.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
