Last week, as Israeli shelling of the Gaza Strip intensified, US presidential envoy Stephen Witkoff announced on social media that a “ceasefire” was entering its second phase. The next day, the administration of US President Donald Trump announced the composition of the Foreign Executive Committee and Peace Commission, which will oversee the interim Gaza administration and will be made up of Palestinian technocrats.
The setting reflects Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s desire that neither Hamas nor the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) be involved in Gaza’s future. The latter is mentioned in President Trump’s “peace plan,” which says it must first implement a series of unnamed reforms before it can play any role in Gaza.
What this means in practice is that Fatah can also easily prevent a return to rule in the Gaza Strip on the pretext that these vague reforms have not been implemented.
The problem with the current regime and Israel’s “no Hamas, no Fatah” claim is that it reflects a deep ignorance of the structure, politics, and history of Palestinian society. The idea that a Palestinian political organization could be created by an external force and fully integrated into the occupation to manage the Palestinian issue is unrealistic.
Over the past 77 years, various Palestinian national movements and revolutions have emerged, united by one commonality: the rejection of Israel’s colonial presence. No Palestinian group, regardless of its form, has ever publicly consented to its integration into Israel’s colonial project.
Within the framework of resistance, a Palestinian collective consciousness was formed, political parties were born, and the trajectory of public opinion was determined.
Although the tools and techniques employed by different parts of Palestinian society and political factions may differ, they all share a common commitment to the Palestinian cause and Palestinian rights.
Fatah and Hamas remain the two largest political components of Palestinian society. While Fatah emerged as a dominant national liberation movement before its political trajectory changed after the Oslo Accords, Hamas has maintained a position of resistance since its inception. Between these two currents and other smaller factions, the Palestinian social structure naturally refuses to accept leaders and organizations operating outside the framework of national independence, or foreign guardianship.
Israel has decided to ignore this deep-rooted reality and is trying to get around it by imposing artificial facts on the ground. As a result, it has continually sought out “local alternatives” for governance in Gaza.
During the war, Israel sought to empower and arm certain individuals and groups, expecting them to play a role after the war. Many of them were socially marginalized before the war, and some have serious criminal records. One example is Yasser Abu Shabab, a member of the Tarabin tribe. He was imprisoned for many years on drug-related charges, and during the war he founded his own militia with significant support from Israel.
He cooperated with the occupation forces in various ways, including plundering humanitarian aid in Rafah and clearing passage for Israeli forces. After his killing on December 4, celebrations were held in Gaza. His own tribe released a statement condemning him. Israel’s attempts to engage with and empower other clans also ended badly.
Prominent families and clans have repeatedly condemned in public statements the actions of individual members who have decided to cooperate with Israel. While they withdrew protection and ostracized collaborators, Palestinian clans affirmed their continued commitment to the Palestinian national struggle.
This rejection reflects the failure of Israeli policy to create local extensions in line with Israeli projects. It also confirms that despite genocide, famine, and displacement, Israel is unable to erase the memory or defeat the collective will of the Palestinian people.
The situation is similar in the West Bank. For 30 years, the Fatah-controlled PA has cooperated with occupation forces on security there. Therefore, its legitimacy is extremely low today. Recent opinion polls show the PA’s approval rating in the West Bank is just 23%, compared to 16% for President Mahmoud Abbas.
What must be noted here is that despite the Palestinian Authority’s close security ties with the occupation, it has not been able to prevent resistance by Palestinians in the West Bank. In the years leading up to the genocidal war, the West Bank witnessed the rise of armed groups independent of traditional factions Fatah and Hamas, such as Nablus’ Aleen al-Usd (Lions’ Den) and the Jenin Brigades.
These groups were organized by young people and enjoyed wide popular support. Their resistance movement reflected the continuity of the armed struggle approach outside traditional structures and the support it enjoys among the Palestinian people.
What Israel and its Western allies, who are creating a new governance structure for Gaza, fail to understand is that legitimacy matters in the Palestinian context. It cannot be created by a foreign council or an Israeli-funded militia. This is because Palestinian legitimacy derives from resistance and connects the nation’s history and identity.
Any attempt to avoid this reality is doomed to failure. Because it will only turn Gaza into a zone of perpetual chaos, internal conflict, and comprehensive security collapse. It would also shatter President Trump’s tradition as a consensus builder and expose the current agreement as nothing more than a political spectacle meant to cover up the aftermath of Israel’s genocide.
The only solution that can guarantee stability is complete administrative independence for Palestine, with a clear path towards the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state, based solely on the will of the Palestinian people in all their diversity and affiliations.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
