Africa’s growing coup belt gained a new front on December 7 when soldiers appeared on Benin’s state television to assert power. Eight uniformed men, led by Lieutenant Colonel Pascal Tigri and calling themselves the Military Commission for Reconstruction, declared President Patrice Talon “removed”, suspended the constitution, dissolved state institutions and ordered the closure of borders.
Observers were bracing for a now-familiar scenario of forced resignations, detention or house arrest of leaders, and routine condemnation from the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
But by noon, those hopes were dashed.
Within hours of the broadcast, Interior Minister Alassane Seydoux announced that the coup attempt had been thwarted.
Talon made another public appearance on television, reporting that authorities had arrested at least 14 conspirators, including 12 soldiers.
The announcement and the ensuing drama shocked the entire region, but it was not a sudden rupture, but rather the visible peak of a political crisis that had been deepening for several years.
The coup attempt was only the final sign.
In the aftermath, order was restored, but legitimacy was not.
Benin’s real coup, the systematic overthrow of democracy, had already taken place under Talon.
This takeover attempt only exposed a political system that was already being undermined from within.
Before Talon took power in April 2016, Benin was widely known for its peaceful transfer of power, centered on the National Assembly in February 1990, which ended single-party rule and laid the foundations for a multiparty democratic system.
Talon, a billionaire cotton tycoon, cast himself as a reformer in his first campaign, pledging to change politics, government and the economy for the better.
Once elected, his career path changed.
Instead of strengthening democracy, Talon began systematically dismantling the democratic institutions that had made Benin, a country of some 15 million people, one of Africa’s earliest democratic successes.
Since 2016, Benin’s democratic institutions have been hollowed out by legislation, judicial capture, and rewritten electoral rules to remove opponents from power.
Talon quietly began packing the court in 2017 and 2018, using presidential appointments to transform the Constitutional Court into a governing law-abiding body. Within a year, constitutional amendments to eliminate elections and strengthen executive control will be legalized.
The timeline of extreme political regression is instructive.
The first significant legal breach occurred in April 2019, when a new electoral law introduced a “certificate of fitness” requirement, giving authorities the power to disqualify entire opposition lists from that year’s parliamentary elections.
As a result, in the April 2019 parliamentary elections, only two pro-government parties, the Union for Innovation and Progress (UPR) and the Republican Bloc (BR), were on the ballot.
All major opposition blocs were banned, including the alliance linked to former Speaker Bruno Amsu, who was once allied with Talon.
Amnesty International has documented a wave of arbitrary arrests, detentions and repression of peaceful protesters and journalists in the run-up to the 2019 vote.
The public reacted.
Voter turnout dropped from nearly two-thirds in the previous election to just 27%.
In the months that followed, widespread protests erupted in places such as Cotonou and Porto-Novo.
Security forces responded with force, killing several demonstrators and arresting dozens.
In June 2019, former President Thomas Boni Yai endured 52 days of house arrest on suspicion of inciting election protests.
As a result, parliament was completely devoid of opposition, making it dangerous to revive political dissent after the upheaval.
The transformation will be completed by 2021. April’s presidential election, held amid violent protests and a boycott by several opposition parties, began with vote counting in an intimidating atmosphere, with civil society observers reporting widespread fraud and highlighting how the political environment had changed. Talon won re-election with an astonishing 86 percent of the vote.
After this, any illusions of democracy in the country disappeared, and all political competition was crushed through politicized arrests, show trials, and long incarcerations.
In December 2021, constitutional scholar Joel Ivo, a prominent opponent of President Patrice Tallon, was found guilty of conspiracy against the state and money laundering and sentenced to 10 years in prison by the Court for the Suppression of Economic Crimes and Terrorism (CRIET).
Days later, the same court sentenced another Talon opponent, former Justice Minister Lekkiyah Madugou, to 20 years in prison for “complicity in acts of terrorism” in a verdict that her lawyers and international rights groups described as politically motivated.
By 2022, more than 50 rebels had been jailed on charges ranging from terrorism to economic sabotage, including 30 who were released during French President Emmanuel Macron’s 2022 visit, although prominent leaders Ivo and Madougou remain imprisoned.
But repression was only part of the project.
Institutional strengthening continued.
On November 16, several weeks before the attempted coup, Congress passed an amendment extending the terms of office of the president and parliament from five to seven years and creating a partially appointed Senate.
The amendment passed with 90 votes in favor and 19 votes against, maintaining the two-term presidential term limit. Opposition lawmakers criticized both its timing and long-term impact, arguing it would disrupt the political calendar and rebalance the balance of power between state institutions.
By the time these warnings were issued, the damage had already been done.
In other words, the soldiers who appeared on TV two days ago to assert their power did not destroy Benin’s democracy.
They revealed how decayed it already was.
Benin fits into a broader African trajectory of term extensions in Zimbabwe and Togo, constitutional disputes in Zambia, and fears of military intervention experienced in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
Public opinion highlights a dilemma.
Afrobarometer’s latest survey of 39 African countries found that while 66% still prefer democracy, more than half think military intervention is acceptable if leaders abuse their power.
In Benin, as elsewhere, trust in elections and democratic governance is declining, with trust in the military outstripping trust in political institutions.
Courts are widely seen as politicized, opinion polls are stripped of credibility, and voters’ sense of agency is undermined.
Coups rarely arise spontaneously from the barracks.
Instead, it traces the systematic erosion of democratic institutions through judicial capture, electoral manipulation, and constitutional amendments that entrench the incumbent.
Elections are still held and courts are still in session, but they no longer serve as instruments of accountability. They serve as the procedural shell of a system in which political competition and choice have disappeared.
When civilian institutions collapse, the military takes advantage of the vacuum.
they won’t repair it.
In Benin, this development is undeniable.
The AU and ECOWAS condemned the coup attempt and pledged support for the constitutional order, but stopped short of imposing sanctions, continued mediation, or binding guarantees against electoral interference.
Lately, democratic backsliding in Africa has produced statements rather than results.
The failed coup attempt in Benin does not bring stability.
On the contrary, the attempted coup risks accelerating securitization and causing further instability.
The reason, the conspirators said, was a failure of policy. They cited Talon’s response to the threat from al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS)-linked fighters in northern Benin, his neglect of fallen soldiers and their families, and unpopular tax and spending decisions.
True recovery requires reversing years of democratic backsliding.
Political prisoners should be freed, special courts abolished or reformed, and unfair electoral laws abolished.
The Election Commission needs to be completely independent from administrative management.
The constitution itself needs an open and comprehensive review with the participation of civil society, opposition parties and independent institutions.
These demands are not radical.
These represent the democratic minimum necessary for legitimacy and stability.
Talon is a businessman who came to power as Benin’s democratic hope, promising to clean up governance and modernize the country.
Almost a decade later, he represents the return of Africa’s post-independence strongman. This is a throwback to the days of control and fear and the possibility of arrest.
What Talon did with the law is as violent as what the soldiers tried with their guns on December 7th.
Still, Benin’s window for reform remains open.
Just, just.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
