The war between the United States and Israel against Iran has only been underway for a day, and it is already clear that it will have a serious impact, especially in the Middle East and the Gulf region. US and Israeli shelling of Iran has killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei as well as numerous senior officials. Tehran responded by attacking various countries in the region as well as Israel.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman have all been attacked by Iranian missiles and drones, even though they did not launch attacks on Iran from their territory. Various locations in these states were targeted, including military bases, airports, ports, and even commercial areas.
A prolonged conflict could represent a real turning point for the Gulf region, reshaping the way nations think about their security, alliances and even their long-term economic futures.
For years, stability in the Gulf has relied on a set of well-known assumptions. The United States remains the dominant security power. The conflict with Iran was managed, contained, and kept below the threshold of full-scale confrontation. And the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), despite differences of opinion, provided enough coordination to prevent regional politics from completely collapsing. If the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran continues, all of these things will become tense at once. It will prompt Gulf capitals to rethink not just their defense plans but the deeper logic of their regional strategies.
Gulf diplomacy has already seen a shift in recent years, cautiously, quietly, and more focused on risk aversion than choosing sides. The China-mediated thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, the viable route between the United Arab Emirates and Iran, and Oman’s steady mediation role all point to the same idea that stability requires dialogue even when mistrust persists. Qatar has also left the door open, betting on diplomacy and détente as a way to reduce risks.
But the longer the war drags on, the more difficult it will be to maintain that balancing act. There will be increasing pressure from Washington to demonstrate clearer coordination. Domestic public opinion will likely demand a firmer answer as to where the national interest truly lies. Regional polarization will become even stronger. In such an environment, strategic ambiguity ceases to be seen as prudent flexibility and begins to look more like a vulnerability because everyone wants to choose a side.
The economic shock could be equally significant. An escalation of the Iran-related conflict would quickly bring maritime chokepoints, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s economic most sensitive arteries, back into the center of global attention. Even limited disruptions could cause sharp increases in energy prices, higher insurance and transportation costs, and renewed investor anxiety.
While higher oil prices may boost profits in the short term, sustained volatility comes with other costs. Just at the moment many Gulf countries are looking to accelerate their diversification, long-term capital could move away, complicating the financing of megaprojects and raising borrowing costs.
There are also long-term strategic risks. Large consumers, especially in Asia, may decide that repeated instability is reason enough to accelerate diversification away from Gulf energy resources. Over time, its influence will quietly decline, even if the region remains a major energy supplier.
Within the GCC, wars can either bring countries closer together or expose rifts. The bloc constantly oscillates between unity and conflict, and crises do not automatically create unity. Different members perceive threats differently and have different levels of comfort with risk. Oman and Qatar have typically focused on mediation and communication channels with Tehran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are increasingly leaning toward deterrence, despite recent investments in de-escalation. Kuwait tends to balance carefully and avoid difficult positioning.
Should the conflict unexpectedly escalate, these differences could resurface and strain cooperation. However, the opposite result is also possible. The crisis could lead to further cooperation on missile defense, intelligence sharing, and maritime security. Which direction the GCC moves will depend less on external pressures and more on whether member states see this as a period of competition or a moment of retraction.
From a narrow perspective, a prolonged war would also accelerate larger geopolitical realignments. China and Russia will not remain passive. Beijing, deeply invested in Gulf energy flows and regional connectivity, could expand its diplomatic footprint and position itself as a stabilizing intermediary. The Russian government could use the turmoil to expand arms sales and leverage regional sectors.
On the other hand, deepening U.S. military involvement and narrowing Washington’s political breadth could put Gulf states in a complicated position, making them more dependent on U.S. security assistance but more wary of relying on a single patron. This dynamic could lead to new patterns of conditional alignment, with Gulf capitals cooperating militarily with the United States but expanding their economic and diplomatic options to avoid overdependence.
But the most profound changes may not be military or economic. From a strategic perspective, it could be cultural. For decades, Gulf states have prioritized stability, modernization, and prudent geopolitical strategies. If regional wars drag on, that model could collapse. It may be forced to make painful trade-offs between security imperatives and development ambitions, between diplomatic flexibility and alliance discipline, between the desire to avoid escalation and the realities of living next door.
That’s why the Gulf feels like it’s at a crossroads right now. It could become a front line in a long-term great power conflict, or it could leverage the diplomatic capital it has built to foster détente while strengthening its defense resilience. In any case, the outcome will not only shape security thinking in the Gulf. It could affect the region’s entire political structure for years, perhaps decades, to come.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
