Ben Rhodes, who served as vice presidential national security adviser under President Barack Obama, famously referred to Washington’s foreign policy establishment as the “blob” to describe the robust ecosystem of think tanks, former government officials, journalists, and funders that perpetuate a narrow view of power, global order, and legitimate actors. This mechanism not only maintains conservative inertia but also defines the limits of what is considered possible in policy. These self-imposed boundaries have been deadly in Sudan’s two-and-a-half year conflict.
A particularly insidious practice within the Blob is the invocation of moral and rhetorical equivalence, depicting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) as equal enemies. This ostensibly balanced U.S. stance, as evidenced by regime analysis and diplomatic statements, represents a deliberate political structure rather than an unbiased default. By equating criminalized, externally supported militias with state-managed national armies, the RSF’s atrocities are framed and reframed as simple wartime emergencies rather than organized operations of ethnic cleansing, urban siege, and terror.
Human Rights Watch reports and UN fact-finding mission reports on ethnic cleansing in West Darfur and the killing, rape, and illegal detention of civilians in Gezira and Khartoum confirm that the RSF deliberately targets civilians. Furthermore, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Monitoring Agency (ACLED) report for late 2024 attributed approximately 77 percent of incidents of violence against civilians to the RSF, highlighting this asymmetry, which the Blob’s discourse often obscures.
This concept has dominated U.S. and international discourse on the Sudanese war since the outbreak of the war. John Godfrey, the US ambassador to Khartoum at the time, tweeted in the first month of the war that he condemned RSF sexual violence, but vaguely attributed it to unspecified “insurgents.” Despite extensive documentation of the RSF’s responsibility for systematic rape, gang rape, and sexual slavery, by refraining from explicitly identifying the perpetrators, his language essentially dispersed responsibility across the warring parties and contributed to a climate of institutional impunity. RSF militias confidently carry out atrocities knowing that responsibility will be blurred and responsibility will be distributed among the parties.
What creates this equivalence? Blob institutions often prioritize access over truth. Framing the conflict symmetrically allows it to create an air of neutrality while protecting diplomatic relations with regional allies, particularly the RSF’s backers in the United Arab Emirates. However, neutrality in the context of asymmetric criminal behavior is not objectivity. It’s tacit collusion. Elevating internationally recognized militias to the same level as sovereign armies gives the RSF unwarranted legitimacy. Its methods, which include the siege and starvation of cities such as El Fasher, the systematic use of rape and sexual violence as weapons of war, the deployment of drones in mosques and markets, and acts of genocide, are clearly systematic, as supported by investigative reporting and human rights. document. Subsuming these as “acts by both parties” distorts empirical reality and erodes the mechanism of responsibility.
Compounding this is the Blob’s uncritical assimilation of RSF propaganda into its interpretive framework. RSF strategically positions itself as a vanguard against “Islamists”, masking its historical criminality, patronage networks, illegal resource extraction, and foreign sponsorship.
Similarly, RSF has publicly expressed its sympathy and strong support for Israel, even proposing to resettle Palestinians displaced from Gaza to suit US interests. This discourse serves as a prelude to the Blob, leveraging common geopolitical priorities to portray the RSF as a pragmatic partner in regional stability.
Some regime experts and diplomats agree with this theory, positioning the RSF as a potent bulwark against an “Islamist resurgence” and thereby lending strategic and moral credibility to forces involved in war crimes. When the Blob internalizes this “anti-Muslim” metaphor as analytical shorthand, it legitimizes rebel militias as a geopolitical truth, alienating Sudanese who reject the realities of war and militarized dichotomous and sectarian lenses.
Contrast this with repeated accusations that the SAF receives external support from ideologically disparate coalitions such as Egypt, Turkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. These claims, amplified in mainstream media coverage, often align with RSF’s narrative, but expose serious contradictions. Egypt’s secular anti-Muslim state, Turkiye’s pro-Islamist government, Saudi Arabia’s Sunni Wahhabi monarchy, and Iran’s Shiite theocracy represent a clash of regional rivalries evident in proxy wars from Yemen to Libya, all of which claim unity. There can be no support for the SAF unless opportunistic realism overrides ideology.
Moreover, the standard of evidence falls short of robust independent documentation showing UAE involvement in RSF operations, relying instead on partisan claims and briefings that appear designed to confuse asymmetries. Importantly, verified SAF assistance typically involves conventional arms transactions with the internationally recognized Sudanese government in Port Sudan, a sovereign authority, as opposed to unchecked donations to the RSF, a non-state actor officially designated as a genocide by the United States. This fundamental difference highlights the blob’s artificial equivalence, which confuses legitimate state-to-state engagement with illegitimate empowerment of atrocity perpetrators.
Even more corrosive is the Blob’s tendency to seek confidence in “pseudo-private” entities aligned with the RSF and its external sponsors, particularly those strengthened by UAE influence, such as Somoud, led by former Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, who is also chairman of the UAE’s business promotion organization, the African Center for Development and Investment (CADI). These networks are often presented as “private stakeholders” or “pragmatic moderates” on Blob forums, sidelining genuine grassroots organizations within Sudan.
This curation of externally accommodating agents turns mediation into theater, directs international scrutiny to RSF-aligned interests, and ignores Sudanese state institutions rather than supporting genuine civic architects of realizing Sudan’s democratic aspirations. The documented logistical and political ties between the UAE and the RSF and the amplification of the Gulf-orchestrated narrative should serve as a warning against supporting such fabricated authorities.
These lapses are not just intellectual. They cause tangible harm. Justifying the RSF through equivalence and narrative cooperation dilutes legal and political avenues for redress and limits policy options to performative cease-fires and superficial stability blueprints to maintain war economies and arms flows. True deterrence, such as targeted interdiction, strong arms embargoes, and arrests of perpetrators, is postponed until atrocities become irreversible.
That’s not the only impact. They go deeper and work with civilian partners to fuel the militias’ authoritarian ambitions. Exploiting this artificial equivalence, they have recently declared Taasi, a parallel governance structure in western Sudan, asserting further legitimacy, at least rhetorically brandishing the threat of partition, despite clear international consensus against recognizing such authority.
A paradigm shift is essential to combat blob pathology. Analysts and policymakers must reject false symmetries and distinguish between symmetric wars and asymmetric atrocities. Where evidence of systematic rights violations is found, international rhetoric and action should reflect this imbalance through targeted sanctions and disruption, while avoiding general “both sides” statements.
They must also deny the RSF narrative. “Anti-Muslim” rhetoric is a partisan slogan, not an objective analysis. U.S. involvement should center on the protection of civilians and prioritize genuine civil society testimony over fabricated proxies. The question of who governs Sudan is first and foremost the prerogative of the Sudanese people themselves, who demonstrated their sovereign agency in April 2019 by overthrowing the Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir without requesting or relying on outside aid.
Equally important is the withholding of recognition from unnatural civilians. The role of mediation should depend on a verifiable grassroots mission. Groups with ties to foreign patrons or militias do not deserve to be elevated to represent Sudan.
Finally, policymakers must dismantle enablers. Rhetorical and legal measures must be matched with enforcement through transparent embargo monitoring, aircraft suspensions, and supply chain sanctions. Justice without execution only brings solace to the victims.
If the Blob proves too strong, an alternative force must intervene. Sudan’s Citizens United, diaspora advocates, independent media, and Ethics Policy Network can gather evidence and apply pressure to force a recalibration of global approaches. Diplomacy that hides complicity under the guise of neutrality perpetuates institutions of brutality. Only those firmly rooted in Sudanese ownership, empirical truth, and unwavering commitment can build a viable peace.
Sudanese do not seek sympathy, only realignment among influential people. It is about ceasing to equate invaders with protectors, amplifying the perpetrators’ propaganda, and replacing vibrant civic reality with an organized façade. Until Washington elites recognize Sudanese people not as geopolitical actors but as people with a right to demand justice, their epistemological maze will continue to permit genocide rather than mediation.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
