In 1987, the New York Times published an open letter to the American people. Its author, New York real estate developer Donald Trump, accused Japan of taking advantage of the United States and warned that the United States was being “laughed at” by its trading partners. Nearly 40 years later, President Trump, now in his second term, has leveled similar complaints at China, accusing it of abusing American generosity and undermining American power.
This idea now drives Washington’s global strategy and increasingly shapes European behavior. The Dutch government’s seizure of Chinese chipmaker Nexperia in September 2025 was the clearest sign yet of how far European governments were drawn into the US-led conflict with China. The move, presented as a matter of national security, came after The Hague declared Chinese ownership of Neexperia a threat to Dutch strategic interests.
The company at the center of this decision has its own complicated history. Nexperia began as the standard products division of NXP Semiconductors. The company was sold to a consortium of Chinese investors in 2017, becoming one of several European tech companies to join China’s expanding industrial portfolio. By the late 2010s, its portfolio already included Supercell, Sumo, Stunlock, and Miniclip in gaming, Kuka in robotics, WorldFirst in currency exchange, and mobile advertising startup MobPartner. Europe, which has long welcomed Chinese investment as a symbol of openness, now treats similar partnerships as a strategic threat.
The scale of these acquisitions increased with increasing pressure within Europe to protect areas deemed essential to national security. Governments have begun to use emergency powers to block or withdraw Chinese ownership of what are now called strategic assets. Neexperia is not the first company to be repossessed from a European country. In 2022, Britain ordered the company to sell its stake in the Newport wafer factory, while France took over Omic in 2023. In the US, Chinese company Kunlun Technology was ordered to sell a 60% stake in Grindr in 2019.
Globally, such retaliatory responses have become commonplace. In response to safety concerns about Nvidia products, in 2024 the Chinese government restricted exports of key minerals used in semiconductor manufacturing and tightened regulations on the sale of foreign chips. Against this background, it is no wonder that European governments are becoming increasingly wary of the transfer of important assets and intellectual property to China.
The instinct to protect a country’s industry is nothing new. But despite Western outrage over Chinese technology theft, it’s worth remembering that Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States, openly encouraged what we would now call industrial espionage. In the early years of the American Republic, British-born engineer Samuel Slater memorized Richard Arkwright’s water-fed technology and helped establish America’s first water-powered cotton mill in Rhode Island. Hamilton later praised such imitations in his 1791 Report on Manufactures.
Fast forward to 2025, when the so-called “Magnificent Seven” (Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta Platform, Microsoft, Nvidia, Tesla) joined the multi-trillion dollar valuation club, their rise was attributed to genius and innovation. But when they stall, as in the Tesla vs. BYD race, the blame often shifts to external factors such as unfair regulation or intellectual theft. American exceptionalism is seen as meritocracy, while China’s ambitions for technological leadership are denounced as unscrupulous.
So, why are European countries participating in the battle for semiconductor supremacy in Central America, which is the third most distant continent?
European leaders say the answer lies in protecting sovereignty and reducing dependence on authoritarian regimes. But the economic impact is already becoming apparent. Most of Nexperia’s production takes place in China, and the company cannot meet demand without that capacity. Since the acquisition, some of the company’s operations have slowed, with hundreds of employees facing layoffs in the Netherlands, UK and Germany. Global carmakers including Volkswagen and Volvo have warned of potential production delays due to a shortage of automotive chips essential to vehicle electronics and control systems.
It’s not just the Netherlands. Across Europe, governments have embraced the rhetoric of “decoupling” from China, even though economies remain deeply intertwined with China. Nexperia’s seizure closely aligns with European proponents of Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” rhetoric, which calls for economic separation from China framed as a moral remedy, and portends further backlash across the Maastricht-born union. Against this background, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s call for “risk reduction, not decoupling” rings hollow.
There is an implicit surrender in all of this that continues to shape European responses to crises, starting with the 1948 Marshall Plan and continuing from the Russo-Ukrainian war to the current battle over technology. Every episode reaffirms the same pattern. As Washington redraws global boundaries, Europe adjusts accordingly. The Dutch occupation of Nexperia may be justified in terms of sovereignty, but it reveals how little sovereignty remains. As the United States and China vie for technological supremacy, Europe once again finds itself not a player in the new order, but its terrain.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.
