The US and Israeli military strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026 were not just another episode in a long cycle of tensions in the region. The attack quickly became a pivotal event with the announcement of the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, a development that disrupted the balance of power within the regional axis that the Iranian government had spent decades building.
Particularly in Yemen, another question has arisen: How will Abdel Malik al-Houthi respond to this moment? Will these developments push the group into a new conflict, or will it choose to manage the situation cautiously and wait until the trajectory of the conflict becomes clearer?
And what will be the fate of the group and its leaders if they decide to wage this war?
In Sanaa, where the Houthis are politically and ideologically tied to the Iranian axis, it was natural that the Houthi leader’s speech would attract attention.
Abdelmalik al-Houthi has appeared three times since the war began. In his first speech, he declared solidarity with Iran and affirmed his readiness for “all developments” in a message that looked more like a political statement than a declaration of military resolve. His second speech took on a more emotional tone, expressing his condolences over Khamenei’s death and reaffirming his support for Tehran.
The third speech was similar, with no different statements and emphasizing the same message.
But what wasn’t said in the speech was just as shocking as what was said.
The group did not issue a clear declaration of military intervention, as in the past, when it wanted to send a message of deterrence or real solidarity to its allies. There was also no recorded direct escalation or clear military threat to Israeli or U.S. interests on the ground. The group’s media messages also appeared more disciplined and restrained this time, a departure from the usual approach in similar regional events, where escalating rhetoric has often prevailed.
This contradiction between mobilization rhetoric and action on the ground suggests that the decision to go to war is not as simple as it seems. The group, which has built much of its political discourse on the idea of an “axis of resistance,” also recognizes that entering into a direct confrontation at a highly complex regional crossroads could open a Pandora’s box of uncontrollable outcomes.
Comparing this to the behavior of other members of the axis reveals a clearer picture. Lebanon’s Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most important military proxies in the region, wasted no time in joining the war after the recent outbreak of war. The party’s participation in the conflict reflects its role in the region known as the Iran Axis, where it is seen as one of the region’s most important deterrent forces and one of the countries most prepared for rapid military action if Tehran comes under direct attack.
This development reinforces the impression that Iran has already begun activating some of its military proxies in the region. With Hezbollah and Iraqi factions now participating in the conflict, the question of the Houthi position has become even more pressing. Will they remain on the sidelines, or will they join the fray later if the war escalates?
The situation for the Houthis appears to be somewhat different. Despite its close ties to the Iranian axis, the group operates in a different geographic and political environment and faces complex internal and regional considerations that make any decision to enter war more nuanced. The restraint seen in current actions may therefore reflect a recognition that a major escalation during a period of regional instability could open multiple fronts.
Recent experience has also shown that the Houthis are capable of a degree of realism when circumstances call for a different calculation. In May 2025, the Sultanate of Oman brokered an agreement between the group and the United States to ease tensions in the Red Sea, after months of heightened tensions due to Houthi attacks on international shipping. The agreement reflected the group’s willingness to readjust its military actions if the costs of escalation outweigh the potential benefits, especially given the high price it paid in the 2025 U.S. airstrikes.
During the 12-day war in June 2025, a sensitive moment in the region, the Houthis limited themselves to rhetoric of solidarity rather than direct military intervention, despite moral pressure exerted within the Iranian axis. These precedents demonstrate that the group has the ability to separate mobilization rhetoric from operational decisions when considering cost-effectiveness.
The most likely scenario in the event of a prolonged regional war therefore appears to be a calculated escalation through symbolic operations and carefully calibrated pressure tactics, without full-scale confrontation. Such an option would give the group room to demonstrate solidarity with Iran and maintain its domestic base without provoking large-scale attacks that could target military infrastructure at a time of regional instability.
There is another equally important possibility in this connection. It is possible that the group could postpone direct intervention and try to support Iran through other fronts, such as the Red Sea or the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The region is one of the most important strategic pressure points on global trade and energy routes, and the Houthis have demonstrated in recent years the ability to use the region as an effective pressure tactic by targeting and threatening shipping.
Such a scenario could allow the group to indirectly participate in the conflict by cutting off international supply lines and sending political and military messages simultaneously without starting an open conflict with Israel. This is also consistent with the role played by the Houthis in recent months, when Red Sea attacks became part of the regional pressure equation related to the Gaza war.
Direct intervention, whether by bombing Israel or carrying out large-scale operations against U.S. interests, remains a high-risk option, especially given that Israel views the Houthis as a months-long target and is increasingly perceived as likely to seize any opportunity to launch widespread attacks against its leadership and military infrastructure.
The group’s calculations are not limited to regional areas. Yemen’s internal dynamics play an equally influential role in determining its choices. It understands that extensive involvement in external conflict can open the door to unpredictable internal changes, especially in efforts to rebalance the balance of power within government camps and reshape military decision-making with Saudi support.
The situation within Houthi-controlled areas is not free from pressure. Accumulating economic challenges, coupled with intermittent security and social tensions, make external escalation a risky decision. In such a situation, the Houthi leadership may prefer to manage tensions carefully to avoid adding new military burdens at a sensitive time.
However, these calculations could change if the regional war goes in a different direction. If it develops into an existential threat to the Iranian regime, or lasts long enough to reshape the regional balance of power, the Houthis may face a new reckoning.
For now, the group appears to be watching with caution. Its rhetoric expresses solidarity with the Iranian government, but military decisions remain postponed as it waits for more clarity on the course of the war.
The coming weeks will reveal the direction the group chooses at this delicate time. The question is no longer simply whether the Houthis will join the war, but how they will position themselves in the regional landscape that is being reshaped by the conflict.
Will they remain within their traditional role as part of Iran’s regional influence network, or will they use this moment to establish themselves as a force with their own calculations, seeking to manage their regional role according to their own interests rather than the rhythms set by others?
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
