Hardly a day goes by without a new conflict between the Trump administration and Europe.
But in a year marked by major disputes over tariffs, President Donald Trump’s threat to annex Greenland, and disagreements over aid to Ukraine, the most pressing threat facing Europe is the continued transatlantic rift over NATO.
After German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the US response to the Iran conflict, saying that Iran had humiliated Washington, President Trump declared that the US would withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, and possibly more.
President Trump also slammed Spain and Italy for not supporting the U.S. campaign against Iran. Asked if he would consider withdrawing U.S. troops from those countries, Trump said, “Maybe…look, why shouldn’t we? Italy was no good for us, and Spain was awful, just awful.”
Spain has denied permission to use U.S. military bases and airspace for conflict-related missions and attacks. President Trump’s criticism of Italy comes despite the fact that Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is an important ally.
President Trump has long complained that the United States bears an unfair burden when it comes to Western security, and he once labeled Germany, Europe’s economic powerhouse, as “delinquent” on the issue. The U.S. partial withdrawal is another iteration of this story, but one that highlights a larger problem.
Germany, Britain and France are promising a new era of spending as the United States shows willingness to help with Europe’s security turmoil and the threat from Russia grows. But they have a mountain to climb, and it won’t take them long to accomplish it.
“If we want to maintain the transatlantic link, we need to strengthen the European pillar within NATO,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said on Saturday, after President Trump’s comments about withdrawing troops.
Pistorius suggested the drawdown was expected, calling it “foreseeable.”
Thousands of U.S. troops remain in Germany, but their numbers are a fraction of what they once were.
As of December 2025, 36,436 active-duty U.S. military personnel were stationed in Germany, according to U.S. Department of Defense data. At the height of the Cold War, approximately 250,000 active duty military personnel were based in West Germany.
That umbrella has been removed, even though Russia remains a threat – and recent US moves “highlight the need for Europe to invest more in defense,” NATO spokeswoman Alison Hart said on Saturday.
The US government wants to focus on challenges in Asia and the hemisphere where “only American power can play a decisive role,” said Elbridge Colby, a senior Pentagon official. Colby added that there was a need for “increased efforts by our allies to strengthen and assume their primary responsibilities for the traditional defense of Europe.”
From a US perspective, he said: “There is nothing anti-European in this vision. On the contrary, it reflects hope and real confidence in Europe’s ability to act substantively and vigorously.”
Some Europeans see this differently, calling it a loss of unity and common purpose and a stark example of American unilateralism.
“The greatest threat to the transatlantic community is not an external enemy, but the continued disintegration of our alliance,” Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Saturday. “We all must do what is necessary to reverse this dire trend.”
Reversing this trend will require increased defense spending in most NATO countries, a revival of arms production, investment in new technologies, and deepening cooperation.
According to current plans, annual European defense spending will almost double by 2030, reaching nearly $750 billion.
But spending that money wisely also requires a different mindset. When it comes to defense, there has been a historical lack of cooperation in production and procurement as governments zealously protect their national priorities.
Analysts say lower production volumes mean equipment like Germany’s Leopard tank costs much more than its American counterpart. The United States produces one main battle tank. About a dozen are produced in Europe.
The collapse of a Franco-German project to build a new generation of jet fighters is an example of conflicting national interests. Amid the bickering over the project’s leadership, Eric Trappier, CEO of French aircraft maker Dassault, said of the neighboring country: “If they want to do it themselves, let them do it themselves.”
There are other challenges as Europe moves away from American hardware. The European Union wants at least half of its member states’ defense spending to remain within the EU by 2030.
The rationale is simple. If you’re buying off-the-shelf products elsewhere, you can’t build your own functionality. To date, almost 80% of purchases have been outside the zone, primarily to the United States.
Managing that transition without creating new vulnerabilities will be a major challenge, one that is already causing headaches for Europe as the United States ramps up consumption of arms and ammunition by both its military and its Gulf allies in its war against Iran.
The shortage of missile defense systems is particularly acute, an area in which Europe is already weak. Analysts have described the “staggering” burn rate of missile defense interceptors such as Patriot and THAAD in the Gulf conflict, and the US plans to send billions of dollars worth of more similar weapons to its Gulf allies.
Notably, in addition to the troop reductions in Germany, the Pentagon announced that it would not deploy a long-range fire battalion equipped with Tomahawks and hypersonic missiles as planned.
European manufacturers produce a variety of anti-missile missiles, but not on a large scale and especially not capable of countering ballistic missiles or advanced cruise missiles. They do not offer “a single complete alternative to the U.S. system,” according to a recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
More co-production would ease the crisis, but as the CSIS report notes, “a degree of transatlantic trust and priority is needed, which may no longer exist.”
Therein lies Europe’s dilemma. Shortcuts to rearmament are spreading across the United States, but they require mutual trust and consistency.
A slower trajectory would require Europe to spend more, overcome a fragmented industrial structure, and take into account whether Washington’s priorities today are a transit phase or a new order.
Despite leaving the EU, there are signs of progress, with the UK becoming more closely involved in building a European defense identity and an increase in joint projects between defense companies and Ukraine.
Companies such as Sweden’s Saab, Germany’s Rheinmetall and Britain’s BAE are on the record order book.
Sweden and Finland, which recently joined NATO, have rapidly integrated into the alliance.
But joint sovereignty and accelerating Europe’s ability to defend itself remains the holy grail.
