For a war that forces such fundamental changes on the battlefield, the retention of 60-year-old Oleksandr Shirschiy as Ukraine’s top commander is an unusual situation. That’s not ageism, but a reflection of the mindset of the recently dismissed Ukrainian military commander.
Seen from this perspective, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s decision on Tuesday to replace Shirschiky with 43-year-old Mykhailo Drapati, a young general from a new generation of military leaders, seems perhaps premature.
Shirushky was a Soviet-era figure who brought tenacity and brutal tenacity to the first years of the war, as well as a blossoming strategic genius. He suited Ukraine’s initial need to confront and sometimes outsmart a larger, bloodier enemy. The defense of Kiev in 2022, the swift retaking of the Kharkov region later that year, and the surprise invasion of Kursk, Russia itself, in 2024 are all credited to him.
However, his leadership was also marked by heavy losses in the Ukrainian army. And ultimately, the same political infighting and naked ambition that led to his rise would lead to his downfall.
Mr Shirushyky took up the post after a failed counterattack in 2023, and then-commander-in-chief Valery Zarzhiny was transferred to London as Ukraine’s ambassador. Many analysts have suggested that the failure was due to Mr. Shirsky convincing Mr. Zelenskyy that a simultaneous attack on the eastern city of Bakhmut and the southern Zaporizhzhya Front would split Russia’s defenses. Rather, it bifurcated Kiev’s vaunted summer momentum, but it failed.
Silsky rose to the top, perhaps because Zarzhini became so popular that his face could often be seen on the walls of military cafes. Opinion polls showed he was overwhelmingly more likable than anyone else. And a failure on the battlefield ensured his exit.
Two years later, the same situation repeated itself. Clashes over strategy have intensified, leading President Zelenskiy to initially remove a rising star, 35-year-old defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov. The head of chaos discussed reforms so openly with President Silschy that President Zelenskiy was also forced to admit that he had become the arbiter between the two. He said quite correctly that such a war could not be waged. The dismissal of Fedorov, a technology and recruitment pioneer, sparked rare protests in Ukraine’s streets.
The week of melodrama followed a familiar pattern for President Zelenskiy and was reminiscent of the crisis a year ago over the fate of Ukraine’s anti-corruption agency. President Zelenskiy limited his powers, but later changed his mind and fired his chief of staff over corruption allegations. All because the protests have peeled away President Zelenskiy’s Teflon-coated exterior. Zelenskiy appears to have learned little from this episode. And this repeated cycle of action, protest, and reaction reveals two things about the current state of the war in Ukraine.
First, Tuesday marked a generational change in the Ukrainian military. The Shirschiky method of war, large-scale, costly frontal attacks, was beginning to look outdated, if not the only real way to take back land. Mr. Fedorov’s attack on old ways of doing things, using instead robots, drones, automation and data to determine why soldiers were injured, all made sense in a country with a severe military shortage. They put Ukraine at the forefront of the world of battlefield technology.
This new army was not Fedorov’s idea alone, but he became its central proponent and gradually became the face of its triumphs, with headlines about robot rescues and raids and the relentless toll of Ukraine’s long-range attacks on Russia. The success was not only for Ukraine but also for Fedorov, who earlier this year touted his decision to finance the purchase of drones.
It is too early to tell whether drones and robots can really replace front-line troops. Ukraine had little choice but to unravel, and the time spent learning its lessons gave Kiev a useful pause for realignment and provided a powerful technological upgrade that Moscow still has to match. War will never be the same again until someone learns how to switch off the machines. Some strategists argue that artillery continues to serve as a deterrent to large-scale Russian advances. Not everything from the past becomes redundant overnight.
But Fedorov’s rise, egos and jokes aside, marked a simple change. The young Ukrainians fighting the war will be led by generals about their age.
The new commander, Mr Drapati, has fought on the war’s toughest front lines, and footage of him driving an armored personnel carrier through pro-Russian separatist barricades in 2014 was also recycled at his inauguration on Tuesday. He’s not a novice, but he’s not from Mr. Shirschiky’s generation. The difference in hacker mentality between him and Fedorov is eight years. There was a 17-year age difference between him and Shirushky, and his desire for brutal attack forces earned him the nickname “Butcher”.
Drapati had a similar experience in war as Shirushki, but gained fame for his victories and reforms. He was key to halting the initial Russian invasion around the city of Kryvi Rih, and later oversaw the rout from Kherson, but later also halted the Russian advance in the Kharkov region. He was an early advocate of using drones to create “kill zones” along the front and effectively halt Russian advances. His leadership of the ground forces also saw a fundamental rethinking of structure and leadership.
Ukraine’s problems will not go away just by introducing relatively young players into the top ranks. The country still lacks the human resources, funding and critical infrastructure to survive next winter. However, they introduced new talent and continued to focus on new ideas and technologies that changed both the story of the war and its dynamics to their advantage. In that sense, the past few days have been a small victory. But this episode offers another, less enlightening lesson for Ukrainians.
The important thing here is that politically, Zelenskiy hates stories slipping out of his hands as much as he hates parallel personalities gaining popularity. In hindsight, the entire incident was avoidable. Zelenskiy could have fired Shirushky a week ago, something that had seemed inevitable for months as talk of his failure echoed across Kiev. Instead, a public spat between the young Fedorov and the older general left Zelenskiy to stick with his older, loyal guard.
Mr. Shirushkyi has proven himself to be the more capable political operator over the years, and perhaps Mr. Zelenskyy feared the collapse of the established command that his resignation would cause. Or was he more concerned that the young disruptor might be seen as trying to force a major personnel change on him?
President Zelenskiy’s instinct was to dump the rising star. Afterwards, large-scale protests erupted in the streets, albeit on a smaller scale. Zelenskiy then began the slow and deliberate task of changing course. This involved a series of public meetings with the military’s top commanders, debriefings, and auditions for the post that Shirschiky had already lost.
It is unlikely that President Zelenskiy would have sought such a long route to an outcome that could have been accelerated last week. Still, the vision of an enlightened president who listens to both the people, especially the younger generation, and the military commanders remains.
It is unclear what “high-profile” role Mr. Fedorov has been offered in the government, or whether he will accept it. It ceased to be important. Mr. Zelenskyy showed his Western allies and voters that he could listen to them and make disruptive change permanent. It is only by changing the situation of the battle that Kiev can inflict damage on Moscow.
But one curiosity remains. Zelenskyy once said that when the war was over, he would sit on the beach and drink beer. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why he would still want to hold the country’s top job once the true “just” peace he seeks is established. There is no real mechanism to replace him, as valid elections are nearly impossible in wartime Ukraine. To that extent, he is invincible. However, he is still very attached to his popularity, and potential rivals Zaryuzhny and Fyodorov are eliminated despite their talent, especially after they both clashed with Shirschiy.
Mr. Zelensky is the consummate showman and salesman for Ukraine’s war effort on the international stage. But these glimpses of domestic weakness illustrate the state of affairs at Bankova’s presidential headquarters, where bad decisions are quickly made against corruption and Fyodorov, and then, under public pressure, choices are slowly reversed.
This is certainly a functioning democracy, but a question arises here. How many other poor claims have gone unchallenged in the last four years?
