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It is no longer possible to interpret the Yemeni landscape solely through the lens of politics. The developments witnessed in the government-controlled southern governorates of Yemen in recent months clearly demonstrate that the security and military situation has become a decisive factor in determining the fate of power on the ground. No government or political arrangement will be sustainable unless the problems of centralizing security control and military command are resolved.
Furthermore, the escalating rift between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates between the two allies that have shaped southern Yemen militarily, politically, and economically in recent years cannot be overlooked, given its direct impact on the balance of power and stability.
Over the past few years, southern provinces have developed a complex security system consisting of official forces and other forces that emerged during the war. Some of these forces are affiliated with state institutions, others are established with Emirati support, such as the tens of thousands of Southern Transitional Council troops, and others are established through local arrangements shaped by the context of the conflict.
Although there have been moves to restructure the situation in recent months following the defeat of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which declared its dissolution in Hadramawt and Al-Mahrah on January 3, 2026, security control remains uneven across provinces. Moreover, the security and military structure of the STC has not completely disappeared. Some people have been relocated, but the fate of the others remains unknown.
In the temporary capital, Aden, security services operate within a complex structure. Some units previously attached to the STC have lost personnel and weapons, while others have been renamed or redeployed. However, long-standing networks of influence remain, and the transfer of leadership and repositioning of factions reflects an attempt to rebalance power rather than a definitive resolution of the situation.
The same is true, to varying degrees, of Lahij, Abian, Dahle, Shabwa, and Hadramawt, where the state’s ability to assert effective authority varies, as does the level of coordination between official security forces and the organizations that emerged during the war.
The most sensitive issue at this stage is the integration of military and security organizations into the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. The government aims to abolish parallel security agencies, but faces complex challenges in the process, including different sources of funding for some forces, varying political loyalties, some commanders’ concerns about losing local influence, and considerations regarding the composition of these forces. As a result, integration appears to be gradual and dependent on relocation and restructuring rather than decisive measures that risk provoking conflict.
The government, currently based in Aden in southern Yemen, faces a delicate equation of having to use its security powers without plunging the country into new internal conflict.
The transition from multiple armed groups to a state monopoly on the use of force requires political consensus, regional support, and international support. Hasty action could reignite internal conflict, especially given existing political and regional sensitivities and concerns that the Saudi-Emirati conflict could once again spark confrontations on the ground.
For this reason, the government is first focused on creating a stable security environment.
This trajectory cannot be understood without considering regional aspects. Saudi Arabia views Yemen as a strategic deep area with direct national security implications and seeks the emergence of a stable state along its southern border.
The conflict between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has been a key factor in shaping the course of the crisis, especially after Yemen demanded the withdrawal of Emirati forces from the territory and as Saudi Arabia accuses Abu Dhabi of continuing to support the STC and strengthening its influence on the ground.
Yemen today is part of a broader regional picture intertwined with the dynamics and routes of the Red Sea, competition for influence in the Horn of Africa, and tensions stretching from Sudan to Somalia and the Gulf. International actors, particularly the United States, are therefore keen to bring the situation in Yemen under control, fearing that a breakdown in security could spark an intra-Gulf conflict, threaten international shipping, create space for a new wave of armed groups, or allow the Houthis to exploit the situation.
In the next phase, the government will continue efforts to strengthen security control in Aden and other southern provinces, including Hadramawt, which borders Saudi Arabia, while gradually integrating military forces and maintaining political balance to prevent a recurrence of conflict.
The success of these efforts will determine whether the country moves toward gradual stabilization or another realignment of power centers. Given this reality, the central question remains as to who truly has the ability to impose security on the ground, especially as some actors continue to push the Southern Transitional Council toward escalation that could potentially reignite conflict.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
