The killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei does not necessarily mean the immediate collapse of the regime.
This is a hasty reading, reflecting wishful thinking rather than dispassionate analysis. Indeed, we are witnessing a seismic shift that is the most dangerous to hit the Islamic Republic since its establishment in 1979. But the more important political question is no. The question is, “Is the blow that bad?” Rather, “Was the system built to absorb a shock of this magnitude?”
The evidence available so far shows that this system was designed from the beginning to be nothing more than a shadow of one person, no matter how high his status.
The Islamic Republic is not a dictatorship like in the familiar Arab context, and when a head disappears, the entire structure collapses. It is a complex ideological and securitized system, with a religious head and beneath him a network of solid institutions, some constitutional, some security-related, and some bureaucratic and economic, all working not simply to serve individuals but to maintain the entity itself.
For this reason, the killing of a supreme leader does not automatically eliminate a nation or overthrow a regime. Rather, it shifts the crisis from a question of “survival of the head” to a question of “internal cohesion.” The real danger lies in the struggle to maintain it.
Iran’s constitution itself was drafted with a premonition of a power vacuum in mind. Article 111 provides that in the event of a vacancy in the position, an ad hoc council shall assume leadership powers until the Assembly of Experts elects a new leader as soon as possible.
After the announcement of the killing of the leader, power was temporarily transferred to a three-person council consisting of President Massoud Pezeshkian, Attorney General Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and Guardian Council member Alireza Alafi.
Meanwhile, the selection of a new supreme leader was in the hands of an 88-member panel of experts.
This clarity on how to deal with vacancies in leadership positions can be described as a “survival protocol” designed to give the system the ability to continue even in moments of greatest shock.
But the bigger mistake would be to be fooled by the form of the Constitution alone. Yes, the text is important, but the balance of power is even more important. Here we need to distinguish between three layers from which the system derives its strengths.
The first layer is religious orthodoxy, represented by the office of supreme leader, the council of experts, and the council of guardians. This layer gives the system its doctrinal legitimacy and determines who holds the “seal of legitimacy.” Therefore, the succession dispute is not just an administrative dispute, but also a theological and political one.
The second tier is the security and military wing, led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which is actually the backbone of the system, rather than just one of its organizations.
The third layer is the political bureaucracy, which refers to the government, the presidential office, the judiciary, and the administrative and economic institutions that maintain the day-to-day functioning of the state and prevent scenes of total collapse.
Among all these layers, the one that is truly decisive is the IRGC.
According to recent reports, the key question after Khamenei’s murder is no longer “Is there a constitutional mechanism?” Rather, “Can the Revolutionary Guards remain cohesive?” Because this organization is neither subordinate to the president nor is it a regular military force. It is the actual guardian of the revolution and has the upper hand in internal security, regional decision-making, economic and influence networks.
With the war and the killing of senior commanders, the Revolutionary Guards tightened the stranglehold on domestic decision-making and became dependent on a degree of operational decentralization that allowed mid-level leadership to continue operating rapidly.
This means that the blow may have hit the head, but the limbs were not paralyzed.
Based on current signs, it is difficult to say with certainty that the Iranian regime will collapse as a result of this war alone. In fact, some signs point to the opposite. Ideological systems can harden rather than collapse when faced with external existential threats, and targeting the supreme leader may lead to a more assertive posture and defensive cohesion rather than a rapid collapse in the short term.
Even some Iranian dissidents abroad have made it clear that bombing alone will not bring down the regime and that if real change is to occur, a broader domestic dynamic is needed than just military strikes.
However, just because it doesn’t collapse right away doesn’t mean it’s safe. The regime may not collapse, but it may emerge war-weary, wary and more self-reliant, especially after the election of the late supreme leader’s son Mojtaba Khamenei. In my view, this is the most likely scenario so far. The government will remain in power, but it will be tougher and less confident.
War not only tests deterrence, but also reveals the extent of internal vulnerabilities and restructures centers of power. When a regime rises to power after suffering losses in such wars and with its very head threatened, it tends to choose the security option. It turns inward, magnifies suspicion, narrows the political sphere, and treats opposition and dissidents as “potential breakthroughs” in the walls of survival.
This trend is already starting to emerge. Reports have spoken of internal rifts that have surfaced under the pressure of war between hard-line groups close to the Revolutionary Guards and less hard-line currents associated with President Pezeshkian’s positions, especially after the controversy following the president’s comments about halting attacks on Gulf states.
Some hard-line clerics within the regime expressed concerns about the temporary decentralization of real power to the Council of Three in the midst of war, and called for an urgent selection of a new supreme leader. These are not yet signs of collapse, but signs of insecurity in the structure itself.
The dilemma, then, is not the absence of a mechanism, but the environment in which this mechanism is tested: war, assassination, external pressure, military loss, division within the elite, fear of defection.
In summary, to date, the Iranian regime does not appear to be headed for a rapid collapse, but it also appears that it will not emerge from this war unscathed as before. The most likely outcome is that it persists, but at a high cost. This means increased dependence on the Revolutionary Guards, less political space, greater sensitivity to the opposition, and an increased tendency to reduce internal security.
To put it more plainly, this war may not end the regime, but it may end what remains of its flexibility. When a regime loses its flexibility, it may extend its life by force, but at the same time a slow internal exodus begins. That is the current Iranian paradox. The regime has not collapsed, but it is entering a worrying new phase of rigidity—rigidity that may protect Iran today but weaken it tomorrow.
The Arabic version of this article was first published by Al Jazeera Arabic.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial stance of Al Jazeera.
